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From Subsistence to Dependence: The Legacy of Reclamation and Allotment on
Quechan Indian Lands, 1700-1940
Chairperson: Dan Flores
  The Quechan Indians of southeastern California’s Fort Yuma Indian Reservation have
occupied the fertile floodplain near the confluence of the Colorado and Gila rivers for
more than 300 years. Since their southward migration to this area sometime in the
seventeenth century, tribal members supported themselves through the adoption of a
multifaceted subsistence strategy that incorporated cultivated agriculture, the semi-
cultivation of wild plants, and the gathering of wild-grown foods. To support their
agricultural endeavors, the Quechans relied on the annual flooding of the Colorado River
to provide both irrigation water and naturally fertilizing silt to the river-bottom lands on
which they raised abundant crops such as corn, beans, pumpkins, and melons.
  The implementation of the federal government’s irrigation and allotment policies of the
late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, however, undermined the Quechans’
traditional subsistence system. Despite policymakers’ visions of turning Indian people
into Jeffersonian farmers by allotting and bringing large-scale irrigation projects to their
lands, these two, deeply intertwined policies rarely fulfilled their grand promises. For the
Quechans, the ultimate impact of the turn-of-the-century allotment and irrigation policies
was to transform a once-self-sufficient, agriculturally oriented tribe into a group whose
members relied, largely, on leasing and wage work, not farming, to support themselves.
In addition, while government policies discouraged tribal farming efforts, the irrigation
system built to serve their lands undermined the environmental conditions that had
encouraged the tribe’s agriculturally based subsistence practices. During the early 1900s,
dams and levees would halt the floods on which the Quechans once relied for irrigation,
depriving tribal farmlands of all-important silt deposits carried by the river. By the mid-
1900s, seepage from the All-American Canal was threatening the viability of the entire
project. All the while, the Quechans’ removal from their traditional subsistence system—
and the nutrient-rich diet it supported—rendered tribal people ever more susceptible to
disease, ill-health, and even death. In short, the federal government’s allotment and
reclamation policies had disastrous consequences for the Quechans, promoting both
environmental and cultural changes that discouraged farming on their lands and pulled up
the roots of this historically agricultural tribe.
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1. INTRODUCTION
At the confluence of the Colorado and Gila rivers, where the southern boundaries
of California and Arizona now meet, resides a history etched deeply into the land and the
people who have occupied the region for more than 300 years. Since their southward
migration to the confluence area prior to the eighteenth century, the Quechan Indians
wrested a living from this sometimes-harsh desert region, largely by relying on the fertile
lands within the lower Colorado River’s floodplain. However, during the first half of the
twentieth century, this area—and the river that runs through it—changed inalterably, and,
with these changes, came significant impacts for the people who had long depended on
the river and its surrounding environment for their livelihood and subsistence.
The stretch of the lower Colorado occupied by the Quechans bears little
resemblance to the mighty, upper reaches of the river that have often captured the
imagination of explorers, adventurers, and nature lovers. The lower reaches of the
Colorado River contain neither the ruggedly spectacular scenery of the Grand Canyon nor
the awe-inspiring, mountainous terrain of the river’s headwaters. Even before twentieth-
century dams tamed the upper Colorado, this area represented a wholly different
landscape—one dominated by the type of arable, river-bottom lands on which the
Quechan Indians planted diverse crops, such as corn, beans, pumpkins, and melons.
While the untamed river flooded onto these lowlands each year, it did so gradually and
with heavy silt loads, providing Quechan families with fertile areas they could rely on
both for the cultivation of crops and for wild-food gathering.
The era of dam-building and reclamation, however, forever altered this fruitful
environment and the Quechans’ subsistence system upon which it relied. Today, as
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historian William deBuys points out, the lower Colorado River has transformed into a
series of concrete-lined canals, siphons, and laterals, utilized to irrigate distant fields in
the once-arid Imperial and Coachella valleys, rather than remaining a natural stream in its
own right. Below the All-American Canal—which runs across Quechan mesa lands to
feed water to the thirsty crops growing in southern California’s principal agricultural
valleys—the main channel of the Colorado is, at best, a “stagnant marsh.” Further south,
the river no longer even concludes its seaward journey into the Gulf of California. And
the annual floods that once watered and fertilized Quechan farming lands have not
occurred for nearly 100 years.1
Big stories often come from small places. The river-bottom lands held by the
Quechan Indians represent a case in point. Although this tribe occupies an often-forgotten
part of America’s third-largest—and, perhaps, most influential—state, along a stretch of
the Colorado River that no longer even reaches the sea, the alteration of the Quechans’
environment and subsistence practices over the past century reflects several of the major
themes in Native American and environmental history. Like many tribes, the federal
government’s allotment, irrigation, and agricultural policies of the late 1800s and early
1900s devastated the lands and traditional livelihood of the Quechan Indians. Examining
how these particular impacts occurred and the ways in which the tribe responded to these
altered circumstances helps elucidate the broader history of Indian people—as well as the
larger history of the Southwest—during this period.
1 William deBuys, Salt Dreams: Land & Water in Low-Down California (Albuquerque: University of
New Mexico Press, 1999), 4-8. See also Donald Worster’s Rivers of Empire, where he points out that, due
to twentieth-century irrigation construction, the Colorado River has not reached the sea since the early
1960s. Discussing the lower Colorado, Worster wrote that the river’s lower reaches had been reduced “to a
mere drainage ditch, lined and edged, carrying only runoff and local floods now and then,” while the river’s
delta had “completely dried up and disappeared.” See Donald Worster, Rivers of Empire: Water, Aridity,
and the Growth of the American West (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985), 272.
3
For most Native Americans, the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries
were dominated by federal efforts to assimilate them into the larger, American society.
The principal means by which officials attempted to achieve this goal was through the
division of tribally held lands into individually owned allotments and through the
instruction of Anglo-American farming techniques and market-driven agricultural
practices. On the arid lands lying beyond the hundredth meridian—and, particularly, in
the arid landscape of the American Southwest—this often required the construction of
large-scale irrigation systems. Through the interrelated efforts of allotment, irrigation,
and market-based agriculture, federal policymakers hoped to transform tribal people into
self-sufficient farmers, whom they could situate comfortably within their Jeffersonian
vision for American life.2
For all their seemingly benevolent intentions, though, these officials failed to
recognize several important considerations. For one, although most Native American
groups did not fit easily within the government’s overarching agrarian model, they were
already self-supporting people, who had actively managed the landscapes in which they
lived for centuries. While some groups relied mainly on hunting and gathering for their
support, others incorporated cultivated agriculture into their subsistence practices. In
making choices about how best to establish a viable livelihood, Native Americans both
altered and adapted to the varied environments they occupied. Through this process,
Indian people developed an intimate knowledge of their lands—a deep understanding that
government officials sorely lacked, no matter how much scientific training they may have
had, nor how firmly they held onto their assimilationist vision for Indian people.
2 Donald J. Pisani, Water and American Government: The Reclamation Bureau, National Water
Policy, and the West, 1902-1935 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 154-55.
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Unlike some tribes who had relied mainly on hunting and gathering for their
subsistence, the Quechan Indians already depended, to a large degree, on agriculture for
their support, prior to Euro-American contact. Despite this, the impacts of the federal
government’s turn-of-the-century allotment, irrigation, and agricultural policies proved
no less traumatic for them than for less-agriculturally-oriented tribes. Federal bureaucrats
viewed the Quechans’ subsistence-based farming techniques with disdain, believing their
lands could achieve greater levels of productivity—along with greater levels of tribal
self-sufficiency—if the Indians would, instead, adopt technologically advanced and
market-driven agricultural methods. Simply put, it was not enough that the Quechans
were already an agricultural tribe. Rather, federal officials, during the late 1800s and
early 1900s, wanted them to fit within the particular, agrarian mold they envisioned for
all Native Americans.
Allotment played a significant role in the government’s efforts to achieve this
objective. By the early 1890s, Indian agents, irrigation engineers, and agricultural
entrepreneurs were eyeing Quechan lands—which, by the mid-1880s had been set aside
as the Fort Yuma Indian Reservation—as a potential site for an irrigation project. This
plan hinged on the allotment of small parcels to individual Quechans and the sale of the
remaining, arable lands within the reservation to non-Indian settlers. The proceeds from
these land sales would be used to help pay for the construction of an irrigation project.
Moreover, the whites who settled within the reservation would help demonstrate the
advantages of Euro-American farming practices to the Indians, as well as the purported
non-Indian virtues of “industry, self-discipline, and thrift.”3
3 Pisani, Water and American Government, 154-161. Discussing the importance of these “surplus” land
sales to the reclamation program on Indian reservations throughout the West, Pisani indicated that
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Although it took several decades for these plans to come to fruition and although
the government, not private industry, became responsible for its construction, once built,
the Yuma Irrigation Project had an almost-immediate impact on the lands and lives of the
Quechan Indians. By 1909, Reclamation Service engineers had overseen the construction
of the Laguna Dam at the northeastern corner of the Fort Yuma Reservation, along with
an associated system of levees. In addition to ushering in a new era of reclamation for the
Quechans, the building of the Laguna Dam and its levee system also signaled the end of
the Colorado River’s centuries-old flooding patterns, upon which the tribe had relied to
cultivate its crops. Along with the stoppage of these yearly floods, the dam also prevented
reservation farmlands from receiving their annual dose of silt, which had been essential
for maintaining soil fertility under aboriginal conditions. The Laguna Dam, thus, stood as
a harbinger of the devastating environmental and subsistence-related impacts of large-
scale irrigation on Quechan lands.
Construction of the Yuma Irrigation Project also coincided with the development
of another government policy that further discouraged Quechan farming in the early
twentieth century—leasing Indian allotments to white renters. While this policy appeared
contradictory to the overarching goals of assimilation and self-sufficiency, historian R.
Douglas Hurt has indicated that Indian officials argued, at the time, that leasing would
provide a source of income with which Indians could later farm their own lands, as well
as providing non-Indian “agricultural examples” for tribal people to imitate.4 Again,
Reclamation Service officials argued that these proceeds could be “put to good use, as could the large
blocks of land left over after allotment.” On the Fort Yuma Reservation, this would result in the sale of
roughly half the reservation’s lands to non-Indian farmers at what Pisani called “bargain-basement prices,”
from which federal officials later deducted the cost of building the Yuma Project.
4 R. Douglas Hurt, Indian Agriculture in America: Prehistory to the Present (Lawrence: University
Press of Kansas, 1987), 142-45. For Pisani’s analysis of the government’s leasing policy, see Pisani, Water
and American Government, 158-59.
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despite this outwardly benign intent, the leasing policy proved to be a failure on the Fort
Yuma Reservation. Under its guise, white renters quickly gained control of the majority
of Quechan allotments, soon after the Yuma Project’s construction, leaving tribal people
with ever-dwindling options for agriculturally based self-support and subsistence.
Faced with the difficult prospect of learning new agricultural techniques while
having limited capital to apply to these efforts, Quechan tribal members increasingly
came to rely on wage labor and lease rentals—from which government officials would
also deduct irrigation-project costs—to support themselves. In addition to the obvious
consequences on their livelihoods, this shift away from farming also had impacts on the
Quechans’ social and family dynamics. Since the tribe’s traditional agricultural practices
had incorporated the entire family unit, the increasing dependence on wage labor in
nearby towns impacted tribal families at a fundamental level. The steady movement
toward wage labor also proved deleterious to the overall health of the tribe, leading, in
part, to lowered levels of necessary nutrients in their diets and to increased instances of
disease among the Quechans.5
While the impacts of government-built irrigation structures and government-
mandated allotment were reflected in the lives, livelihoods, and even the bodies of tribal
members, the lands of the Fort Yuma Indian Reservation manifested other ill-effects. The
substitution of subsistence-based crops such as corn, beans, melons, and pumpkins with
market-oriented ones like cotton and alfalfa—which not only placed a greater strain on
reservation soils, but also were typically planted without the benefit of crop-rotation
techniques—further undermined the naturally regenerative process that existed under
5 Clifford E. Trafzer, “Invisible Enemies: Ranching, Farming, and Quechan Indian Deaths at the Fort
Yuma Agency, California, 1915-1925,” American Indian Culture and Research Journal 21, no. 3 (1997):
83-95, 106.
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aboriginal agricultural conditions. Coupled with the earlier halting of the Colorado
River’s silt-laden annual floods, the introduction of new crops and the replacement of
traditional farming practices led to ever-declining levels of soil fertility during the early
twentieth century.
Congress dealt a final blow to the health of tribal farmlands in 1928, with the
passage of the so-called Boulder Canyon Project Act. Legislators intended the law,
principally, to serve as a means of taming upstream portions of the Colorado River, as
well as providing irrigation to farms in the Imperial and Coachella valleys, located north
of the Quechans’ lands. However, the key component of the water-distribution system
that fed these burgeoning agricultural valleys—the All-American Canal—ran directly
through the Fort Yuma Reservation.6 Although the canal was not designed to furnish a
drop of water to the reservation, seepage from it ultimately inundated the reservation,
contributing to higher levels of soil alkalinity and threatening the security of the Yuma
Project as a whole.
By the time engineers began diverting Colorado River waters into the All-
American Canal in 1940, it had become clear that the application of the government’s
allotment, irrigation, and agricultural policies on the Fort Yuma Reservation had
thoroughly undermined the traditional subsistence patterns and environment of the
Quechan Indians. Rather than creating self-sufficient farmers, modeled on a Jeffersonian
vision of agrarian independence, these policies had largely transformed a once-self-
sufficient, agricultural tribe into a group of people who relied mainly on non-agricultural
work for their subsistence. Instead of becoming Anglo-inspired farmers, the Quechans
6 deBuys, Salt Dreams, 154-63. For another discussion of the growth of the Imperial valley and the
eventual construction of the All-American Canal, see Worster, Rivers of Empire, 194-212.
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increasingly depended on wage labor and leasing to support themselves. Rather than
planting the seeds of agricultural independence, as federal officials had intended, the
policies of allotment and irrigation were ultimately responsible for pulling up the
Quechan Indians’ agricultural roots.
The devastating legacy of reclamation and allotment on the Quechan Indians’
lands and livelihoods reflects the larger history of tribal people during the late-nineteenth
and early-twentieth centuries. Since my study centers on such overarching topics as the
development of irrigation and allotment on Indian lands, it owes a significant debt to
several of the increasingly canonical works in Native American history. Among these are
books such as Frederick Hoxie’s A Final Promise: The Campaign to Assimilate the
Indians, 1880-1920, which established the basic framework for understanding the federal
government’s allotment and assimilation policies of this period. As Hoxie points out,
allotment became the primary means by which federal officials sought to incorporate
Native people into the larger American culture, through the division of tribal lands into
individually held parcels and the inculcation of Anglo notions of both private-property
ownership and market-based farming practices.7
Perhaps more important to this study, from a theoretical and topical standpoint,
are Richard White’s The Roots of Dependency and R. Douglas Hurt’s Indian Agriculture
in America. In White’s book, he laid the groundwork for examining how the efforts of
non-Indians to assimilate Native Americans into the larger, market-oriented society of
whites led both to increasing levels of dependency among tribal people and to widespread
environmental degradation on Indian lands. Importantly, White also rejected the
7 Frederick E. Hoxie, A Final Promise: The Campaign to Assimilate the Indians, 1880-1920
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, reprint of the 1984 University of Nebraska Press edition),
147-62, 169-71, 186-87.
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previously suggested notion that, prior to Euro-American contact, Native Americans had
existed either wholly outside of or as “one” with nature. Instead, White showed how the
tribal groups he studied—the Choctaws, Pawnees, and Navajos—actively managed the
landscapes within which they resided to create self-sustaining subsistence systems that
later collapsed under the weight of assimilationist forces.8
Hurt’s book provides another important theoretical foundation for my current
study. His thorough analysis of the broad developments in Native American agriculture
across various regions, over time, form the backdrop for tribal- and reservation-specific
histories of agricultural and environmental change, such as mine. In constructing this
analysis, Hurt further emphasized the central place occupied by the agrarian myth in the
federal government’s allotment-and-assimilation agenda of the late 1800s and early
1900s. In addition to underscoring the impact of allotment on Native people, he also
revealed the importance of large-scale irrigation systems—especially in the arid West—
to the government’s broader agrarian vision. On lands such as those held by the Quechan
Indians, government officials deemed this type of irrigation development necessary,
despite the fact that tribal people had successfully cultivated crops in this region for
centuries.9
While historians, thus far, have focused little attention on the post-nineteenth-
century history of the Quechan Indians themselves, ethnographer Robert Bee’s extensive
work pertaining to the tribe—especially his book-length study Crosscurrents Along the
Colorado—has also been informative for my thesis. While the principal focus of Bee’s
work centered on the impact of federal Indian policy on tribal socio-cultural and political
8 Richard White, The Roots of Dependency: Subsistence, Environment, and Social Change Among the
Choctaws, Pawnees, and Navajos (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983), xiii-xix.
9 Hurt, Indian Agriculture in America, 136-53.
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development, his study also included concise discussions about the history of allotment
and irrigation development on the Fort Yuma Reservation, which have been instructive.
Furthermore, his endnotes and bibliography proved invaluable in uncovering both
primary and secondary sources relating to the Quechan Indians.10
Two of the early-twentieth-century anthropological studies relied on by Bee have
also been extremely helpful in understanding the traditional farming methods and
subsistence system of the Quechan Indians. Anthropologist C. Daryll Forde’s 1931 article
entitled “Ethnography of the Yuma Indians” has been especially important for providing
information about the Quechans’ aboriginal agricultural practices. Since Forde conducted
his fieldwork in the late 1920s, many of his informants were alive before the introduction
of modern irrigation systems and, thus, had direct experience with traditional farming
techniques.11 Also helpful was a broader study of aboriginal subsistence systems
throughout the entire lower Colorado River basin, published by Edward Castetter and
Willis Bell in 1951. While Castetter and Bell did not devote their entire study to the
Quechans, the portions of their study pertaining to the tribe provide additional details
about their aboriginal agricultural practices.12
10 Robert L. Bee, Crosscurrents Along the Colorado: The Impact of Government Policy on the
Quechan Indians (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1981), ix-xiii, 160-66. For another book-length
study of the Quechan Indians, see Jack D. Forbes, Warriors of the Colorado: The Yumas of the Quechan
Nation and Their Neighbors (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1965). Forbes’s study is primarily an
ethnographic work that focuses on the warring aspects of the Quechans’ culture during period leading up to
American contact.
11 C. Daryll Forde, “Ethnography of the Yuma Indians,” in University of California Publications in
American Archaeology and Ethnology 28 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1931), 83-278. Note
the title of Forde’s work, which reflects the predominant use of the name “Yuma” in reference to the
Quechan Indians. While nearly all of the historical documents from the late 1800s and early 1900s refer to
the tribe as the “Yuma Indians,” I will use the term “Quechan,” as this is the tribe’s name for itself and the
name that is in use today.
12 Edward F. Castetter and Willis H. Bell, Yuman Indian Agriculture: Primitive Subsistence on the
Lower Colorado and Gila Rivers (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1951).
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In a newly released book—published in late 2009 by the University of Nevada
Press—historical geographer Robert Sauder examines the history of the Yuma Project in
Arizona and California. Using Donald Pisani’s Water and American Government as a
direct model, Sauder outlines the early difficulties associated with the development and
settlement on the Yuma Project, ultimately arguing that, by the 1920s, the project “had
turned the corner, and the agricultural possibilities so long promised were finally
beginning to materialize.” While this may have been the case for the settlers on the
Arizona portion of the Yuma Project—and, possibly, on the surplus lands within the
reservation’s Bard unit—it was certainly not true for the Quechan Indians who previously
farmed this once-fertile landscape. Although Sauder does discuss some of the negative
impacts that the Yuma Project had on the Quechans—including the allotment, sale, and
leasing of their lands—he is able to devote only a portion of his book to these issues and,
thus, he is not able to provide an in-depth account of the project’s varied, deleterious
effects on the tribe.13
Like Sauder’s book, Pisani’s Water and American Government also informed and
provided an important model for my study. The chapters in Pisani’s book devoted to the
impact of reclamation on Indian lands demonstrated, once again, the crucial role that
irrigation played in the larger campaign to assimilate Native groups into American
society. According to Pisani, reclamation, coupled with allotment and surplus-land sales,
promised to provide Indian people a direct example of Anglo-American farming
techniques, as well as instructing them in market-based agriculture. His detailed study of
the impacts of constructing large-scale irrigation projects on Pima Indian lands in
13 Robert A. Sauder, The Yuma Reclamation Project: Irrigation, Indian Allotment, and Settlement
Along the Lower Colorado River (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 2009), xviii, 19-35, 40-44, 63-65, 89-
108, 164-172, 191-194, 196-204.
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southern Arizona and on the Yakama Reservation in south-central Washington clearly
reveals how the goals of the closely connected irrigation and allotment policies rarely
fulfilled their promises for Native Americans.14
In a similar vein, David Rich Lewis’s Neither Wolf Nor Dog analyzed the ways in
which three Native American groups—Utah’s Northern Utes, the Hupas of northern
California, and the Tohono O’odham of Arizona—responded to the overwhelming forces
of the intersecting policies of allotment, irrigation, and agriculture. Lewis showed how
the application of the federal government’s agrarian vision during the late 1800s and
early 1900s altered the subsistence patterns of each group, with often-devastating “social
and environmental consequences.” In doing so, he also emphasized that these things did
not simply happen to Indians, but, rather, that the responses and actions of Indian people
to this “directed culture change” impacted how government policies played out in
different places. Like White before him, Lewis showed Indian people as active
participants in history, who both developed complex subsistence systems and responded,
in varied ways, when those long-established systems became threatened.15
Discussing his reasons for selecting the three, above-mentioned tribal groups as
case studies, Lewis indicated that he chose them, mainly, because of the diversity of the
environments they occupied and because they all “experienced some form of imposed
agrarian settlement” at roughly the same time. This provided him with a paradigm within
which to examine “a range of native behaviors and responses to the same directed
change.” Additionally, Lewis selected tribal groups that he believed had been under-
represented in the secondary literature in Native American history. By looking at Native
14 Pisani, Water and American Government, 154-201.
15 David Rich Lewis, Neither Wolf Nor Dog: American Indians, Environment, & Agrarian Change
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 3-6.
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American tribes who had “received less attention than some others,” he hoped to do his
part in “broadening the representation of native groups in the literature.”16
My intent is that this study will provide another example—using the models laid
out by Lewis and Pisani—of how the lands and the subsistence strategies of a particular
tribe, in a particular place, were impacted and forever altered by the federal government’s
allotment, irrigation, and agricultural policies of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth
centuries. As Lewis sought to do with his work, my thesis also will serve to further
broaden the representation of heretofore under-represented groups in the existing
literature on Native American history. In so doing, my hope is that the story of
reclamation and allotment’s legacy on Quechan lands will assist in understanding the
varied ways in which the government’s overarching policies of the late 1800s and early
1900s impacted Indian people and altered the environments in which they resided and
upon which they had subsisted for centuries.
16 Ibid., vii-viii.
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2. TRADITIONAL QUECHAN AGRICULTURAL PRACTICES AND THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FORT YUMA INDIAN RESERVATION, 1700-1890
Each year the river spreads out for a long distance through the
bottom lands in the season of the floods … from this irrigation,
they are greatly fertilized and have moisture for the crops which
the Indians plant in them when the water recedes, and for the
abundant harvests which they get.
Pedro Font, Spanish Missionary, 17751
Ethnohistorians are unsure about precisely when the Quechan Indians began
occupying the fertile floodplain near the confluence of the Colorado and Gila rivers.
Ethnographer Robert Bee relates a Quechan creation story involving a southward
migration from the mountains near present-day Needles, California—more than 250
river-miles north of Yuma, Arizona—where the tribe’s ancestors were created “along
with the Cocopa, Maricopa, eastern Tipai, and Mohave.” Bee suggests that these tribal
groups split off from one another—as well as merging with smaller, now-extinct
groups—sometime “between the thirteenth and eighteenth century,” ultimately occupying
distinct parts of the lower Colorado River basin. But exactly when the Quechans’
southern movement into the confluence area occurred remains a source of speculation.2
What is clear is that the first two Spanish explorers who ventured to the
convergence of the Colorado and Gila rivers—Hernando de Alarcón in 1540 and Juan de
Oñate in 1604-5—did not make specific mention of the Quechan Indians living there.
Scholars have offered varying interpretations about why neither Alarcón nor Oñate
1 Father Fray Pedro Font, “Diary of an Expedition to Monterey by Way of the Colorado River, 1775-
1776,” in Herbert Eugene Bolton, trans. and ed., Anza’s California Expeditions, vol. 4, Font’s Complete
Diary of the Second Anza Expedition (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1930), 98-99 [hereinafter
cited as Font, “Complete Diary,” in Bolton, trans. and ed., Anza’s California Expeditions, vol. 4].
2 Robert L. Bee, “Quechan,” in Alfonso Ortiz, vol. ed., Southwest, vol. 10, William Sturtevant, gen.
ed., Handbook of North American Indians (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1983), 86. See also
Bee, Crosscurrents Along the Colorado, xviii-xix. For the estimated river-mileage between Needles,
California, and Yuma, Arizona, see Castetter and Bell, Yuman Indian Agriculture, 2.
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encountered the Quechans. Edward Castetter and Willis Bell suggested the possibility
that the Quechan villages, at the time of the latter explorer’s visit, may have been situated
exclusively west of the confluence area, noting that “it is known that Oñate did not cross
the [Colorado] river.” C. Daryll Forde’s work relating to the tribe provides further
support for this theory. Forde stated that the Quechans had “always been most numerous”
on the “west bank” of the Colorado, while also noting that the Oñate expedition did not
travel to that side of the river.3
Given the fluctuating nature of Native American settlements and tribal group
identities along the lower Colorado during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,
however, it is conceivable that the Quechan Indians had simply not yet coalesced into a
distinguishable tribal unit by the early 1600s. Castetter and Bell make reference to this
idea, noting the possibility that the Quechans “had not yet come into existence as a
distinct entity” by the time of Oñate’s visit. Forde, meanwhile, proposes that the
Quechans may have pushed out the long-since-vanished Ocaras people—a group likely
related to either the Pima or Maricopa, whom Oñate reported as living within the eastern
portion of the Colorado-Gila region—from the confluence area sometime during the
seventeenth century.4
While it remains unclear exactly when the Quechans came into being as a distinct
tribal entity and when they first began occupying lands as far south as the Colorado-Gila
3 Castetter and Bell, Yuman Indian Agriculture, 48-49; and Forde, “Ethnography of the Yuma Indians,”
98-99.
4 Castetter and Bell, Yuman Indian Agriculture, 48-49; and Forde, “Ethnography of the Yuma Indians,”
98-99. See also Forbes, Warriors of the Colorado, 35-36; and Bee, Crosscurrents Along the Colorado,
xviii-xix. Note that Bee appears to stay out of the debate, simply stating anthropological evidence shows
that all Yuman tribes—including the Quechans—are likely “the result of an amalgamation of smaller bands
between the thirteenth and eighteenth century,” a process that was “fostered in part by nearness to each
other along river bottoms during the horticultural seasons, by similarity of languages, and by the effects of
incessant warfare.”
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confluence, the extant records of Spanish exploration into the region indicate that they
had a firm hold on this area by the turn of the eighteenth century, at the latest. In 1701,
nearly 100 years after the previous Spanish foray into this part of the lower Colorado
basin, Father Eusebio Kino completed a missionary expedition down the Gila River to its
junction with the Colorado, encountering several Quechan villages along the way. Kino,
who later explored the southernmost reaches of the Colorado, was impressed with the
sheer size of the river and the fertility of the lands along its banks, noting the “very rich
and abundant fields” that existed within the “pleasant lands and valleys of these new
conquests and conversions.” He also informed the Spanish crown about the “crops of
wheat, maize, frijoles, chick-peas, [and] beans” that abounded throughout the lower
Colorado basin.5
Despite his favorable impression of the indigenous fields and general agricultural
potential of this region, Kino provided scant information about the specific farming and
subsistence practices of newly encountered Indians, such as the Quechans. Moreover,
Forde points out that Kino, like Oñate before him, failed to cross the Colorado River at
the confluence area, creating the impression that the majority of Quechan villages were
located east of the river, along the lower Gila. That the tribe did, in fact, have settlements
west of the confluence at this time, however, is reflected in Kino’s letters, most notably
where they indicate that “some three hundred” Quechans swam across the Colorado to
greet his party, upon their arrival. Since Kino spent little time discussing the farming
methods employed by the tribe—or even visiting all of their villages—the records of his
5 Herbert Eugene Bolton, ed., Spanish Exploration in the Southwest, 1542-1706 (New York: Charles
Scribner’s Sons, 1916), 444-45, 450, 457-59.
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travels into the confluence area are valuable mainly for confirming that they had gained a
secure foothold in this region by the early 1700s.6
The first detailed account of Quechan subsistence practices would not surface for
another 70 years after Kino’s visit to the Colorado-Gila junction. The diaries kept by
members of Father Francisco Garcés’s missionary expedition in 1771 and Captain Juan
Bautista de Anza’s 1774-1776 campaign to secure a route to Spain’s newly opened
mission in Monterey, California, increase our knowledge of the Quechan Indians
exponentially. As Castetter and Bell point out, the Quechans “figure prominently” in
these records, since the explorers needed the tribe’s cooperation in fording the wide and
often-difficult-to-cross Colorado River. Moreover, after the Anza expedition marched
west of Quechan territory en route to the California coast, Garcés and several members of
his party remained there, in an attempt to establish two ill-fated missions in the heart of
Quechan territory.7 (Map 1)
Perhaps the most extensive depiction of the Quechans’ traditional agricultural
practices is that included in the diary of Father Pedro Font, Garcés’s chaplain who
accompanied the Anza expeditions into the confluence area in the early 1770s. After
spending time at the Quechans’ villages in November and December 1775, Font wrote a
6 Forde, “Ethnography of the Yuma Indians,” 99. Herbert Bolton, in his preface to the journals of the
Juan de Bautista de Anza expeditions of 1774-1776, provides further evidence of the secure grasp the
Quechans had on the confluence area by the eighteenth century. In fact, Bolton argued that Anza could not
have accomplished his mission without the Quechans’ assistance, since they “controlled the gateway to
California.” See Herbert Eugene Bolton, trans. and ed., Anza’s California Expeditions, vol. 1, An Outpost
of Empire (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1930), ix.
7 Castetter and Bell, Yuman Indian Agriculture, 32-33. For a lengthy discussion about the
establishment of the two Spanish missions in Quechan territory in 1780 and their destruction the following
year by the Indians, see Forbes, Warriors of the Colorado, 175-205. As Castetter and Bell succinctly wrote,
“[T]he period of Franciscan padres on the lower river came to an abrupt end July 17, 1781, when the Yuma
attacked the missions, killing all the Spaniards present including Garcés himself.” The Quechans rebuffed
subsequent Spanish efforts at re-conquest, thereby avoiding the fate of the Pueblo Indians following their
revolt 100 years earlier. Note, too, that one of the missions established by Garcés in 1780—Puerto de la
Concepción—was located at the same site later occupied by the American military garrison of Fort Yuma
and, still later, by the Fort Yuma Indian Agency.
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Map 1: Quechan Aboriginal Territory, published in Bee, “Quechan,” in Handbook of North American
Indians, vol. 10, 87.
detailed portrait of the tribe that included a clear picture of their agricultural lands and
farming methods, as they existed under aboriginal conditions. Discussing the flooding
patterns of the Colorado River, Font indicated that, each year, the river, fed by melting
snows in the mountains far to the north, “gradually” flooded the lowlands along the river.
Owing to the river’s slow rise and fall, Font claimed that “the water spreads over [the
bottom lands] so gently it does not injure them.” He also noted that the Colorado’s waters
were “fresh and good, and are not salty like those of the Gila River,” making them ideal
for agricultural use.8
8 Font, “Complete Diary,” in Bolton, trans. and ed., Anza’s California Expeditions, vol. 4, 98-99. For
basic background information about the early 1770s expeditions into Quechan territory, see Castetter and
Bell, Yuman Indian Agriculture, 32-33. Bolton was particularly impressed with Font’s diary, claiming that
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Relying on the waters furnished by these annual floods, the Quechans planted
crops such as corn, beans, melons, gourds, and wheat, from which they obtained
“abundant harvests.” Noting that these cultivated crops ensured that they had “plenty to
eat,” Font indicated that the Quechans also gathered “a great quantity” of wild plants,
such as screwbeans and mesquite, to supplement their food supply. Font attributed such
gathering, though, to a desire for “variety,” rather than “necessity.” Indeed, he marveled
at the Quechans’ relative agricultural prosperity compared with other tribes he had seen,
asserting that they “may be reputed as the most fortunate, rich, and prosperous of them
all.”9 Anza confirmed Font’s depiction, noting the “abundance” of the Quechans’ crops
and claiming that their wheat fields were “so good and well sprouted that the best
irrigated wheat in our country does not equal it.” Indeed, Anza expressed a desire that all
the tribes the Spanish had encountered “would devote themselves as industriously to
agriculture as these.”10
Font’s 1775 journal also provided a detailed portrait of the farming techniques
employed by the Quechans to secure their “abundant harvests.” Prior to the annual
flooding of the Colorado, the Indians cleared brush and “rubbish” from plots of land they
intended to plant that year. According to Font, floodwaters gradually began to rise “in
he was a “superb” chronicler of events and that his diary of the 1774-1776 Anza expeditions “is
unsurpassed in all the long history of exploration in the Western Hemisphere.” See Bolton, trans. and ed.,
Anza’s California Expeditions, vol. 1, viii.
9 Font, “Complete Diary,” in Bolton, trans. and ed., Anza’s California Expeditions, vol. 4, 98-99, 108-
110. The full list of crops cultivated by the Quechans, according to Font, were as follows: “The crops raised
by the Indians are wheat, maize, which they call Apache maize and which matures in a very short time,
orimuni beans, tepari beans, cantaloupes, watermelons, and very large calabashes of which they make dried
strips … and seeds of grasses.” In addition, Castetter and Bell argue that Font’s assertion that the Quechans
were “the most fortunate, rich, and prosperous” tribe in the region was particularly “revealing,” since that
Font had previously visited “the prosperous Pima Indians on the Gila.” See Castetter and Bell, Yuman
Indian Agriculture, 67-68.
10 “Anza’s Complete Diary, 1774,” in Herbert Eugene Bolton, trans. and ed., Anza’s California
Expeditions, vol. 2, Opening a Land Route to California (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1930),
51-52.
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March and April,” swelling over the river’s banks until June, “when it begins to go down,
and then every day it gets smaller until the end of the year.” As the floodwaters receded,
Quechan families descended from higher ground into the recently overflowed areas,
carrying wooden digging sticks, with which they would “make holes in the earth, plant
their seeds, and do nothing else to it.”11 Father Tomás Eixarch, who spent the winter of
1775-1776 in Quechan territory after Anza left the area en route to the coast, provided
more precise information about the Colorado’s floods, noting that the river began rising
as early as mid-February and gradually rose and fell until its final inundation of the
bottom lands during May and early June. On the subject of planting and cultivation
techniques, though, Eixarch’s account added little to Font’s earlier depiction.12
Because they employed so-called “crude” cultivation methods, which did not
demand highly-labor-intensive efforts, many Spanish observers considered the Quechans
“lazy,” even as they expressed awe at their agricultural production. In Font’s journal, for
example, he accused tribal people of being “very lazy” and claimed they would “reap
much larger harvests” if they simply exerted greater effort. He considered this unlikely to
occur, however, since the Quechans appeared “content” with simply “provid[ing]
themselves with plenty to eat” and since their well-watered and naturally fertilized lands
allowed them to reap harvests “with little trouble.” The fecundity of the bottom lands
near the Colorado-Gila confluence led others, like Eixarch, to speculate about the
11 Font, “Complete Diary,” in Bolton, trans. and ed., Anza’s California Expeditions, vol. 4, 98-99, 108.
12 “Eixarch’s Diary of His Winter on the Colorado, 1775-1776,” in Herbert Eugene Bolton, trans. and
ed., Anza’s California Expeditions, vol. 3, The San Francisco Colony (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1930), 347-48, 356-57, 371-77. See also Forde, “Ethnography of the Yuma Indians,” 108.
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potential crop yields that might be obtained by employing “modern methods” of
irrigation and agriculture.13
While the late-1700s journals of individuals such as Font, Eixarch, and Anza
contemplated the application of “modern” farming techniques to Quechan lands, they
also provided crucial information about the Indians’ traditional, subsistence-based
agricultural methods. Using these early accounts—as well as later reports by American
military officials and their own fieldwork among the Quechans—anthropologists C.
Daryll Forde, Edward Castetter, and Willis Bell have been able to construct a thorough
portrait of the tribe’s aboriginal subsistence patterns and farming practices. Published 20
years apart, in 1931 and 1951 respectively, both Forde’s “Ethnography of the Yuma
Indians” and Castetter and Bell’s Yuman Indian Agriculture revealed that cultivated
agriculture represented a significant component of Quechan subsistence strategies
throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In painting this picture of the
Quechans’ traditional lifeways, the work of these anthropologists provides a crucial
counterpoint to the post-reclamation era on tribal farmlands.14
As Font and Eixarch indicated in their accounts, the principal crops raised by the
Quechan Indians included several varieties of maize, teparies, black-eyed beans, semi-
cultivated wild grasses, and pumpkins, as well as Old World crops such as watermelons,
muskmelons, and winter wheat. The latter were likely obtained from other tribes who had
earlier contact with Spanish explorers. The Quechans’ primary planting period occurred
in late June and early July, after tribal members began to see the Colorado’s floodwaters
13 Font, “Complete Diary,” in Bolton, trans. and ed., Anza’s California Expeditions, vol. 4, 108; and
“Eixarch’s Diary,” in Bolton, trans. and ed., Anza’s California Expeditions, vol. 3, 371-77. See also Forde,
“Ethnography of the Yuma Indians,” 108.
14 Forde, “Ethnography of the Yuma Indians,” 88-117; and Castetter and Bell, Yuman Indian
Agriculture, 47-52, 94-178.
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receding, as well as observing the constellation Pleiades rising in the east at dawn.
Planting began once the fields were free of standing water and when the mud in the
recently inundated bottom lands “began to cake at the surface.” Beginning with
watermelons—which “formed the first planting,” according to Forde, and thus “offered a
welcome green diet” just prior to each year’s harvest—Quechan farmers used wooden
“dibbles,” or planting sticks, to dig holes in the still-damp soil, into which they sowed
their seeds. After planting watermelons, tribal members continued with the remaining
crops, often sowing beans and melons between rows of corn, while segregating plants
such as pumpkins in “special plots.”15
In addition to this yearly summer planting, the Quechans sometimes were able to
sow “[a] little corn and some melons” in February, as well as planting winter wheat after
their beans and melons had ripened at summer’s end. Regarding their periodic February
planting, Forde indicates that this transitory occurrence depended almost entirely on the
region’s “slight and unreliable spring showers.” When such showers did occur, the
Quechans could harvest two corn crops, since they seeded the rain-dampened bottom
lands with a fast-ripening variety of corn known as “Apache maize,” which took only two
months to mature. In addition, during this period just before the annual spring floods, the
Indians harvested the wheat crops they had planted the previous fall. Quechan farmers
15 Forde, “Ethnography of the Yuma Indians,” 107-12; and Castetter and Bell, Yuman Indian
Agriculture, 94-130. Forde quotes one of his informants, Hipa Norton, regarding the importance of
constellations in determining planting times. In particular, Norton, who was 66 at the time of Forde’s
fieldwork, indicated that lands were typically ready for planting “when the Pleiades first appeared in the
east in the morning (late June)” and that seeds needed to be in the ground before the constellation Orion
“first appeared at dawn, for plants sown later would not get enough water from the ground.”
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also added the cultivation of wild grasses—generally in “less fertile” areas—to the
already-extensive list of crops they planted, tended, and harvested throughout the year.16
Prior to their annual planting, Quechan families undertook an extensive amount of
work to identify and clear fields for cultivation. When selecting lands for planting, tribal
members most often sought out areas that displayed the following characteristics: open
lands that contained “few if any trees”; lands that did not support the growth of salt grass,
nor exhibit the “frosty appearance” or salty taste of saline lands; and, last, areas over
which the river’s annual floods would flow more rapidly, since stagnant water rendered
soils “heavy and subject to bad cracking.” Once they selected cultivable plots, tribal
members used a combination of fire and hand-clearing techniques to ready their soon-to-
be-flooded fields for planting. As Castetter and Bell succinctly put it, they “sought out a
suitable place, then in spring broke down and burned all shrubby growth,” an annual
activity that consisted largely of “gathering and burning the weeds and trash” that had
accumulated on the lowlands.17
These authors also revealed that the Quechans further altered and managed the
river-bottom landscape where they resided by implementing basic irrigation techniques.
Discussing this “modified method of irrigation,” Castetter and Bell stated that they found,
during their late-1930s fieldwork, “[f]airly large-sized swales,” angling off “from near
the edge of the river and just a little above river level,” which their informants told them
“ran for long distances over most of their territory.” Quechan informants also helped
16 Forde, “Ethnography of the Yuma Indians,” 107-13; and Bee, Crosscurrents Along the Colorado, 3-
4. Castetter and Bell provide a broad description of the typical planting and water-use practices common
among the tribes of the lower Colorado River basin, as well as providing some, more detailed information
for specific tribes, such as the Quechans. Their depiction of these practices does not differ materially from
Forde’s. See Castetter and Bell, Yuman Indian Agriculture, 131-32, 144-56.
17 Castetter and Bell, Yuman Indian Agriculture, 139-41. Castetter and Bell also differentiated between
the “original clearing” of a selected plot and the “annual clearing” that occurred on previously planted
fields, with the former involving more extensive work than the latter.
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reconstruct how this irrigation system operated. During low-water periods in the winter
months, tribal farmers built a series of earthen dams across these swales, as well as log
dikes in the river bed, which fed water into the swales during the Colorado’s annual
floods. The system began functioning once flood waters entered the swales:
When the first section of the swale had filled, it overflowed and
irrigated adjacent land. Then the first earth dam was broken and
the water filled the section, and so on until a considerable
amount of land was irrigated. In some years the Indians were
able to get water into these swales, in others not … but at best
this was an inefficient method of irrigation, as lands were not
leveled and therefore the soil was watered very unevenly.18
Although Castetter and Bell conducted their fieldwork on Quechan lands well
after the introduction of modern irrigation systems and Anglo farming practices to the
region, their informants told them this swale-based irrigation was “an ancient practice.”
The authors also claimed that they were “not at all convinced that it is a historic
development,” noting a similar practice of constructing “rudimentary diversion dams”
among the Western Apaches. Despite the apparently aboriginal origin of the Quechans’
“modified” irrigation system, Castetter and Bell were careful not to overstate its
importance. Discussing the general picture of pre-contact agricultural practices along the
lower Colorado, the authors asserted that even the atypical example of the Quechans did
not reflect “conventional artificial canal and ditch irrigation.” Moreover, they drew a
sharp contrast between the basic irrigation techniques of the lower Colorado tribes and
those of the Pima Indians of southern Arizona, who displayed a far more sophisticated
“irrigated cultivation.”19
18 Castetter and Bell, Yuman Indian Agriculture, 133-34. The authors stated that this swale-based
irrigation system functioned best when “the level of the river rose somewhat during the winter or early
spring months.” They also indicated that, in some years, “water overflowed from the river into the swales
without the necessity of constructing a dam.”
19 Castetter and Bell, Yuman Indian Agriculture, 131-34.
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The most important factor in traditional Quechan agriculture, by all accounts, was
the Colorado River itself. The river’s silt-laden annual floods not only provided water to
the lands on which the tribe planted its crops, but also fertilized them naturally, creating
what Castetter and Bell referred to as an agricultural “oasis” within an otherwise-arid
landscape. Anthropological studies reveal that the Colorado’s annual silt load was “far
higher than that of the Mississippi or the Nile,” as well as being nitrogen-rich and
“exceptionally free from alkali salts.” These unique conditions allowed aboriginal
agriculture throughout the lower Colorado River basin—including on Quechan lands at
the river’s junction with the Gila—to flourish. Indeed, Castetter and Bell marveled that
tribal people throughout the region had “cultivated the bottom lands for hundreds of years
without adding manures or any other kind of fertilizer to the soil.” This, they argued, was
possible “only because of the fertilizing elements deposited by the annual overflow.”20
The river’s yearly flooding also had significant impacts on the location and
distribution of Quechan fields. Because the Colorado flooded with such regularity and at
such great distances from its regular channel—Anza estimated that the river inundated
lands “half a league beyond each bank of the river, and in some places twice that
distance,” or nearly three miles—it continually altered the landscape through which it
flowed. These “marauding” annual floods made it impossible to establish permanent
fields, “since the waters changed the contour of the land from year to year.” At times,
floodwaters would transform a once-productive plot into an “uncultivable” area the
20 Forde, “Ethnography of the Yuma Indians,” 88-91; and Castetter and Bell, Yuman Indian
Agriculture, 11-13, 131-32. Discussing the chemical components that contributed to the soil-fertilizing
content of the Colorado’s floodwaters, Castetter and Bell indicated that, in addition to nitrogen, the river
also carried large amounts of potassium and phosphorus. However, nitrogen and other “organic matter”
constituted the most “significant substances in the flood waters,” since these elements represented “the
chief deficiencies of the desert soils” in the region.
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following year. The river’s floods, thus, required constant adaptations by the Quechans in
their efforts to maintain a viable livelihood in an ever-changing agricultural landscape.21
Annual flooding also determined, to a great extent, the settlement patterns of the
Quechans themselves. Since they relied on the bottom lands lying within the Colorado’s
floodplain to raise their crops, tribal members tended to live much of the year in
temporary, open-frame houses near the banks of the river, extending north and south of
the confluence area, as well as eastward along the Gila. During the annual flooding
period, Quechan families abandoned these habitations, moving their homes away from
the about-to-be-inundated floodplain into the “nearby uplands” until the river began to
recede. Because of this, Forde noted that many Quechan settlements were located “near
projecting spurs of the mesas which approach closely to the river,” thereby necessitating
less significant seasonal movements between habitation areas. The continual shifting of
tribal settlements and planting areas reflected the highly adaptive nature of the Quechans’
traditional livelihood, which required almost-constant responses to and alterations of an
often-unpredictable environment.22
The tribe’s ability to undertake such significant and recurrent adaptations to the
lower Colorado River landscape lay in the structure of the Quechans’ traditional family
unit. As anthropologist Robert Bee has shown, these “composite” families—which
consisted of both parents and their children, as well as grandparents, aunts, uncles, and
cousins—formed the “basic cooperative group” for accomplishing agricultural tasks,
including the seasonal migrations necessitated by the river’s annual floods. Although
21 Castetter and Bell, Yuman Indian Agriculture, 38-39. For estimates of the mileage contained in a
typical league, see Bolton, trans. and ed., Anza’s California Expeditions, vol. 4, vii, where he states that
“Anza’s leagues” were “generally about three miles,” while Font’s were typically “about 2.6 miles.”
22 Forde, “Ethnography of the Yuma Indians,” 100-102, 120; and Bee, Crosscurrents Along the
Colorado, 4, 22-23.
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earlier anthropological studies indicated that it was common among the region’s tribes to
segregate agricultural duties by gender, Bee’s work revealed that, among the Quechans,
“the division of labor was by no means strictly sexual.” While men generally performed
“heavier work” such as clearing and digging and women were often responsible for
sowing seeds and storing harvests, Bee argued that “both women and men could work at
agricultural chores of their choosing.”23
These extended family units also played a fundamental role in the Quechans’
other essential subsistence activity, outside of cultivated agriculture—gathering wild
foods. Of primary importance were mesquite and screwbeans, the “sweetish pods” of
which tribal members typically “ground into a pulp, dried, then ground into flour and
mixed with water to make cakes that could last indefinitely.” The long-lasting nature of
the foods prepared from wild plants made them especially important during pre-harvest
periods, when cultivated crops were generally unavailable, and during other times of
intermittent food shortage. Although both mesquite and screwbeans grew abundantly
throughout the lower Colorado’s floodplain, the more-drought-resistant mesquite trees
spread further into the uplands, making their pods more consistently available and, thus,
more popular among the Quechans. Other wild plants gathered by the tribe included
seeds such as pigweed, quail brush, barnyard grass, and ironwood, as well as wolfberries
and the roots of desert lilies and cattails. Anthropologists, though, considered these other
23 Bee, Crosscurrents Along the Colorado, 4-5; and Bee, “Quechan,” in Handbook of North American
Indians, vol. 10, 87-89. Bee argued that the Quechans’ “extended family household[s]” represented “an
optimal unit of agricultural exploitation,” since they “provided a cooperating work force large enough to
lessen the amount of heavy individual labor” but remained “small enough to reduce conflict over personal
versus group economic interests.”
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wild foods to be “casual adjuncts” to the more important mesquite and screwbeans,
indicating that they were “employed largely for variety.”24
Gathering wild plants was a cross-generational activity for the Quechans. Once
mesquite beans started to ripen in mid-June, women and children began spending entire
days—and, later in summer, several-day outings, accompanied by men for protection—
gathering these and other wild-plant foods. These activities continued through July and
August, when screwbean pods ripened, and extended into the early fall. Tribal members
collected their gathered produce in “large carrying nets,” drying it on rooftops upon their
arrival home. Once dried, the gathered plants were stored in large, cylindrical bins,
situated near the uplands where most of the tribe’s gathering activities took place. As
with their cultivated fields, the Quechans did not acknowledge individual ownership of
mesquite groves or other wild plants, unless they were located near established village
sites. That said, family groups often returned to the same general areas for their annual
gathering activities.25
While anthropologists have been unable to determine precisely the proportion of
cultivated crops to wild-grown foods in the Quechan diet during aboriginal times, it is
clear that their agricultural activities were “no mere accessory to the collecting of wild
fruits.” Spanish accounts of “abundant” harvests of corn, beans, pumpkins, and melons
reveal the importance of farming among the Quechans and the significant degree to
24 Bee, Crosscurrents Along the Colorado, 4; and Castetter and Bell, Yuman Indian Agriculture, 179-
211. Castetter and Bell’s informants told them that “no other wild food compared in importance” with
mesquite and screwbean pods, indicating that these plants “virtually supplied the living through the winter
and until the next cultivated crop was ready.” These authors’ work also contains an extensive list of wild
seeds, fruits, and roots gathered and eaten by the tribes of the lower Colorado River basin. For this list and
a summary discussion of the use of these wild plants by each group, see Castetter and Bell, Yuman Indian
Agriculture, 187-211.
25 Castetter and Bell, Yuman Indian Agriculture, 179-86; Forde, “Ethnography of the Yuma Indians,”
115-17; and Bee, Crosscurrents Along the Colorado, 4.
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which they depended on it for their subsistence. These accounts are supported by mid-
nineteenth century correspondence of American military officials, who issued equally
favorable reports about the Quechans’ agricultural endeavors. In their effort to estimate
the relative amounts of cultivated agriculture and gathering activities among the lower
Colorado River tribes, meanwhile, Castetter and Bell suggested that farming likely
comprised anywhere from one-third to one-half of the Quechan Indians’ aboriginal
subsistence.26
The exact percentages of cultivated agriculture and wild-plant gathering within
the tribe’s traditional subsistence strategies likely changed from year to year, as well. As
anthropologists have indicated, the annual overflow of the Colorado River was
sometimes smaller than average and, in rare instances, did not occur at all. Obviously,
years of low flooding led to lower crop yields, which, in turn, required a greater reliance
on wild plants. In contrast, during years of adequate flooding—which were far more
typical than low-flood years in pre-contact times—tribal members enjoyed the fruits of
their more abundant yields and adjusted their gathering activities accordingly. Indeed,
Forde pointed out that gathered plants such as mesquite and screwbeans were “very
important” to the Quechan food supply, since they “insured against starvation in years of
irregular flood.” Similarly, Bee suggested that gathered plants “were probably the main
source of sustenance when there were crop failures or occasional food scarcities between
harvests.”27
26 Castetter and Bell, Yuman Indian Agriculture, 73-74, 179-81; Forde, “Ethnography of the Yuma
Indians,” 115-16; and Bee, Crosscurrents Along the Colorado, 4. Note, however, that Castetter and Bell’s
rough estimates of cultivated-to-gathered subsistence activities are “as of the middle of [the nineteenth]
century,” and, thus, may reflect the impact of Euro-American exploration and settlement from the 1700s
through the mid-1800s.
27 Castetter and Bell, Yuman Indian Agriculture, 7-8, 73-74, 179-81; Forde, “Ethnography of the Yuma
Indians,” 108, 115-16; and Bee, Crosscurrents Along the Colorado, 4. Castetter and Bell note several
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Despite the yearly fluctuations in the exact proportions of the Quechans’ farming
and gathering activities, their overall subsistence strategies remained quite constant. They
relied on a flexible combination of cultivated agriculture and wild-food gathering, which
they modified according to the changing conditions of the landscape they inhabited.
Anthropologists have situated the tribe’s agricultural efforts within the larger “maize-
beans-pumpkins complex” that dominated much of the present-day Southwest prior to
Anglo contact. While the Quechans’ aboriginal farming output may not have matched
that of other agricultural tribes like the Pima and Pueblo Indians, they supplemented it
with an impressive array of gathered plants that helped them subsist even in years of low
cultivated-crop yields. In so doing, they displayed a keen ability both to respond to and to
actively manage the often-harsh, desert environment in which they resided, adapting their
subsistence strategies to often-changing conditions.28
These traditional subsistence practices also exhibited a marked degree of stability
from the late eighteenth century to the mid-nineteenth century. For roughly 70 years after
the destruction of the Spanish missions near the confluence of the Colorado and Gila
rivers, the Quechans’ indigenous lifeways experienced surprisingly little disruption.
Although “various trappers, adventurers, and military detachments” passed through their
territory during the early 1800s, these migrations had only slight impacts on the tribe.
instances when the Colorado’s floods were either insufficient for the Quechans to produce large crops or
did not occur at all. These included the years 1775, 1851, and 1888. However, the authors also indicate that
years of no overflow were “not common” prior to large-scale non-Indian settlement in the region, noting
that “when whites began to settle on some of these Indian lands [throughout the lower Colorado] and to
utilize river water for irrigation, the overflow available to the Indians ceased to be adequate.”
28 Castetter and Bell, Yuman Indian Agriculture, 97-99; and Forde, “Ethnography of the Yuma
Indians,” 113. Comparing the Quechans’ agricultural activities with broader aboriginal agricultural trends
throughout the Southwest, Forde claimed that the Quechans’ farming could be “regarded as an
impoverished version of the Pueblo type of agriculture.” For discussions about the importance of the
“maize-beans-pumpkins complex” and the pre-contact agricultural practices of tribes such as the Pima and
Pueblo Indians, see Hurt, Indian Agriculture in America, 42-54; and Pisani, Water and American
Government, 193.
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This situation changed quickly, though, after the United States’ annexation of the present-
day Southwest in the late 1840s and early 1850s. The rush of gold seekers and other
emigrants to California and the attendant establishment of military posts throughout the
region brought an increasing, non-Indian presence into the area that would fundamentally
affect the Quechans’ environment and aboriginal subsistence patterns in the coming
decades.29
The most concrete development, in this regard, was the construction of the
military post of Fort Yuma, just west of the Colorado’s junction with the Gila, between
1850 and 1852. Its establishment signaled the commencement of the American
government’s dominant influence over the lands and livelihoods of the Quechan Indians.
In just over 30 years, tribal members would see reservation boundaries formally plotted
over their lands. And, within two generations, Quechan farmers would witness the
construction of a modern irrigation system that would forever alter the flooding and
fertilizing patterns of the river around which they centered their traditional livelihood.
The presence of the military post—and the non-Indian influx it encouraged and
safeguarded—also led to additional observations of Quechan farming practices, as well as
speculation about the agricultural prospects of the fertile bottom lands they occupied. The
first such report—written by the fort’s commander, Samuel Heintzelman, in July 1853—
offered an account of Quechan agriculture that was, perhaps, most notable for its
similarity to those written by Spanish missionaries and explorers in the 1770s.30
Like Font, Anza, and Eixarch before him, Heintzelman portrayed a scene of
relative agricultural abundance on Quechan lands. He claimed that the “Cu-cha-no[s]”
29 Bee, Crosscurrents Along the Colorado, 2.
30 Bee, Crosscurrents Along the Colorado, 2-4; 14-20; Bee, “Quechan,” in Handbook of North
American Indians, vol. 10, 94-95; and Forde, “Ethnography of the Yuma Indians,” 110.
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lived exclusively along the Colorado, with villages extending an estimated “sixty miles
above its junction with the Gila” and “forty or fifty miles” below the confluence.
Discussing the “excellent land” occupied by the tribe, the military commander indicated
that the Colorado’s floodplain was “wide and fertile, covered with a heavy growth of
arrow wood, grease wood, cotton wood, willow of three varieties, and mesquite of two,
the flat pod and screw bean.” He also noted the “very muddy” nature of the river, which
gave it a “yellowish brown” hue and contributed to the deposition of an “immense deal of
earthy matter” onto nearby lowlands, during its annual spring overflow.31
Heintzelman’s representation of the Quechans’ cultivation practices also echoed
that of his Spanish forebears. He indicated that, in late June or early July “or so soon as
the waters of the annual rise commence to subside,” the Indians seeded the Colorado’s
recently flooded bottom lands, noting that “[n]o vegetables will grow beyond the
influence of the overflow.” According to Heintzelman, the principal crops sown during
this early-summer planting season included “water melons, musk melons, pumpkins, corn
and beans.” He also painted a brief, but detailed, portrait of the Quechans’ agricultural
methods in the mid-1800s—a portrait that bore an uncanny resemblance to that depicted
by the Spanish in the late eighteenth century:
Their agriculture is simple. With an old axe (if they are so
fortunate as to possess one), knives and fire, a spot likely to
overflow is cleared. After the waters subside, small holes are dug
at proper intervals, a few inches deep, with a sharpened stick,
having first removed the surface for an inch or two, as it is apt to
cake. The ground is tasted, and if salt the place rejected; if not,
the seeds are then planted. No further care is required but to
31 Captain S.P. Heintzelman, Fort Yuma, to Major E.D. Townsend, Assistant Adjutant General, July
15, 1853, in House, Indian Affairs on the Pacific, 34th Cong., 3d sess., 1857, H. Ex. Doc. 76, serial 906,
36-38.
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remove the weeds which grow most luxuriantly wherever the
water has been.32
In addition to this early-summer planting, the Quechans sowed wheat in the fall
for spring harvest, as well as growing “grass seed for food.” Heintzelman also noted the
importance of gathered plants, such as mesquite and screwbeans, in the Quechans’ diet.
His discussion about the preparation of the wild foods that the tribe gathered and the
grasses they cultivated indicated that the two processes were almost identical. Tribal
members ground gathered and cultivated seeds, pods, and roots into flour, to which they
added water, then “kneaded into a mass, and then dried in the sun.” Once dried, this meal
could keep for an entire year, providing the Indians with an important supplement to their
food supply between annual harvests. Relying on this combination of cultivated and wild
foods, the Quechans, thus, were able to support themselves with relatively little
difficulty—a situation that had changed little since the Spanish missionary period.33
But, while Heintzelman’s July 1853 report revealed a remarkable level of
consistency in the Quechans’ traditional subsistence practices, it also portended many of
the wholesale changes that would affect the tribe’s lands in the coming years. For one,
Heintzelman not only noted the subsistence-based crops grown by the Quechans, but also
speculated about the types of market-based agricultural goods that might flourish in the
confluence area. In addition to crops such as wheat and corn, which the Indians were
already cultivating, the military commander believed that cotton, sugarcane, and rice
could grow in the region. Moreover, he deemed the area’s climate and soils to be “well
adapted to the cultivation of the vine, fig, and tropical fruits.” Heintzelman also hoped to
encourage a more market-oriented agriculture among the Quechans, noting that they had
32 Ibid., 36-37.
33 Ibid., 37, 49.
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already “made great preparations to supply us with vegetables” and that they would soon
“become accustomed to get from us things they now consider luxuries, but which will
become necessaries.”34
Equally important for the future of Quechan lands were Heintzelman’s
discussions about the imminent development of transportation networks through the
region. After noting the protracted efforts to establish the garrison at Fort Yuma—a
nearly two-year process that included a brief abandonment of the post in response to
reported “threat[s]” from the Quechans—Heintzelman indicated that, by mid-1853, the
fort had solidified into “a permanent station” that he deemed the “most important in
southern California,” since it protected “the southern route of emigration” into the state.
In addition to protecting gold-seeking and land-hungry Americans from the “numerous
tribes of warlike Indians” who inhabited the area, Heintzelman stated that Fort Yuma also
“command[ed] the passage by land” into Mexico, as well as ensuring the continued
expansion of steamboat traffic along the lower Colorado River. He further indicated that
others had spoken enthusiastically about the confluence area as a possible “point on the
great Pacific railroad.”35
Less than a year after Heintzelman wrote his report, this vision of a railroad route
through the lower Colorado basin came one step closer to realization. In early 1854, a
crew of topographical engineers, under the command of Lieutenant Amiel Whipple,
crossed a wide swath of the United States’ recently acquired lands in the present-day
34 Ibid., 38, 50.
35 Ibid., 34, 38, 51. Heintzelman appeared to hold greater hopes for the expansion of steamboat
navigation along the lower Colorado than for the possibility of constructing a railroad directly through
Quechan territory. Discussing the ongoing efforts to navigate the river, he indicated that “light draft” boats
had already ascended the Colorado, from its mouth “as far as its junction with the Gila.” Heintzelman
believed the river was, without question, “navigable to the great canon [Grand Canyon], one hundred and
fifty miles (at least) above its junction with the Gila.” Meanwhile, he expressed “doubt” about “whether a
route for a railroad can be found along the [Colorado].”
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Southwest. The previous year, Congress had ordered this expeditionary force to conduct
surveys to determine the “most practicable” route for a transcontinental railroad,
stretching from the Mississippi River to the Pacific Ocean. Although Whipple’s party did
not pass directly through the confluence area, it did encounter several Quechan Indians
during its time spent at the Mohave villages north of Fort Yuma, near the Colorado’s
junction with the Bill Williams River.36
These Quechans’ experiences with members of the Whipple expedition served as
a further portent of the momentous changes that would confront the tribe in the ensuing
decades. When a “great chief” of the tribe arrived at the Mohave villages in late-February
1854, Whipple’s party informed him of their objectives and outlined the “benefits that
would result to them from opening a highway for emigrants, or a railroad, and thus
creating a market for the produce of their fertile valley.” In response, the unnamed leader
promised Whipple that the Quechans would offer the party “every assistance in their
power to accomplish the objects of our mission.” The leader also reportedly “expressed
his satisfaction at the prospect of establishing a system of trade with the whites.” Along
these lines, Whipple indicated that the two Quechans who had previously encamped at
the Mohave villages had already witnessed some of the benefits of the “market” system
he hoped to introduce to the lower Colorado River tribes, noting the “eager” exchange of
cultivated crops and American goods that had occurred only two days before the visit of
the “great chief.”37
36 Lieutenant A.W. Whipple, “Report of Explorations for a Railway Route Near the Thirty-Fifth
Parallel of North Latitude, from the Mississippi River to the Pacific Ocean,” Part 1, Itinerary, in Senate,
Reports of Explorations and Surveys to Ascertain the Most Practicable and Economical Route for a
Railroad from the Mississippi River to the Pacific Ocean, vol. 3, 33d Cong., 2d sess., 1856, H. Ex. Doc. 78,
serial 760, 109-128.
37 Whipple, “Report of Explorations for a Railway Route …,” Part 1, Itinerary, in Senate, Reports of
Explorations and Surveys…, 114-17. Whipple reported that there were two Quechan Indians encamped at
36
Like Heintzelman before him, Whipple remarked optimistically about the future
prospects of the lower Colorado region. He stated that the valley lands along this portion
of the river could “scarcely be surpassed” for the cultivation of “all kinds of grain and
vegetables,” asserting that the Mormons “had made a great mistake in not occupying the
valley of the Colorado.” In addition to these crops, Whipple believed that the river’s
“wide and rich bottom-lands” could support the growth of cotton, tobacco, as well as
“sugar, and possibly rice.” He further pointed out that, in addition to the government’s
railroad survey, officials were also undertaking efforts to expand steamboat traffic along
the lower Colorado. Taken together, Whipple argued that these potential developments
left little doubt that, “before many years pass away, a great change will take place”
amongst the Indians living along the lower Colorado River.38
Yet another sign of the imminent transformation of the lands and livelihoods of
the region’s tribes came in the winter of 1857-58, when Lieutenant Joseph Ives—who
had accompanied Whipple’s party four years earlier—headed a military and scientific
expedition to determine the navigability of the lower Colorado. Upon his arrival at Fort
Yuma, Ives described its grounds, indicating that the fort was “built upon the west side of
the [Colorado] river, on the top of a gravelly spur that extends with a steep bluff to the
edge of the stream.” While Ives was not particularly impressed with the garrison itself—
the Mohave villages on February 25, 1854, when his party had established a “market” at which the whites
exchanged items such as beads, blankets, and cloth for corn, beans, flour, and “great numbers of pumpkins”
with the Indians. Moreover, he indicated that these Quechans had visited the Mohaves in hopes of securing
“a fresh supply of provisions,” since they had “exhausted” their supply of cultivated crops “in trade with
the troops at Fort Yuma.” After conducting another round of “general trading” two days later, Whipple also
commented favorably on the “shrewd” trading skills of the lower Colorado tribes, noting that they “would
part with no article without a really valuable compensation.”
38 Whipple, “Report of Explorations for a Railway Route …,” Part 1, Itinerary, in Senate, Reports of
Explorations and Surveys …, 124-25. Regarding the expansion of steamboat traffic, Whipple indicated that
“steamers of light draught” were “already carry[ing] supplies for the troops as high as Fort Yuma” and that,
from Fort Yuma “to the mouth of Rio Virgen,” the depth of the Colorado appeared sufficient “to allow the
passage of small steamboats.”
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stating that “Fort Yuma is not a place to inspire one with regret at leaving”—he praised
its success in placing the once-feared Quechans “into entire subjection.” Moreover, its
presence had encouraged the development of “an anticipated town,” then called Colorado
City, which was situated on the east bank of the river, just opposite the fort.39
Although this newly established non-Indian settlement contained “only a few
straggling buildings” at the time of Ives’s visit, its prime location across from Fort Yuma
and adjacent to the southern emigrant trail’s river crossing ensured its rapid development.
Along with the federal government’s ongoing efforts to increase steamboat traffic on the
river and to build a transcontinental railway just north of the military post, the almost-
certain growth of the town provided further evidence of the looming challenges to the
Quechans’ traditional lifeways. Ives’s report also intimated at the likelihood of a further
alteration of the river-bottom landscape occupied by the tribe. While he indicated that
Quechan farmers had continued their traditional practice of cultivating the Colorado’s
fertile lowlands following the river’s annual overflow, Ives stated that he and other
members of his expedition firmly believed that the construction of a “well-conducted
system of irrigation” on their lands would significantly increase the area’s agricultural
productivity.40
39 Lieutenant J.C. Ives, “General Report,” Part 1, in House, Report Upon the Colorado River of the
West, Explored in 1857 and 1858 by Lieutenant Joseph C. Ives, Corp of Topographical Engineers, 36th
Cong., 1st sess., 1861, H. Ex. Doc. 90, serial 1058, 7-8, 42-44. Discussing the reportedly aggressive nature
of the Quechan Indians toward California-bound emigrants, Ives stated that, “a few years ago,” they were
“the most powerful and warlike of the Colorado tribes.” While Whipple had also noted the “many accounts
of the hostility of the Yumas” given by “numerous emigrants” in the late 1840s, he was far less convinced
of their veracity than Ives. In particular, Whipple claimed that investigations into these emigrants’ accounts
revealed that the whites had often been “the first aggressors,” in many instances having stolen “maize
belonging to the Indians,” even after the Quechans had offered them “great assistance” in crossing the
Colorado. See Whipple, “Report of Explorations for a Railway Route …,” Part 3, “Report Upon the Indian
Tribes,” in Senate, Reports of Explorations and Surveys …, 18.
40 Ives, “General Report,” Part 1, in House, Report Upon the Colorado River of the West …, 42-44, 53-
55. Discussing this proposed irrigation system further, Ives claimed that a modern system would “wash out
the salt” from those areas within the Colorado’s bottom lands that were reportedly “so charged with alkali
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Despite the overwhelming and intersecting forces confronting the Quechans in the
mid-1800s, wholesale changes to their aboriginal lifeways did not occur immediately. In
part, this was because of the still-uncertain prospects of the developing transportation
networks and settlements in the confluence area. In 1862, for example, larger-than-
average spring floods washed out the fledgling community of Colorado City. Settlers,
though, soon rebuilt the town—later renamed Yuma—and, by the early 1870s, it was
flourishing as a major stop for steamboats plying the lower Colorado. Meanwhile,
although steam shipments gradually became established on the river by the early 1870s,
the railroad’s much-anticipated entry into Quechan territory did not come to fruition until
1877, when the Southern Pacific Railway laid its tracks through Yuma. The halting
implementation of these changes during the 1860s and 1870s rendered their overall
impact slightly less jarring for the Indians’ traditional livelihood.41
Additional developments occurred in the early 1880s, however, that posed further
challenges to the continuance of the Quechans’ aboriginal subsistence patterns. By 1883,
federal officials had concluded that the military’s presence at Fort Yuma was no longer
needed to protect the growing town of Yuma or the now-well-established river crossing
into California. As Robert Bee stated, the previously feared Quechans’ had become “so
docile” that the post simply was deemed “no longer necessary.” As preparations for the
closure of the garrison proceeded, President Chestur Arthur issued an executive order in
July 1883, formally establishing a reservation for the Quechan Indians on the east bank of
the Colorado, in what was then Arizona Territory. Situated as it was, the July 1883
as to be unproductive.” Meanwhile, noting the Quechans’ proclivity for farming, Ives claimed that they
cultivated “the better portions” of their “fertile” lands and that, despite being “warlike,” they were also
“domestic, and seldom leave their own valleys.”
41 Bee, Crosscurrents Along the Colorado, 19. For the date of the completion of the Southern Pacific
Railroad through Yuma, see Castetter and Bell, Yuman Indian Agriculture, 4.
39
reservation was located on the opposite side of the river from the majority of the
Quechans’ villages.42
Whether the initial designation of the Fort Yuma Indian Reservation resulted
merely from an error or something more ignoble remains unclear. However, President
Arthur promptly revoked the July 1883 order, six months after its promulgation, in
response to a series of reports expressing the unified opposition of military officials,
Indian agents, and tribal members to the establishment of the reservation on the Arizona
side of the river. The new boundaries outlined by executive order on January 9, 1884,
encompassed lands wholly on the west bank of the Colorado, where tribal leaders had
requested that the reservation be created. In a letter discussing the meetings he held with
the tribe in October 1883 about the proposed creation of the Arizona reservation, the
agent in charge of the Quechans claimed these meetings were the “largest” of any
previous council with the tribe. He further indicated that the Quechans’ principal chief,
Pasqual, spoke vehemently against the tribe’s “removal” from their traditional lands and
that the tribal members present voted unanimously against moving to a reservation on the
Arizona side of the river.43
In helping to secure this alteration of reservation boundaries, the Quechans
avoided the fate of numerous other tribes throughout the West, many of whom were
42 Executive Order of July 6, 1883, in Charles J. Kappler, ed., Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties, vol. 1
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1904), 831-32; and Bee, Crosscurrents Along the Colorado, 19-20.
43 John Clark, Agent, Colorado River Agency, to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs [CIA],
November 12, 1883, Letter 21406-1883, Entry 91, Letters Received by the Office of Indian Affairs, 1881-
1907 [LR 1881-1907], Record Group 75, Records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs [RG 75], National
Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C. [NARA I]. For additional letters revealing the
widespread opposition to the establishment of the Fort Yuma Indian Reservation on the Arizona side of the
Colorado, see Lieutenant George Anderson, Yuma, Arizona, to the Assistant Adjutant General, Department
of Arizona, August 20, 1883, Letter 17345-1883; and Brigadier General George Crook, Headquarters,
Department of Arizona, to the Assistant Adjutant General, Military Division of the Pacific, August 27,
1883, Letter 17345-1883; both in Entry 91, LR 1881-1907, RG 75, NARA I.
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forced to leave their aboriginal lands for reservations located well outside their long-
occupied territories. However, as had been the case with the American military post in
the 1850s, the creation of the Fort Yuma Indian Reservation reflected the increasing
control of the federal government over the lands and livelihoods of the Quechan Indians.
The reservation created on the California side of the river in 1884 encompassed roughly
45,000 acres, including a swath of fertile, agricultural lands along the river valley. The
remainder of the reservation—encompassing roughly 30,000 acres—comprised non-
irrigable mesa lands that lay north and west of the river, stretching from the reservation’s
northeastern corner to its southwestern edge.44 (Map 2)
Although the changes that occurred throughout the region from the 1850s to the
1880s had rendered the preservation of their aboriginal subsistence practices more
difficult, the Quechans were able, by and large, to maintain their traditional lifeways. As
they had shown in their responses to the ever-shifting landscape of the lower Colorado
during pre-contact times, tribal members displayed a keen ability to adapt to the rapidly
changing circumstances they faced during the late-nineteenth century. While some
yielded to the lure of the often-low-paying, wage-labor opportunities in nearby Yuma,
most continued to survive by planting in the Colorado’s flood-moistened bottom lands.
Indeed, the military reports opposing the establishment of the Arizona reservation did so,
in large part, because these lands were deemed “less favorable” for the Quechans’ flood-
based irrigation methods and because their removal would inhibit them from gathering
additional foods from the “country over which they have roamed.” Moreover, these
44 Executive Order of January 9, 1884, in Kappler, Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties, vol. 1, 832; and
Bee, Crosscurrents Along the Colorado, 19-20.
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Map 2: “Map of the Yuma Indian Reservation, California, Showing Proposed Irrigation Ditch,” in Walter
H. Graves, U.S. Indian Inspector, to the SOI, January 10, 1902, Box 8, Inspection Reports 1901-1907,
Indian Division, Records of the Secretary of the Interior, Record Group 48 [RG 48], National Archives and
Records Administration, College Park, Maryland [NARA II].
reports indicated that the Indians still subsisted, mainly, through these long-standing
cultivation and gathering practices.45
A series of magazine articles written about the Quechans in the summer of 1889
further revealed the tribe’s success in maintaining its traditional subsistence system. After
making “[f]requent visits” to the tribe over a period of 18 months, writer Eugene Trippel
45 Brigadier General George Crook, Headquarters, Department of Arizona, to the Assistant Adjutant
General, Military Division of the Pacific, August 27, 1883, Letter 17345-1883, LR 1881-1907, Entry 91,
RG 75, NARA I. See also Bee, Crosscurrents Along the Colorado, 19-20, 43. The principal reasons given
by Crook for opposing the Quechans’ removal to the Arizona side of the Colorado were as follows: 1) that
the lands lying east of the river were “less favorable for cultivation by the methods at present in use by
them”; and 2) that the Quechans’ removal from the California side of the river would deprive them of “such
supplies as have hitherto been obtained from the extent of country over which they have roamed, and much
suffering will inevitably ensue.” It should also be noted that Crook did indicate that some tribal members
had begun to search for “such employment as they may be able to procure” in Yuma.
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published back-to-back pieces in the California-based journal Overland Monthly that
included a lengthy and comprehensive portrait of the Quechan Indians, including a
discussion of their then-current farming and gathering practices. Although Trippel
thoroughly outlined the significant transformations that had impacted the tribe since the
advent of the American period—most notably, the expansion of steamboat traffic, the
growth of Yuma, and the arrival of the railroad—his articles revealed that, in spite of
these developments, the Quechans’ subsistence patterns had changed little since
Heintzelman’s time.46
This is not to say that the ever-increasing, non-Indian presence in Quechan
territory had not made an impact. As Trippel indicated, since the 1850s, steamboats had
begun plying the Colorado “laden with goods destined for the expectant frontiersman,”
and the Southern Pacific had extended its meandering course past Yuma, crossing the
Colorado “by the massive bridge that spans it.” Moreover, Yuma itself had grown from a
tiny settlement of only “straggling buildings” to a town that boasted “wide, sandy streets”
and “quaint, one-story adobe structures,” as well as “gardens filled with semi-tropical
vegetation.” While Trippel indicated that some Quechans sought employment as
“deckhands upon the Colorado River steamers” or as laborers in Yuma, he claimed that
their “knowledge of modern requirements does not greatly extend,” which limited their
ability to make a living solely by wage work. Instead, most tribal members preferred to
46 Eugene J. Trippel, “The Yuma Indians,” Overland Monthly 13 (June 1889): 561-84; and Eugene J.
Trippel, “The Yuma Indians—II,” Overland Monthly 14 (July 1889): 1-11. Trippel also noted, at the close
of his second article that, due to the absence of sufficient interpreters, he took upon himself the task of
learning the Quechan language—an undertaking that bespeaks the significant research effort that formed
the basis for his articles.
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continue their customary practices of farming in the Colorado’s bottom lands and
supplementing their agriculture with wild-plant gathering.47
Like other commentators before him, Trippel considered the tribe’s agricultural
methods to be “of the simplest kind.” This viewpoint prompted sometimes-disparaging
remarks about the perceived limitations of the Quechans’ subsistence-based farming
efforts. These efforts continued to center on the production of “melons, squash,
pumpkins, corn, and beans”—a condition Trippel attributed to the Indians’ “deficient
knowledge” of modern farming methods, rather than a conscious decision to raise these
staple food products. Despite his often-derogatory view of Quechan agriculture, Trippel
gave a detailed depiction of their cultivation practices, which almost wholly matched the
description provided by Heintzelman more than 30 years earlier. He wrote:
Open spots are selected along the Colorado, so situated as to be
liable to the overflows, and to some extent cleared of brush and
stubble by burning. After the subsidence of the inundations,
holes are dug in the moist earth with sticks to a depth of eight or
ten inches. Seeds are thrown on the bottom, and the holes filled
to the surface to save and utilize the moisture as long as possible
… nothing further is done until the products ripen, when they are
harvested.48
To supplement this yearly stock of cultivated crops, the Quechans continued to
gather wild plants, seeds, and roots from nearby uplands, still preferring the beans of the
“scrubby mesquite trees” that reportedly “abound[ed] everywhere.” Trippel’s lengthy
description of the tribe’s collection and preparation of mesquite beans and screwbean
pods reflected the ongoing value of this food supply to the tribal diet. He claimed that the
47 Trippel, “The Yuma Indians,” 562-64.
48 Trippel, “The Yuma Indians,” 573-74. Trippel’s biased perceptions were also reflected in his
statements about the Quechans’ purported “lack of ambition and necessary knowledge” regarding canal
construction. He claimed that tribal members were only “worth their salt at canal construction” when they
were “personally directed and controlled by the whites.” He additionally claimed that the Quechans sowed
seeds with “[n]o uniformity,” planting simply “where the digging is easiest.” This practice led to crops that
grew “everywhere and anywhere in the most curious combinations, and in a manner calculated to bewilder
the mind of the average civilized husbandman.”
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Indians enjoyed these plants in various ways, eating them straight from the tree, grinding
fresh pods into a “mush,” or drying them for future use. By grinding and applying water,
the dried pods or beans could be converted into “flat unleavened cake[s]” that “kept for
years.” The remarkable similarities between Trippel’s description of the tribe’s overall
subsistence patterns and that given by Heintzelman—as well as the Spanish missionaries
a century before—stood as a testament to the Indians’ ability to preserve their traditional
lifestyle in the face of the turbulent changes surrounding them.49
But, while Trippel’s articles illustrated the tribe’s thus-far-successful effort to
maintain its aboriginal subsistence system, they also reflected troubling environmental
trends in the lower Colorado basin that signaled future difficulties for the Quechans’
traditional farming practices. In particular, Trippel revealed that, in 1888, the river’s
spring overflow was insufficient to produce a typical crop yield, leaving the Indians
“seriously crippled” and forcing them to make “extra exertions to keep from starving.”
As anthropologists Castetter and Bell indicated in their study of aboriginal farming along
the lower Colorado, the annual floods on which the region’s tribes depended to plant their
crops became less certain as non-Indian settlement increased in the river basin. After
noting that low-flood years were “not common” during the pre-contact period, Castetter
and Bell pointed out that deficient flooding occurred in the basin in 1858, 1871, and
1873, as well as in the late 1880s, when Trippel visited the Quechan villages. The authors
attributed these increasingly inadequate overflows to the expanding use of the river for
irrigation by white settlers.50
49 Trippel, “The Yuma Indians,” 574.
50 Trippel, “The Yuma Indians,” 574; and Castetter and Bell, Yuman Indian Agriculture, 7-8.
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In recognition of these impacts, Trippel closed his articles about the Quechans
with a gloomy prediction for their future. Although the Indians had “maintain[ed] their
numerical strength for the past thirty or forty years,” the author argued that their
“existence as a united people” was becoming “seriously threatened.” He asserted that
whites had “virtually ignored” their lands until the mid-1800s because they “erroneously
believed that Arizona and Southeastern California were deserts incapable of sustaining
life.” However, the Quechans’ typically “flourishing” fields had proven this long-held
belief to be “totally incorrect.” This, in turn, had unintentionally encouraged non-Indians
to scoop up open lands in the region “at an unprecedented rate” and begin rapidly settling
“hitherto unoccupied valleys.” According to Trippel, the increasing Anglo settlement
along the lower Colorado could only prove disastrous for the Quechans:
In due course of time the constantly increasing population will
encroach upon the outskirts of the Indian ranges to the extent of
forcing the weaker race to adopt the habits of the stronger and by
assimilation to lose their identity, which will naturally follow the
destruction of tribal customs and traditions—the only influence
that unites them.51
The expanding influence of non-Indian settlements and transportation networks in
the region was not the only assimilationist force challenging the tribe’s customary
lifeways at the end of the 1880s. As the town of Yuma grew and as the railroad brought
increasing numbers of white settlers and Anglo goods into Quechan territory, federal
officials were busy formulating the two policies that would reshape Indian lands and
livelihoods throughout the West at the most fundamental level—allotment and irrigation.
The imminent onset of these intersecting policies was reflected in numerous reports
written at the close of the decade, most notably the inspection report of Special Agent
51 Trippel, “The Yuma Indians—II,” 10.
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W.E. Ferrebee, which was published as a part of the 1890 census. As his predecessors
had done, Ferrebee provided a detailed description of the Quechans’ purportedly “crude,”
yet still relied upon, farming practices. Predictably, he also speculated about the market-
based crops that, he believed, could prosper in the region.52
The most telling statements in Ferrebee’s report, however, were those in which he
divulged his high hopes for the future application of modern agricultural and irrigation
techniques to the Quechans’ lands. Echoing the exceedingly redemptive rhetoric of his
reclamation-happy, late-nineteenth-century counterparts, Ferrebee asserted that much of
the 45,000-acre Fort Yuma Reservation “could be cultivated if water for irrigation could
be procured.” He then offered his version of the oft-repeated, turn-of-the-century call to
make the desert bloom, claiming that the Quechans’ “rich” lands needed only water to
make them “blossom as the valley of Hebron.” While the expense of bringing a modern
irrigation system to the reservation would be “considerable,” Ferrebee believed the tribe
would be quickly repaid through both increased agricultural production and the “practical
instructions” they would receive in Anglo farming methods.53
The beneficial byproducts envisioned by Ferrebee could only come about through
the application of the federal government’s still-nascent vision of allotting and irrigating
Indian lands throughout the arid West. Over the next two decades, the dual impacts of
these overarching policies would be increasingly felt upon the lands of the Fort Yuma
Reservation and within lives of tribal members. The Quechans had successfully retained
their traditional subsistence system during the four decades following the establishment
52 “Report of Special Agent W.E. Ferrebee, M.D., on the Indians of the Yuma Reservation,” December
1890, in House, Report on Indians Taxed and Indians Not Taxed in the United States (Except Alaska) at the
Eleventh Census: 1890, 52d Cong., 1st sess., 1894, H. Misc. Doc. 340, pt. 15, serial 3016, 220.
53 “Report of Special Agent W.E. Ferrebee,” in House, Report on Indians Taxed and Indians Not
Taxed, 220.
47
of a military post in their territory, skillfully adapting to the altered circumstances created
by transportation development, the growth of non-Indian settlements, and the creation of
a reservation in the confluence area. Continuing to undertake such adaptations would
prove ever more difficult, however, in the face of the impending allotment and irrigation
construction on their lands. Ultimately, it was a battle that would prove impossible to
win, not only for the Quechans, but for tribes throughout the West.
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3. IRRIGATING AND ALLOTTING QUECHAN INDIAN LANDS, 1890-1910
Their land is as fertile as any in the world, perhaps. Millions of
gallons of water wash its banks and pass on to the sea. At a
comparatively small outlay a portion of this water could be
distributed upon the land, and the prosperity of the Indians
thereby assured … I am more convinced every day that if their
land were irrigated and allotted, the Indians would work it
profitably and successfully.
John Spear, Fort Yuma Superintendent, 19011
Although the Quechans had already weathered multiple challenges to their
traditional lifeways throughout the latter half of the 1800s, the turn of the century would
usher in even more difficult trials. As Special Agent Ferrebee intimated in his 1890
inspection report, federal officials were already considering the application of the newly
passed Dawes Act, as well as the redemptive vision of large-scale reclamation, to the
tribe’s lands. While the federal government would not successfully implement these
policies for another 20 years, for the Quechans, the two decades straddling the turn of the
century would be marked, principally, by the ongoing efforts to do so. Agents in the
Indian Office and the Reclamation Service worked diligently through the 1890s and early
1900s to bring the purportedly beneficial transformations of allotment and irrigation to
the Fort Yuma Reservation. By the early 1910s, they would finally succeed.
Unlike the earlier changes that had come to the confluence area during the closing
decades of the nineteenth century, allotment and irrigation were directed squarely at the
Quechans themselves. While tribal members undoubtedly felt the impacts of occurrences
such as railroad development and non-Indian settlement near the reservation, these events
happened largely outside of individuals’ lives. The Quechans, thus, were able to choose
1 John S. Spear, Superintendent, Fort Yuma Indian School, to the CIA, August 17, 1901, in Annual
Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs [ARCIA] 1901, 530.
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how they incorporated these transformations into their livelihoods—or whether they
incorporated them at all. Allotment and irrigation, however, were altogether different
creatures. As many historians have shown, the primary intent of these policies was to
alter, fundamentally, the way in which Indian people lived their lives. Whether a tribe
had previously subsisted by hunting and fishing or by farming and gathering wild plants,
the government’s vision for them was the same—to become self-sufficient, market-
oriented farmers in the Jeffersonian mold. To do this, federal officials sought to divide
Indian lands into small, individually owned parcels and, on many reservations throughout
the arid West and Southwest, to build irrigation projects. Situated as they were on the
lower Colorado’s fertile bottom lands, the Quechan Indians were prime targets for both
developments.2
Discussions about the possibilities for irrigation on the tribe’s lands began as the
government was debating the establishment of the Fort Yuma Indian Reservation in the
early 1880s. In addition to the Indians’ opposition to the Arizona reservation, government
officials agreed to move the tribe’s reservation to the California side of the river partly
because the lands on the east bank of the Colorado exhibited less potential for irrigation.
Lieutenant George Anderson, for example, deemed it “impossible to irrigate from the
Colorado” on the Arizona side, stating, “Wherever ditches have been taken out, they have
proved failures, and I think capital would have been attracted to this extensive and rich
bottom land had the cultivation of it been feasible.” Similarly, Indian Agent John Clark
2 For good discussions about the importance of allotment and irrigation in the federal government’s
efforts to assimilate Native Americans into their agrarian vision of Anglo life, see Lewis, Neither Wolf Nor
Dog, 3-21; Pisani, Water and American Government, 154-61, 172-80; and Hurt, Indian Agriculture in
America, 136-173.
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argued that “no ditch or canal can be constructed in that locality which would prove
beneficial to the Indians or any one else.”3
Investigations into prospective irrigation projects on the California side of the
river would prove far more fruitful. By 1890, Special Agent Ferrebee was discussing,
with high hopes, irrigation possibilities on the recently established reservation on the
west bank of the Colorado. Ferrebee indicated that Indian officials were then considering
“the purchase of pumps to raise the water from the river, and the construction of a canal
to convey it upon the lands.” He believed that such construction efforts, coupled with
“practical instructions in the methods of farming,” would offer the Quechans “an
opportunity to redeem themselves” from the alleged “degradation” of their present
existence. Ferrebee further noted that the tribe’s lands, through irrigation, could support
the growth of “all semitropical fruits, both citrus and deciduous,” as well other market-
based crops, which would position the Indians for “successful and profitable
cultivation.”4
United States Geological Survey Director John Wesley Powell, who previously
had explored much of the lower Colorado basin, outlined the findings of the federal
government’s irrigation investigations in a February 1891 letter to the Indian Office.
After noting that it appeared “perfectly feasible” to build canals from the Colorado to
irrigate arable lands on both sides of the river, Powell expressed concern about the cost of
such a venture, especially if “the irrigation of the Yuma Reservation alone were
contemplated.” As a possible alternative, he suggested using pumps to raise “large
3 Lieutenant George Anderson, Yuma, Arizona, to the Assistant Adjutant General, Department of
Arizona, August 20, 1883, Letter 17345-1883; and John Clark, Agent, Colorado River Agency, to the CIA,
November 12, 1883, Letter 21406-1883; both in LR 1881-1907, Entry 91, RG 75, NARA I.
4 “Report of Special Agent W.E. Ferrebee,” in House, Report on Indians Taxed and Indians Not Taxed,
220.
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quantities of water” onto the estimated 25,000 acres of cultivable lands on the
reservation—which Powell believed could support the growth of agricultural products “of
the highest value.” This method, though, involved “relatively high” annual expenses, due
to the constant need for fuel to run the pumps. Presumably because of the high costs
involved in these proposed irrigation schemes, these examinations led to little actual
irrigation work on Quechan lands during the early 1890s.5
Despite these ongoing federal investigations, the first serious proposals to irrigate
the Fort Yuma Reservation were made by private canal companies, not the government.
By early 1893, officials in charge of the recently incorporated Colorado River Irrigation
Company (CRIC) were lobbying Congress and the Indian Office to grant them a right-of-
way for an irrigation canal across the reservation. Outlining the company’s grand vision
for irrigating heretofore-arid lands in the Imperial valley, the House Indian Affairs
Committee reported that CRIC planned to “take a gravity canal from such point [on] the
Colorado River as will insure sufficient flow of water so as to reach and develop certain
lands in southern California now entirely arid and useless.” In so doing, the company was
“compelled to pass through the Yuma Indian Reservation, owing to the contour of the
country.” In short, the committee report revealed that the Quechans’ recently established
reservation stood as the linchpin to the anticipated development of the Imperial valley—
the reportedly “arid and useless” region to which CRIC hoped to deliver water.6
Owing to the vital importance of the Quechans’ lands to its overall plan, the
company was amenable to granting certain concessions to the tribe. In particular, the
5 John Wesley Powell, Director, U.S. Geological Survey, to T.J. Morgan, CIA, February 6, 1891,
Letter 4963-1891, Box 215, Special Case [SC] 190, Special Cases 1821-1907, Entry 102, RG 75, NARA I.
6 House, Right of Way Through Yuma Indian Reservation, Cal., 52d Cong., 2d sess., 1893, H. Rpt.
2440, serial 3141, 1. For good discussions about the early development of the Imperial valley, see deBuys,
Salt Dreams, 99-121, 128-29, 154-65; and Worster, Rivers of Empire, 194-212.
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House committee indicated that CRIC officials were “perfectly willing to subject
themselves to the conditions of obtaining the consent of the Indians now located on the
reservation” before proceeding with their work. Additionally, if Congress granted the
requested right-of-way, the company promised to “furnish said Indians with all the water
they need for irrigating and other purposes, under such conditions as the Secretary of the
Interior may prescribe.” Revealing their support for the CRIC scheme, committee
members claimed that the construction of the proposed canal would “not only benefit all
the regions through which it passes, but will be found especially beneficial to the Indians
on the reservation.” Legislators further asserted that the company was “fully officered by
responsible men” and was “well equipped to carry out its work.”7
Like his congressional counterparts, Commissioner of Indian Affairs Thomas
Morgan also threw his full support behind the measure. Writing to the secretary of the
interior in February 1893, Morgan extolled the virtues of CRIC’s lofty vision, noting that
he had “been on the ground” and knew “from personal observation” that the Quechans’
lands were “greatly in need of a system of irrigation.” He claimed that the government’s
investigations into the matter had revealed that building a system solely to benefit tribal
members would “necessarily involve a large expense,” making it especially “wise” to
consider the plan proposed by CRIC. Moreover, Morgan argued that the Indians would
be “fully compensated, at least for the land that will be taken in the construction of the
canal, by receiving a supply of water therefrom sufficient for all their purposes, domestic
and agricultural, including irrigation.” Considering all these factors, the commissioner
7 House, Right of Way Through Yuma Indian Reservation, Cal., 1.
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told the secretary that he “not only raise[d] no objections” to passing the right-of-way
bill, but instead “strongly recommended its enactment.”8
Morgan’s high praise of CRIC’s plan helped it win swift congressional approval.
Large portions of his commendatory letter were read on the floor of the House, leading to
that body’s prompt passage of the company’s right-of-way legislation.9 The Senate
quickly followed suit, and, on February 15, 1893—a mere week after Morgan wrote to
the secretary—the president signed the bill into law. As enacted, the legislation granted
CRIC a 50-feet-wide canal right-of-way extending from the northeastern corner of the
Fort Yuma Reservation—where the boundary intersected with the Colorado River, near
the later location of the Laguna Dam—“running thence south and west through the said
reservation to and beyond the limits thereof.” In addition, Congress made the grant “on
the express condition” that the company “furnish the Indian occupants of the land
situated on the lower side of the canal” with enough water to meet all their “domestic and
agricultural” needs. With this legislation in place, it appeared that the dawn of a new era
of irrigated agriculture was on the horizon for the Quechan Indians.10
Indeed, Commissioner Morgan was so certain about the legislation’s beneficial
impacts that he recommended the immediate application of the other vital component of
the government’s late-1800s assimilation agenda to the reservation—the allotment of
Quechan lands. On the eve of the right-of-way act’s passage, Morgan sent another letter
to the secretary, telling him that CRIC’s irrigation proposal would “remove the principal
obstacle which has heretofore stood in the way of agricultural pursuits of the Indians on
8 T.J. Morgan, CIA, to the Secretary of the Interior [SOI], February 8, 1893, Letter Book 251, Land
Division, Letters Sent by the Office of Indian Affairs 1881-1907 [LS 1881-1907], Entry 96, RG 75, NARA
I, pp. 444-46.
9 Congressional Record, 52d Cong., 2d sess., February 10, 1893, 24: 1427.
10 Act of February 15, 1893, 27 Stat. 456.
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this reservation.” Ignoring the fact that the Quechans had cultivated lands along the river
for centuries, he claimed that, with their reservation allotted and water to irrigate it,
together with “a few farming implements,” tribal members would “soon need no further
support from the government.” With this in mind, Morgan urged the secretary to call on
outgoing President Benjamin Harrison to exercise the authority granted him under the
recently passed Dawes Act by ordering the immediate allotment of the Fort Yuma
Reservation.11
The imminent change of administrations in the White House, though, halted the
hoped-for progress in allotting the Quechans’ lands. Six months after Morgan made his
recommendation, newly inaugurated President Grover Cleveland had yet to order the
allotment of the reservation. Moreover, a September 1893 letter written by Morgan’s
successor, Daniel Browning, revealed that CRIC was facing financial difficulties that
threatened to undermine its entire venture. The company’s president, John Beatty, told
Browning about these problems in August, noting that, if CRIC were to succeed in its
attempts to irrigate “700,000 or 800,000 acres” in the “Colorado Desert,” the company
would need to raise money to begin building its canal “as soon as possible.” To do this,
Beatty asked the Indian Office to appoint a negotiating team to secure an agreement from
the Quechans to cede “a portion of their lands” lying under the proposed ditch. Opening
these lands to non-Indian settlement would, according to Beatty, enable CRIC to make
11 T.J. Morgan, CIA, to the SOI, February 14, 1893, Letter 28700-1893 (Enclosure No. 1), Box 1007,
LR 1881-1907, Entry 91, RG 75, NARA I. Apparently hoping to push the allotment of the Fort Yuma
Reservation through before the lame-duck Harrison administration left office the following month, Morgan
suggested the appointment of a specific allotting agent, William Jenkins, who had just finished allotting a
small reservation in Oregon and was reportedly “at his home awaiting orders.”
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“an earning capacity for their canal,” which, in turn, would allow company officials to
begin work on it.12
Like his predecessor, Browning did everything in his power to assist CRIC’s
irrigation-related endeavors. Citing a minor provision within the recently passed Indian
Appropriations Act, he told the secretary that he had “unquestionable” authority under
this law to appoint a commission to negotiate with the Quechans “for the cession of such
portion of their reservation as they may be willing to cede.” While Congress would still
need to ratify any such agreement, Browning pointed out that the proposed commission
could be appointed “without the specific authority of the President,” thereby empowering
the secretary to advance the eagerly anticipated allotment and irrigation of the Fort Yuma
Reservation on his own. Browning’s unequivocal support for these developments was
clear, as he told the secretary that the Quechans’ lands were “as fertile as any in the world
when water can be had, but without the artificial application of water it is worthless.”
Believing that the land cession requested by Beatty would expedite completion of CRIC’s
much-hoped-for canal, Browning recommended the immediate appointment of three
government negotiators to consult with the tribe.13
While the commissioner was undertaking administrative efforts to promote the
allotment and irrigation of Quechan lands, townspeople in Yuma were taking hands-on
steps to ensure the nearby reservation’s rapid development. At the end of July 1893, local
Wells Fargo agent O.F. Townsend notarized—and very likely wrote—a petition and
proposed “agreement” allegedly signed by a group of roughly 100 tribal members, in
12 D.M. Browning, CIA, to the SOI, September 1, 1893, Letter Book 264, Land Division, LS 1881-
1907, Entry 96, RG 75, NARA I, pp. 163-68.
13 Browning to the SOI, September 1, 1893, Letter Book 264, Land Division, LS 1881-1907, Entry 96,
RG 75, NARA I, pp. 163-68.
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which they asked for their lands to be allotted. Outlining their reasons for this request, the
Indians purportedly stated their belief that, “if a portion of the land now embraced in our
reservation could be thrown open to settlement an irrigating ditch would be built through
the reservation, which is not practicable off our reservation in this vicinity.” In addition to
providing a more certain supply of water to their lands, the proposed canal’s construction
would also increase tribal members’ ability to “secur[e] labor while building and among
settlers after its completion.” The CRIC canal would also improve the Indians’ ability to
participate in the area’s expanding agricultural market. The petition stated:
We have noticed that our white neighbors across the river on the
Arizona side raise fine crops, and on account of the climate get
their fruits early, so that they bring large prices and they are
compelled to cultivate only very small tracts to make a living
and more. As it is the white man has his watermelons ripe by the
first of June. We must wait for ours until September. So it is with
other products of the soil because we have to wait on the river
for our irrigation. While with water the soil is fertile, nothing
will grow without irrigation, for there is no rain. Hence we want
the ditch built so that we can get water and have early and large
crops like our white friends.14
Besides the suspiciously legalistic verbiage contained in the Quechans’ purported
July 1893 agreement and petition, the documents bore other indications of dubiousness.
In particular, the names of several tribal leaders were absent from the list of signatories.
Anthropologist Robert Bee further indicated that tribal members informed him, during
interviews conducted in 1974, that many of the names that appeared on the documents
“were not recognizable Quechan names.” Most notably absent from this list, though, was
the signature of the Quechans’ recently deposed head chief, Miguel, who had held this
14 Yuma Indians to the President and Congress, July 27, 1893; and “Articles of Agreement Made and
Entered Into on the Fort Yuma Indian Reservation, County of San Diego, California, on the Part of the
Yuma Indians,” July 24, 1893; both in Senate, Letter from the Secretary of the Interior, Transmitting a
Copy of an Agreement with the Yuma Indians, with a Report from the Commissioner of Indian Affairs and
Accompanying Papers, 53d Cong., 2d sess., 1894, S. Ex. Doc. 68, serial 3160, 14-17. For brief discussions
about O.F. Townsend and his impact on tribal political affairs during the late 1880s and early 1890s, see
Bee, Crosscurrents Along the Colorado, 28, 33-34.
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leadership position since 1887, when he secured the post via the deathbed appointment of
the tribe’s long-standing chief, Pasqual. Miguel had fallen out of favor with officials at
the Fort Yuma Indian School for refusing to compel tribal members to send their children
to school. In response, school officials ousted Miguel in March 1893—four months prior
to the petition and agreement—and appointed a new leader, Joe Palma, who appeared
more sympathetic toward the school.15
Irrespective of the credibility of the July 1893 agreement and petition, these
documents clearly revealed the highly uncertain nature of the Quechans’ political affairs
in the early 1890s—a time when the tribe was facing the most difficult challenges, to
date, to its long-standing livelihood. Tribal leadership would become no less muddled
during the months following the drafting of the suspect July petition and agreement. In
September 1893, while Interior Department officials were considering Commissioner
Browning’s recommendation to appoint an official negotiating team to meet with the
Quechans, Indian police officers—acting under orders from school officials—arrested
former-head-chief Miguel and seven of his associates. Accused of protesting ongoing
allotment-and-canal surveys on the reservation, the detained individuals endured
whippings and then spent the next several months far from the reservation, in a county
jail in Los Angeles. Bee argues that Miguel’s arrest likely reflected a “deliberate” effort
15 Bee, Crosscurrents Along the Colorado, 24-34. Trippel provided a detailed account of the transfer of
leadership from Pasqual—who had served as the Quechans’ head chief since 1852—to Miguel. Trippel had
spent time with Pasqual, enjoying “several very interesting conversations with him,” during his extended
visits to the Fort Yuma Reservation in preparation for writing his 1889 articles for Overland Monthly.
Interestingly, Trippel indicated that Pasqual chose Miguel over his own son—Joe Palma, whom school
officials, in 1893, appointed as Miguel’s replacement—after his son reportedly refused the post “for the
reason that the dignity attending such an exalted position would prevent extensive commercial intercourse,
and that he would be able to make more money as a private individual.” See Trippel, “The Yuma Indians,”
567-68.
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by school officials “to get Miguel and his associates temporarily off the reservation” as
government negotiators tried to hammer out a land-cession agreement with the tribe.16
All the while, government officials were proceeding with steps to establish a
commission to negotiate the formal land-cession agreement requested by Beatty in
August 1893. By late-October, the secretary had appointed three negotiators, and
Browning had sent instructions to guide their talks with the Quechans. In addition to
outlining CRIC’s overall irrigation plan, Browning informed the appointees that the
company had agreed to furnish the Indians with water sufficient for agricultural and
domestic purposes. Although the company had yet to file “any maps of definite location”
showing where their proposed canal would run, Browning instructed the commissioners
to consult with CRIC officials to ascertain “as near as may be the proposed route of the
canal,” which, in turn, would allow them to “determine what lands should be retained for
the Indians.” In this regard, Browning suggested that “ten acres or possibly five acres”
would be “sufficient” for each Quechan allottee—a quantity that paled in comparison to
the typically 80- and 160-acre allotments on other reservations throughout the West, but
likely reflected the presumed high value of these lands after irrigation.17
Government negotiators arrived on the Fort Yuma Reservation at the close of
November 1893. Although the extant record of the councils held with the Quechans
includes only a brief report of the proceedings, even this limited documentary record
reveals that tribal members showed particular interest in the proposed construction of
CRIC’s canal. Specifically, the Indians inquired about “how soon” the company planned
to initiate work on its canal and “when they are going to have it finished.” CRIC officials,
16 Bee, Crosscurrents Along the Colorado, 29-33.
17 D.M. Browning, CIA, to Washington J. Houston, John A. Gorman, and Peter R. Brady, October 24,
1893, Letter Book 267, Land Division, LS 1881-1907, Entry 96, RG 75, NARA I, pp. 193-200.
59
who were present at the council, informed the assembled tribal members that “work
would be commenced about the 1st of December and pushed as quickly as circumstances
would admit.” The available records also indicated that the Quechans present agreed to
accept the smaller allotments recommended by Browning, as well as agreeing to sell the
irrigable acreage that remained after dividing their lands into individually held tracts.18
The Yuma Commission’s subsequent report of its negotiations with the Quechans
provided additional details about the council. Most important were comments about the
lands to be irrigated, allotted, and sold below the line of CRIC’s proposed canal. Figuring
that the Indians’ five-acre allotments would cover about 3,600 acres, the commissioners
believed that the roughly 14,000 irrigable acres remaining in the reservation could be sold
to white settlers in 10-acre tracts at post-reclamation prices. Since they estimated the
value of irrigated land in the region at $50 per acre—a ballpark “average” decided upon,
after hearing estimates “from $25 to $100 and upward”—the commission told tribal
members that the land sales could generate over $600,000 for use in “the payment of
water rent, building of levees, irrigating ditches,” and other agricultural expenses.
According to the report, the most important factor impacting the land’s value was its
status as a “first-class citrus land,” as well as its capacity for growing market-based crops,
such as “cereals, fruits, vegetables, [and] alfalfa.” The report indicated that the land
values and potential land sales were “very thoroughly discussed” with the Indians. These
discussions, in turn, led to the insertion of a proviso in the December 1893 agreement that
outlined the procedures under which the tribe’s so-called “surplus” lands would be sold
18 Houston, Gorman, and Brady, [Report of Proceedings], November 24 and December 4, 1893, in
Senate, Letter from the Secretary of the Interior, Transmitting a Copy of an Agreement with the Yuma
Indians …, 17-18.
60
to bidders at public auction, after irrigation, “at not less than the appraised value
thereof.”19
Discussing the overall condition of the lands to be irrigated by the CRIC canal,
the commissioners stated, unequivocally, that there was “no better land anywhere.” In
saying this, they noted, in particular, that the “sandy loam” comprising the reservation’s
bottom lands had been “annually enriched by the overflow of the Colorado River.”
Moreover, the Quechans’ “primitive” flood-based farming techniques had clearly
demonstrated the “great fertility” of the areas to be irrigated by CRIC’s canal, even
though these methods had reportedly brought “[o]nly small patches” under cultivation.
The Yuma Commission led trips over these potentially irrigable areas with tribal leaders
to determine where the Indians “would prefer to have their allotments.” On the basis of
these excursions, the commissioners recommended that the allotments be located on the
reservation’s eastern edge, in a contiguous body, “near the headwaters of the canal.”
Finally, they urged the Indian Office to insert a provision in the ratifying legislation that
would place a “time limit” on CRIC’s canal work.20
In spite of these apparent precautions taken by the commission, letters written
after the negotiation of the December 1893 agreement indicated that it, too—like the
agreement and petition purportedly signed by the tribe six months earlier—was marred
by questions about its authenticity and the conduct of the commissioners who negotiated
it. Three weeks after the agreement’s negotiation, Yuma attorney George Knight wrote a
letter claiming that, only “by threats,” had the negotiators been able to convince “a large
19 Houston, Gorman, and Brady to the SOI, January 24, 1894; and Articles of Agreement, December 4,
1893; both in Senate, Letter from the Secretary of the Interior, Transmitting a Copy of an Agreement with
the Yuma Indians …, 6-13, 19-22.
20 Houston, Gorman, and Brady to the SOI, January 24, 1894, in Senate, Letter from the Secretary of
the Interior, Transmitting a Copy of an Agreement with the Yuma Indians …, 6-13.
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number of Indians to sign the paper which they presented, the contents of which the
Indians had no knowledge of.” Claiming that he had “little faith” in the commission’s
“honesty of purpose,” Knight suggested, in no uncertain terms, that the entire agreement
was intended to benefit CRIC, not the Quechans. He wrote, “It is generally believed here
that the whole thing is a huge swindle in the interest of the said canal company, in whose
private interest the Indians are to be ousted.”21
Even the local newspaper questioned the negotiations, writing in late-October, “It
is rumored on the streets that the big canal company across the river are at the bottom of
this matter.” The paper further wondered whether “actual settlers” would ultimately take
up the lands under the proposed canal or whether these “fine valley lands” would be
“gobble[d] up” by speculators.22 Perhaps even more telling was that one of the
commission’s own members, Peter Brady, expressed doubts about the integrity of the
proceedings. In early January 1894, Brady informed Commissioner Browning that the
chairman of the negotiating team seemed to know “very little about Indian character” and
appeared to be in “a rush and hurry” to “return back to Washington.” Although Brady
worried, at the time, that the chairman’s “improper haste” would inhibit the Yuma
Commission from “fully discharg[ing]” its duties, he felt “compelled to defer” to his
chairman “or else have an open rupture with him.” In his closing remarks, Brady
apologized to the Indian Office that he and the other appointees “did not fully comply
and carry out the instructions of the Department.”23
21 G.M. Knight, Yuma, Arizona, to Captain John Mullan, December 27, 1893, in Senate, Letter from
the Secretary of the Interior, Transmitting a Copy of an Agreement with the Yuma Indians …, 24-25.
22 Arizona Sentinel, October 28, 1893, “To Be Cut Up.”
23 Peter R. Brady, Commissioner to Yuma Indians, to D.M. Browning, CIA, January 18, 1894, Letter
3433-1894, Box 178, SC 147, Special Cases 1821-1907, Entry 102, RG 75, NARA I.
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Despite the significant questions surrounding the conduct of the negotiations that
led to the December 1893 agreement with the Quechans, the agreement experienced little
difficulty obtaining both Indian Office and legislative approval. One by one, the members
of the Yuma Commission simply denied the allegations made by George Knight,
claiming that the attorney’s assertions regarding “threats and want of knowledge on the
part of the Indians” were “false in every particular.” They also painted the attorney as “a
crank,” who had a penchant for “roaring, blustering diatribe” and whose condemnatory
letter merely reflected “the vagaries of a lunatic.”24 Moreover, once he had received a
copy of Knight’s letter, Peter Brady quickly retracted his earlier critique of the
chairman’s work—telling Commissioner Browning that he “may have been a little too
hasty in the matter”—and asked that his own letter of rebuke be returned to him. As
Brady requested, his letter did not appear in the report that the Indian Office submitted to
Congress along with the December 1893 agreement.25
In fact, the Indian Office’s transmittal of the agreement and the commissioners’
report made little mention of the controversy surrounding the negotiations with the
Quechans. After outlining the complaints made by George Knight, Indian officials simply
noted that each member of the Yuma Commission had “emphatically denied all the
material allegations of Mr. Knight” and that Knight appeared “uninformed as to the
provisions of the agreement.” With these issues summarily disposed of, the Indian Office
recommended congressional approval of draft legislation that incorporated the provisions
24 Washington J. Houston, Chairman, Yuma Commission, to Peter Brady, January 29, 1894; and P.R.
Brady to John A. Gorman, February 8, 1894; both in Senate, Letter from the Secretary of the Interior,
Transmitting a Copy of an Agreement with the Yuma Indians …, 25-27.
25 Peter R. Brady, Yuma Indian Commissioner, to D.M. Browning, CIA, February 5, 1894, Letter
5902-1894, Box 178, SC 147, Special Cases 1821-1907, Entry 102, RG 75, NARA I. For the absence of
Brady’s earlier letter of rebuke from the Indian Office’s report to Congress, see Senate, Letter from the
Secretary of the Interior, Transmitting a Copy of an Agreement with the Yuma Indians … , 1-32.
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of the December 1893 agreement. The office submitted the proposed bill to Congress in
March 1894, recommending its prompt passage. The Interior Department, likewise, urged
the swift approval of a ratification law.26
The Senate took up the measure in the spring of 1894, passing the proposed bill
without debate in May of that year. As recommended by the Senate Committee on Indian
Affairs, the Senate version of the bill included two important provisions added to the
original draft legislation that the Indian Office had sent to Congress two months earlier.
First, the Senate bill fixed a three-year time limit within which CRIC was required to
begin work on its proposed canal through the Fort Yuma Reservation. Perhaps equally
important to the Quechans was the proviso that formally granted each adult, male tribal
member irrigation water from the anticipated CRIC canal “free of all rent charges” for
one acre of his allotment. Additionally, the Senate bill authorized the Interior Department
to set any future water rents payable by tribal members.27
Like its Senate counterpart, the House Indian Affairs Committee viewed the
CRIC canal as a key component of the proposed legislation. Discussing its support for the
ratification bill, the committee claimed that approving the December 1893 agreement
would be a boon for the Quechans and their ability to implement the market-oriented
agricultural future that the government envisioned for them. With CRIC’s promise of “a
perpetual free water right” to tribal members and “free water rental” for a portion of their
allotted lands, the House committee believed that the Indians would soon have “ample
means of earning a livelihood.” In fact, committee members suggested that, through
26 Frank C. Armstrong, Acting CIA, to the SOI, February 28, 1894; and Hoke Smith, SOI, to the
President of the Senate, March 19, 1894; both in Senate, Letter from the Secretary of the Interior,
Transmitting a Copy of an Agreement with the Yuma Indians …, 1-6.
27 Congressional Record¸ 53d Cong., 2d sess., May 19, 1894, 26: 4969.
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irrigation, the estimated 3,600 acres of individual allotments—which represented less
than 10 percent of the entire Fort Yuma Reservation—would be “of far greater value than
the entire reservation now is.” Indeed, the report claimed that the “paramount reason” for
the proposed legislation was “found in the proposition of the Colorado River Irrigation
Company to furnish the Yuma Indians with water for irrigation purposes.”28
But it was equally clear to the House committee that the Quechans were not the
only ones who would benefit from the ratification of the December 1893 agreement. In
particular, committee members emphasized the advantages to be derived from irrigating
not only the reservation, but also lands within the nascent Imperial valley, which the
report called “the most arid in America.” Although the committee considered this area to
be “an absolute waste land” at present, its members believed that, with irrigation, the
valley would prove “exceedingly fertile” and would be particularly adapted to cultivating
high-value crops, such as “semitropical and tropical fruits and vegetation.” Since CRIC
officials viewed the route through the Fort Yuma Reservation as the most cost-effective
way to bring water to the Imperial valley, legislators were more than happy to assist the
company in its attempts to make this particular desert bloom:
This irrigation enterprise has been organized with the purpose of
building an extensive canal, to be supplied with water from the
Colorado River, which, heading at the upper extremity of the
present Yuma Reservation, crosses the entire reservation and
passing through Lower California, extends into the Colorado
desert, where there is an immense body of land susceptible of
irrigation … All reports agree that if water can be placed upon
the soil, as there is no doubt it can be, by this proposed canal, the
region will soon become one of the most prosperous and
productive in the country.29
28 House, Agreement With Yuma Indians in California, 53d Cong., 2d sess., 1894, H. Rpt. 1145, serial
3271, 2.
29 Ibid.
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With visions of transforming the heretofore-arid Imperial valley into an
agricultural wonderland firmly implanted in their minds, legislators promptly passed
legislation to ratify the December 1893 agreement with the Quechans.30 However, despite
the lofty hopes of government officials, CRIC’s much-anticipated canal was never built.
Although the company’s president submitted plats of the proposed canal to the secretary
of the interior in the fall of 1894, Interior officials found these maps useless, telling the
Indian Office that its engineers had been unable to “accurately locate the canal upon the
ground.”31 Moreover, while the government took steps to survey the reservation in
anticipation of allotting lands to the Quechans, allotment work could not proceed, under
the terms of the 1893 agreement and the subsequent ratification law, until irrigation
construction was complete.32 By 1898, it had become abundantly clear that this would not
occur under the auspices of the CRIC enterprise. The agent in charge of the Fort Yuma
Indian School summed up the situation well, telling the Indian Office that summer, “The
[CRIC] undertaking is a complete failure. No work being done for the past three years. It
is seemingly abandoned.”33
In spite of the colossal failure of CRIC to abide by the terms of the December
1893 agreement, federal officials did not relinquish their hopes of irrigating and allotting
the Quechans’ lands. By the turn of the century, these officials had simply shifted their
30 Act of August 15, 1894, 28 Stat. 286 at 332. Rather than passing as a separate bill, the ratifying
legislation was ultimately attached as a rider to the 1895 Indian appropriations bill. See Congressional
Record¸ 53d Cong., 2d sess., July 12, 1894, 26: 7386-87; and Congressional Record¸ 53d Cong., 2d sess.,
July 18, 1894, 26: 7630-31.
31 Hoke Smith, SOI, to the CIA, February 27, 1895, Letter 8939-1895, Box 215, SC 190, Special Cases
1821-1907, Entry 102, RG 75, NARA I.
32 Frank S. Ingalls, “Plat Showing the Subdivision of the Yuma Indian Reservation into Sections,”
approved August 17, 1896, copy obtained from the Bureau of Land Management [BLM], California State
Office, Sacramento, California. For the terms of the ratifying legislation requiring irrigation to precede
allotment, see Act of August 15, 1894, 28 Stat. 286 at 332.
33 Mary O’Neil, Superintendent, Fort Yuma Indian School, August 18, 1898, Letter 38728-1898, Box
215, SC 190, Special Cases 1821-1907, Entry 102, RG 75, NARA I.
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focus away from private enterprise toward government development of the area’s water
supply. Interior Department inspector Frank Armstrong elucidated this shift clearly in a
November 1901 report to the secretary. Noting that the Quechans continued to rely on the
annual overflow of the Colorado River to plant their crops, Armstrong claimed that, if
only they had “sufficient land, under irrigation, to give them five acres per capita, well
irrigated, they could make a comfortable living.” Given CRIC’s recent failure, Armstrong
called on the federal government to construct an irrigation system to serve the Fort Yuma
Reservation. He wrote:
I believe that the best thing for [the Quechans] would be for the
Government to build them a ditch and control the water for these
people. Experience has shown that where Indians depend on
ditch companies for water they generally get a very poor
showing.
A ditch could be taken out by the Government and these Indians
allotted their land along the same, and made permanently self-
supporting.34
Commissioner of Indian Affairs William Jones echoed this sentiment in a January
1902 letter discussing the proposal of a second private enterprise—the Western Irrigation
and Improvement Company—to irrigate Quechan lands. According to officials of this
new company, CRIC had been unable to initiate work on its proposed canal because it
lacked sufficient capital. To overcome this hurdle, officials at Western Irrigation asked
Congress to allot the Quechans immediately, then to allow the company to purchase the
remaining irrigable lands within the Fort Yuma Reservation at the pre-reclamation price
of $1.25 per acre. Given the estimated $50-per-acre post-irrigation value of these lands,
the company stood to secure a handsome profit from this proposal. Recognizing this,
34 Frank C. Armstrong, Special Agent, to the SOI, November 27, 1901, Box 8, Inspection Reports
1901-1907, Indian Division, Records of the Secretary of the Interior, Record Group 48 [RG 48], National
Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland [NARA II].
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Commissioner Jones told the Interior Department that this plan would “deprive the
Indians of their best lands” and that the “inconsiderable sum” offered for those lands
would “hardly make it worth the while for them to enter into such an arrangement.”
Moreover, the government’s recent experience with CRIC left Indian officials wary of
private irrigation proposals, in general. In light of these facts, Jones told the secretary:
[I]t would seem that if anything is to be done for the Yuma
Indians in the way of irrigation, the government should do it
alone and not through the instrumentality of any ditch company.
The government would then have the entire control and in
disposing of the surplus lands could serve and protect the best
interests of the Indians.35
In spite of Jones’s good intentions, though, the government’s initial efforts to
assume responsibility for irrigation work on the Fort Yuma Reservation did not meet with
immediate success. Surveys conducted in 1902 revealed that the cost of building either a
ditch or a pumping plant to serve only Quechan lands within the reservation would be too
expensive for the government to consider. As Jones wrote in the fall of 1902, the Indian
Office was “unwilling” to build an irrigation system for “this small reservation” at “so
large a sum as $65,000, and an annual cost of operation of $24,000.” Because of these
unexpectedly high construction-cost estimates and the inability to sell surplus lands under
the government’s various irrigation proposals, Jones briefly reconsidered his position
regarding private canal companies. In November 1902, he told the secretary that, perhaps,
“a responsible individual or corporation” might actually be able to provide “a more
economical means for supplying water to these Indians, than the construction of a system
by the Government.”36
35 W.A. Jones, CIA, to the SOI, January 2, 1902, Letter 1472-1902, Box 215, SC 190, Special Cases
1821-1907, Entry 102, RG 75, NARA I.
36 Jones to the SOI, November 29, 1902, Box 8, Inspection Reports 1901-1907, Indian Division, RG
48, NARA II. For the government’s proposals for an irrigation system on the Fort Yuma Reservation, see
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The passage of the Reclamation Act prevented Commissioner Jones from having
to test this theory. Enacted in June 1902—as Indian officials were scrambling to find a
cost-effective means of irrigating Quechan lands—the Reclamation Act granted the
federal government broad authority to use proceeds from the sale of public lands in
sixteen western states and territories to fund irrigation construction throughout the West.
As historian Donald Pisani has pointed out, passage of the reclamation law also became
one of the primary means by which the construction of government-built irrigation
systems on Indian reservations occurred in the early 1900s. Owing to its prime position
along the Colorado River and its status as one of the principal routes through which a
canal might ultimately serve the still-undeveloped Imperial valley, the Fort Yuma Indian
Reservation appeared destined to be part of a government-constructed reclamation
project.37
This destiny was further sealed by the Interior Department’s inclusion of the
reservation within a broad withdrawal of lands being considered for possible reclamation
in July 1902.38 By the fall of 1903, officials in the newly created Reclamation Service
had received authority to conduct surveys of the Fort Yuma Reservation in connection
with broader investigations of possible irrigation projects throughout the lower Colorado
River basin.39 On the basis of these investigations, the head of the Reclamation Service,
W.H. Code, U.S. Indian Inspector, to the SOI, October 17, 1902; and Walter H. Graves, U.S. Indian
Inspector, to the SOI, January 10, 1902; both in Box 8, Inspection Reports 1901-1907, Indian Division, RG
48, NARA II.
37 Act of June 17, 1902, 32 Stat. 388; and Pisani, Water and American Government, 155-161. Note that
there is no evidence indicating that officials attempted to apply the terms of the 1894 Carey Act—the law
that empowered Western states to build irrigation works within their borders—to Quechan lands.
38 Charles Walcott, Director, United States Geological Survey [USGS], to the SOI, October 12, 1903,
Letter 9758-1903, Box 334, Letters Received [LR] 1881-1907, Indian Division, Entry 653, RG 48, NARA
II.
39 H.C. Rizer, Acting Director, USGS, to the SOI, November 10, 1903; and SOI to the Director, USGS,
November 13, 1903; both in Letter 73806-1903, Box 2404, LR 1881-1907, Entry 91, RG 75, NARA I.
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Charles Walcott, requested Interior Department authority, under the terms of the 1902
Reclamation Act, to include the Quechans’ reservation—along with the Colorado River
Reservation located roughly 100 miles to the north—within a “comprehensive” irrigation
system that encompassed lands along the Colorado River in California and Arizona.40
Since the Reclamation Act required the repayment of all moneys spent on
irrigation construction, Walcott noted that the inclusion of Indian lands within
reclamation projects would need “special authority from Congress.” Fortunately for
Walcott, a recent Supreme Court ruling had significantly eased the process of obtaining
legislative authority for such matters. In a January 1904 letter to the secretary, he cited
the high court’s recent opinion in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock as evidence that Congress now
had “full power to dispose of the Indian lands in such manner as it may consider best
fitted for the benefit of the Indians.” This meant that government officials did not need to
obtain the Quechans’ assent to incorporate their lands within a proposed reclamation
project, as they had allegedly done during the ill-fated negotiations of December 1893.
Unallotted reservation lands, thus, became a potential revenue source to pay back the
government for building irrigation systems in the West. Walcott clearly viewed Quechan
lands through this lens, touting that his proposed project would leave 20,000 acres of
irrigable land in their reservation open for sale to whites, the proceeds of which “could be
used to pay into the reclamation fund the cost of irrigating the lands allotted to the
Indians.”41
40 Charles Walcott, Director, USGS, to the SOI, January 23, 1904, in Senate, Indian Appropriation
Bill, 58th Cong., 2d sess., 1904, S. Rpt. 1660, serial 4574, 28.
41 Charles D. Walcott, Director, USGS, to the SOI, January 23, 1904, in Senate, Indian Appropriation
Bill, 58th Cong., 2d sess., 1904, S. Rpt. 1660, serial 4574, 28; and Pisani, Water and American
Government, 1-4, 161-62. Note that, from 1902 to 1907, the USGS had jurisdiction over the Reclamation
Service. In 1907, the Reclamation Service became an independent agency within the Interior Department.
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Officials in both the Indian Office and the Interior Department wholeheartedly
endorsed Walcott’s plan. In February 1904, the acting commissioner of Indian affairs
advised the secretary of the interior to approve the proposal, claiming it would solve the
long-standing problem of providing the Quechans with allotments and irrigation. He later
called Walcott’s plan “the only practicable method for providing a system of irrigation
for the Yuma Reservation.” The Interior Department likewise supported the proposition
and lobbied for its insertion in that year’s Indian appropriations bill, which Congress
passed in April 1904. As enacted, the law authorized the secretary to “reclaim, utilize,
and dispose of” all irrigable reservation lands under the terms of the Reclamation Act,
provided that tribal members received five-acre irrigated allotments. The remaining lands
irrigated under the project would be opened to non-Indian settlement. In keeping with the
Reclamation Act’s repayment requirements, the 1904 legislation also stipulated that the
secretary use the proceeds from the sale of the unallotted, irrigable lands in the
reservation—at lower, pre-irrigation values—to pay for irrigation construction on the
Indians’ allotments.42
In his annual report for 1904, the agent in charge of the Fort Yuma Reservation
pointed to the passage of the 1904 act as one of the most important events in the history
of the Quechan Indians. Echoing the redemptive rhetoric of officials in both the Indian
Office and the Reclamation Service regarding the transformative qualities of irrigation
and allotment, Superintendent John Spear wrote:
42 A.C. Tonner, Acting CIA, to the SOI, February 3, 1904; and E.A. Hitchcock, SOI, to the Chairman,
House Committee on Indian Affairs, Feb. 9, 1904; both in Senate, Indian Appropriation Bill, 58th Cong.,
2d sess., 1904, S. Rpt. 1660, serial 4574, 29-30; A.C. Tonner, Acting CIA, to the SOI, March 17, 1904,
Letter 2963-1904, Box 343, LR 1881-1907, Indian Division, Entry 653, RG 48, NARA II; and Act of April
21, 1904, 33 Stat. 189 at 224.
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At last it seems that irrigation is in sight for the Yuma Indians.
The ‘Yuma project,’ under the national irrigation act,
contemplates the damming of the Colorado River just above the
reservation, so that the waters may be diverted to the adjoining
lands upon both sides of the river. … About 18,000 acres will be
reclaimed, the Indians will get about 3,000 acres. It may take
three years to complete the project. When it is done and
allotments are made, the future of the Yuma will be vastly
different from their past. There is no doubt in regard to the
fertility of their lands or that they will make good farmers.43
While Superintendent Spear seemed certain about the positive changes that would
occur under the government’s allotment-and-irrigation scheme, Quechan tribal members
were far less sanguine about its prospects. Even before Walcott submitted his agency’s
reclamation plan to Congress, the Quechans had witnessed government engineers
conducting irrigation surveys on their reservation. In response, tribal leaders petitioned
the Interior Department against any proposals that would disturb their traditional farming
methods. J.F. Pasqual, who was then vying for leadership of the tribe, wrote to the
secretary in March 1903, informing him that the Quechans had recently held a meeting
where they had come to the consensus that they did “not want the pumping plant or
gravity system of irrigation on our Reservation.” Stating that the Colorado’s annual
overflow provided “a sufficient supply of water for all purposes,” Pasqual claimed that
tribal people could “now raise a good crop after the overflow in the valley and they think
that they can very well get along with that; in fact they have been self-sustaining through
this source of water supply for centuries.”44
With the passage of the 1904 act and the strongly worded opinion in Lone Wolf v.
Hitchcock backing their actions, though, government officials did not feel compelled to
43 John S. Spear, Superintendent, Fort Yuma Indian School, to the CIA, August 17, 1904, in ARCIA
1904, 158.
44 J.F. Pasqual, Chief of the Yuma Tribe of Indians, to E.A. Hitchcock, SOI, March 4, 1903, Letter
3253-1903 (Enclosure), Box 323, LR 1881-1907, Indian Division, Entry 653, RG 48, NARA II. For further
information about tribal leadership at this time, see Bee, Crosscurrents Along the Colorado, 54-58.
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heed the Quechans’ requests. By May 1904—one month after Congress passed the 1904
legislation—the secretary had set aside $3 million from the reclamation fund for the
construction of the newly minted Yuma Project. By the end of that year, Reclamation
Service engineers had settled on the basic plans for the construction and operation of the
irrigation system. The central feature was the Laguna Dam, which would be situated on
mesa lands at the northeastern corner of the reservation. Reclamation officials planned to
build two canal systems from the dam to irrigate more than 70,000 acres of private land
in Arizona, as well as a hoped-for 20,000 acres of reservation land in California.
In addition to the obvious impact that the Laguna Dam would have on the
Colorado River’s annual flooding patterns, two other planned features of the Yuma
Project would significantly impact Quechan lands. First, Reclamation officials planned to
build a system of sluiceways and settling ponds at each end of the dam to prevent silt
from being deposited into their canal systems—and, thus, preventing valuable silt
deposits from reaching tribal lands. Second, the Reclamation Service planned to construct
levees along the reservation’s southern and eastern borders to “protect” reservation lands
from the annual flooding of the Colorado.45 (Map 3)
Despite the flurry of planning activity that occurred in the immediate wake of the
1904 act’s passage, actual construction and allotment work on the reservation proceeded
at a slower pace. This was due, in large part, to interagency disagreements between the
Indian Office and the Reclamation Service. Reclamation engineers, for example,
complained about Indian Office delays in allotting the Quechans, which reportedly
prevented them from planning their canal systems. Although the Indian Office expressed
45 Third Annual Report of the Reclamation Service, 1903-4 (Washington: GPO, 1905), 63-64, 192-99;
Seventh Annual Report of the Reclamation Service, 1907-1908 (Washington: GPO, 1909), 59-61; and
Eighth Annual Report of the Reclamation Service, 1908-1909 (Washington: GPO, 1910), 53-56.
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Map 3: U.S. Reclamation Service, “General Map of Proposed Yuma Project, Ariz.-Calif.,” in Third Annual
Report of the Reclamation Service, 1903-4 (Washington: GPO, 1905), 192.
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disbelief that the location of the allotments would have any bearing on the canal system,
its officials promised to move forward on the allotment work as quickly as possible. The
two agencies also quarreled over jurisdictional issues within the boundaries of the
reservation. Questions about whether the Reclamation Service had authority over non-
irrigable lands within the reservation proved particularly troublesome, especially as these
questions related to the tribe’s ability to gather wood and other subsistence materials
from these areas.46
The location and size of the Quechans’ allotments, however, stood as the biggest
stumbling block to the early development of the reservation portion of the Yuma Project.
Writing about this in the summer of 1906, newly appointed Fort Yuma Superintendent Ira
Deaver notified the Indian Office that, while the Reclamation Service had initiated
construction on the non-Indian side of the project in Arizona, engineers refused to begin
work within the reservation until Indian officials had set aside a block of land for the
Quechans’ allotments. Deaver found this position suspect, telling the Indian Office that
he believed this was “only a scheme to get the best land for the white man.” Expressing
his disbelief about the Reclamation Service’s reasons for delaying its work on Quechan
lands, Deaver wrote, “It seems to me that a canal located to carry water for a white man
would carry water for an Indian as well.” Instead of abiding by requests to delineate a
large block of irrigable land for the Indians, Deaver believed tribal members should be
46 F.E. Leupp, CIA, to the SOI, August 18, 1905, Letter 8642-1905, Box 375; and C.F. Larrabbee,
Acting CIA, to the SOI, August 14, 1906, Box 397; both in LR 1881-1907, Indian Division, Entry 653, RG
48, NARA II.
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allowed to choose their allotments wherever they saw fit and to have “the white man [be]
allowed to take what is left.”47
Despite Superintendent Deaver’s suggestions and warnings, the Indian Office
ultimately acquiesced to the Reclamation Service’s demands about identifying a block of
land for Quechan allotments. In the spring of 1907, Indian Office engineers met with
Reclamation officials on the reservation to agree on “a tentative selection of a body of
irrigable land for Indian allotments” under the Yuma Project’s main canal on the
California side of the river. Interestingly, these meetings led to the placement of Quechan
allotments in a location that was at odds with that proposed by the Yuma Commission in
1893. In particular, the 1893 negotiations had resulted in a recommendation that the
Indians’ allotments be situated “near the headwaters of the canal”—which would have
placed the Quechans’ lands on the east side of the reservation, near the later location of
the Laguna Dam. By contrast, the 1907 meetings called for the allotments to be located in
the south-central portion of the reservation, far removed from the dam. Thus, as a result
of these meetings, the lands intended to be allotted to the Quechans in 1893 would,
instead, be opened to non-Indian settlement. During hearings held on the reservation in
the early 1930s, tribal members told Senate investigators that the Bard unit contained “the
best land” in the reservation and asked for a proper “settlement” for the loss of this area.48
47 Ira Deaver, Superintendent, Fort Yuma School, to the CIA, July 3, 1906, Letter 57532-1906, Box
215, SC 190, Special Cases 1821-1907, Entry 102, RG 75, NARA I. For additional information about the
progress of construction on the Arizona side of the Yuma Project, see C.F. Larrabee, Acting CIA, to the
SOI, February 28, 1906, Letter 2043-1906, Box 385, LR 1881-1907, Indian Division, Entry 653, RG 48,
NARA II.
48 W.H. Code, Chief Engineer, Indian Irrigation Service, to the SOI, June 12, 1907, Letter 58300-1907,
Box 3691, LR 1881-1907, Entry 91, RG 75, NARA I. For the Yuma Commission’s recommendation in
1893 regarding the location of Quechan allotments, see Washington J. Houston, John A. Gorman, and Peter
R. Brady, Commissioners, to the SOI, January 24, 1894, in Senate, Letter from the Secretary of the Interior,
Transmitting a Copy of an Agreement with the Yuma Indians …, 10. For tribal assertions that the Bard unit
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The agreement produced during these meetings also prompted increased irrigation
construction within the reservation’s borders. By the close of 1908, Reclamation officials
were nearing completion of the levees designed to “protect” Quechan lands from the
Colorado River’s annual floods. In addition, they were proceeding with the construction
of canals on the eastern side of the reservation—on lands that would soon be opened to
non-Indian settlement. By the following March, the Reclamation Service had completed
construction of the Laguna Dam at the northeastern corner of the reservation, and, by the
spring of 1910, the main canals and sub-laterals designed to serve the reservation’s
“surplus” lands were finished. As construction work within the Fort Yuma Reservation
progressed, Reclamation Service officials also prepared the farm-unit plats they would
use to advertise the sale of the Quechans’ “surplus” lands. By the close of 1909, the
preparation of these maps was reportedly “well advanced.”49
The Interior Department wasted no time in opening the newly irrigated lands
within the reservation to non-Indian settlement. In January 1910, Secretary Richard
Ballinger issued a public notice, informing prospective settlers that 173 farm units,
totaling roughly 6,500 acres in the eastern portion of the Fort Yuma Reservation, would
be opened to settlement that spring. Potential purchasers exhibited significant interest in
the Quechans’ lands, as more than 1,700 applicants entered the lottery for the 40-acre
farm units—nearly 10 applications for each tract offered for sale. As outlined in Secretary
Ballinger’s public notice, each settler was required to pay an additional pre-reclamation
cost of $10 per acre, which the government intended to use in repaying building costs on
contained the reservation’s “best land,” see Senate, Survey of Conditions of the Indians in the United States,
Part 17 (Washington: GPO, 1931), 8019.
49 Seventh Annual Report of the Reclamation Service, 1907-1908 (Washington: GPO, 1909), 59-61;
Eighth Annual Report of the Reclamation Service, 1908-1909 (Washington: GPO, 1910), 53-56; and Ninth
Annual Report of the Reclamation Service, 1909-1910 (Washington: GPO, 1911), 77-78.
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the Indian portion of the Yuma Project. These added fees did little to lessen the interest in
the irrigated tracts within the reservation—by the fall of 1910, settlers had occupied every
farm unit, and, by 1911, they were already cultivating more than 2,000 acres within the
reservation.50
As non-Indians quickly gobbled up the irrigated farm units within the Fort Yuma
Reservation, the Quechans still awaited their long-promised allotments. The opening of
the reservation prior to allotment—an atypical occurrence that did not reflect standard
practice with regard to selling “surplus” lands on Indian reservations in the West—was
due, in part, to efforts by Indian officials, Indian supporters, and the Quechans to increase
the size of their proposed five-acre allotments. However, this uncharacteristic approach to
opening the reservation’s lands also reflected the Reclamation Service’s desire to begin
immediately paying back the costs of building the project. As the Indian Office indicated
in a 1911 letter to the allotting agent assigned to Fort Yuma, the Reclamation Service had
“urged” Indian officials to open some of the reservation’s unallotted irrigable lands, “so
as to enable that Bureau to reimburse itself for some of the expenditures connected with
the construction of the Yuma project.” Since Reclamation engineers were aware of the
ongoing attempts to increase the Quechans’ allotments to 10 acres, they agreed to open a
smaller amount of land than they had originally planned to sell.51
50 Ninth Annual Report of the Reclamation Service, 1909-1910 (Washington: GPO, 1911), 79-80; and
Tenth Annual Report of the Reclamation Service, 1910-1911 (Washington: GPO, 1912), 76. See also R.A.
Ballinger, SOI, to D.H. Anderson, Editor, Irrigation Age, March 23, 1910, File 8-3: Reclamation Service-
Yuma Project-Yuma Indian Reservation, Box 1680, Central Classified Files [CCF] 1907-1936, RG 48,
NARA II.
51 C.F. Hauke, Second Assistant CIA, to Charles E. Roblin, Special Allotting Agent, November 18,
1911, Box 1, Correspondence 1907-1926, Fort Yuma Agency, RG 75, National Archives and Records
Administration-Pacific Region, Riverside, California [NARA-Riverside]. I am unaware of any other
reservation where the sale of surplus lands preceded both the completion of allotment fieldwork and the
issuance of trust patents to individual Indians. The Quechans’ experience may be a singular case, in this
regard.
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The proposed expansion of the Quechans’ allotments, meanwhile, had been an
ongoing issue since at least 1906, when Inspector Levi Chubbuck called for enlarging the
area authorized for allotment. In making this proposition, Chubbuck surmised that the
five-acre allotments provided in the 1904 act “would seem to have been determined on
the assumption that five acres is all an Indian will or can use.” He viewed the Quechans,
however, as a “sturdy and virile” people who could quickly “develop into a thrifty,
intelligent lot of farmers,” if only they were allowed to secure larger parcels of land.52
Although the secretary did not immediately heed Chubbuck’s recommendation, it became
increasingly difficult to ignore such proposals as the decade wore on. In 1909, Fort Yuma
Superintendent Anna Egan added her voice to the growing chorus of those calling for
larger allotments, telling the Indian Office, “The land is there, enough to give each man[,]
woman and child 10 acres apiece, and why not let them have it; it will be little enough, in
the long run, to wrest a living from.”53
The Quechans themselves, likewise, petitioned Congress in the summer of 1909
for an increase in their allotted acreage. While the 43 tribal leaders who signed the
petition expressed uniform opposition to the proposed allotment and sale of “surplus”
lands within their reservation, they claimed that, “if forced upon us, we insist that a much
larger share of irrigated land be allotted each member of our tribe.” In making their
argument, the petitioners claimed that five-acre allotments would be “altogether too small
to enable us to support ourselves.” Principal among the signatories to the 1909 petition
was J.F. (Frank) Pasqual, the tribal leader who, in 1903, had expressed opposition to the
52 Levi Chubbuck, Special Inspector, to the SOI, January 25, 1906, Box 8, Inspection Reports 1901-
1907, Indian Division, RG 48, NARA II.
53 Anna C. Egan, Superintendent, Fort Yuma Indian School, to the CIA, July 8, 1909, File 91005-1907-
Fort Yuma-313, Box 19, Fort Yuma Agency, CCF 1907-1939, RG 75, NARA I.
79
proposed irrigation systems then under consideration by the Indian Office and the
Reclamation Service.54
By 1910, members of the Indian Rights Association attached their names to the
list of those advocating for larger allotments on the reservation. Writing to the Senate,
S.M. Brosius, an agent for the organization, asserted that five acres was insufficient to
support any individual farmer in southern California, white or Indian. He further stated
that the farm units opened to non-Indians within the reservation would be 40 acres—a
figure that stood in stark contrast to the amount of land allowed for individual Quechans.
Last, Brosius noted that tribal members had “protest[ed] against the allotment of their
lands” and that the sale of their “surplus” lands was “against the wishes of the Indians.”
Because of this, he claimed it was the government’s duty to “see that the [Quechans’]
interests are fully protected.”55 Making pleas to legislators’ sense of righteousness was
not the only method of lobbying for larger allotments, though. One California senator, in
particular, indicated that threats from Reclamation officials that they would sell off the
reservation’s remaining irrigated acreage “and limit the Indians to 5 acres,” played a
significant role in his decision to act on the matter.56
Irrespective of the ultimate reasons behind its action, Congress finally responded
to this steady stream of complaints by passing legislation in March 1911 to increase the
size of the Quechans’ allotments from five to 10 acres. Legislators, though, were not
entirely magnanimous in enacting the law, since the 1911 act also made the entire cost of
54 Yuma Tribe to Congress, August 31, 1909, File 5-1: Indian Office-Fort Yuma-Allotments, Box
1215, CCF 1907-1936, RG 48, NARA II. For the Quechans’ earlier petition opposing irrigation
construction, see J.F. Pasqual, Chief of the Yuma Tribe of Indians, to E.A. Hitchcock, SOI, March 4, 1903,
Letter 3253-1903 (Enclosure), Box 323, LR 1881-1907, Indian Division, Entry 653, RG 48, NARA II.
55 S.M. Brosius, Agent, Indian Rights Association, to Frank Flint, U.S. Senate, December 24, 1909;
and Merrill E. Gates, Secretary, Board of Indian Commissioners, to the SOI, December 22, 1909; both in
File 5-1: Indian Office-Fort Yuma-Allotments, Box 1215, CCF 1907-1936, RG 48, NARA II.
56 Congressional Record, 61st Cong., 3d sess., January 25, 1911, 46: 1412.
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irrigating the Indians’ allotments reimbursable to the government. Congress intended the
money from the sale of the reservation’s “surplus” lands to cover the reclamation costs
made reimbursable by the 1911 act. However, in the event that the revenues from these
sales were insufficient to repay the reclamation fund, the law stipulated that any unpaid
costs would become a “first lien” against the tribe’s allotments, at the close of the 25-year
trust period. In effect, this meant that allottees who later gained unrestricted title to their
10-acre parcels were going to face a hefty loan from the government upon receipt of their
fee patents.57
With the passage of the 1911 act, allotment on the Fort Yuma Reservation moved
quickly toward completion. Allotment field work began in the fall of 1911, and, by the
following spring, government agents had divvied up the roughly 8,000-acre block of
land, reserved for Quechan allotments five years earlier, into individually owned parcels.
Although the formal issuance of trust patents for these lands would not be forthcoming
until 1914, the field work completed in 1912 brought finality to the long-standing efforts
of the Indian Office to irrigate and allot the reservation. After two decades of unflagging
attempts to implement their redemptive vision of reclamation and individual ownership
on Quechan lands, government officials could finally report the beginning of a “great
awakening” for the Indians along these lines. The ultimate impact of irrigation and
allotment on the lives of tribal people, however, would prove far different—and much
less positive—than federal officials had envisioned.58
57 Act of March 3, 1911, 36 Stat. 1058 at 1063. Unlike many other tribes in the West, the Quechans
ultimately avoided fee-patenting of their allotments. Despite this, the threat of these liens likely had an
adverse impact on tribal members’ use of project canals.
58 Fort Yuma Agency Narrative Report, 1912, Section VII—Allotments; and Fort Yuma Agency
Narrative Report, 1914, Section VII—Allotments, p. 22; both in Roll 55, National Archives Microfilm
Publication M1011, Superintendents’ Annual Narrative and Statistical Reports from Field Jurisdictions of
the Bureau of Indian Affairs 1907-1938 [hereinafter cited as M1011].
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4. THE IMPACT OF IRRIGATION AND ALLOTMENT ON QUECHAN INDIAN
LANDS, 1910-1940
It is immediately apparent to the most casual observer that a
considerable number of the farmers on the Yuma Indian
Reservation, included in the Yuma Federal Reclamation Project,
are attempting a hopeless and impossible task in trying to
support themselves by farming lands that are so badly
impregnated with alkali as to be practically useless … it seems
reasonable to predict that the entire area will within a few years
be transformed into a swamp or lake.
C.A. Engle, Engineer, Indian Irrigation Service, 19361
The Quechans began feeling the impacts of irrigation and allotment almost
immediately after the authorization of the Yuma Project—and well before their trust
patents were formally approved in 1914. Unlike the earlier changes that had occurred on
their lands during the latter half of the nineteenth century, the construction of a
reclamation project and the division of their reservation into individually owned parcels
left the Quechans with little choice about how—or whether—to incorporate these new
transformations into their existing livelihoods. Whereas expanding transportation
networks and the growth of non-Indian towns and agricultural settlements in the lower
Colorado basin clearly impacted the river and constricted the Indians’ ability to shift their
habitations as freely as they had in aboriginal times, the allotment of their lands and the
construction of a dam and levee system along the Colorado represented a much more
abrupt alteration to the Quechans’ long-standing lifeways.
During the period leading up to the 1904 authorization of the Yuma Project—and
even in the immediate wake of the project’s approval—the Quechans remained able, for
the most part, to rely on their traditional farming methods and subsistence practices. In
1 C.A. Engle, Supervising Engineer, Indian Irrigation Service [IIS], to A.L. Wathen, Director, IIS,
October 12, 1936, File 5-1 (Part 2): Indian Affairs-Colorado River-Removal of Indians, Box 3395, CCF
1937-1953, RG 48, NARA II.
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her annual report for 1897, Sister Mary O’Neil, who headed the Fort Yuma Indian School
through much of the 1890s, stated that the Indians continued to “avail themselves of low
lands overflowed along the course of the Colorado River to plant their crops,” claiming
that they “eke[d] out a very precarious livelihood thereby.”2 Indian Office inspectors who
visited the Fort Yuma Reservation in the early 1900s likewise noted the Quechans’
continued reliance on the river’s annual overflow for their planting. In 1901, Frank
Armstrong indicated that, since neither the government nor private industry had built an
irrigation system on their lands, tribal members still “depend[ed] on the overflow for
moisture.” Three years later, Levi Chubbuck’s inspection of the reservation revealed that
the Indians relied on what he called a “very crude” method of planting, cultivating a wide
range of crops including beans, corn, melons, wheat, barley, and potatoes, some of which
they grew “in considerable quantities.”3
The steady growth of settlements along the lower Colorado River in the early
1900s—spurred, in part, by the government’s plans to construct large-scale irrigation
projects in the area—rendered the Quechans’ efforts to continue their traditional farming
practices increasingly difficult. In particular, the periodic low-flooding years that began
occurring in the 1870s and 1880s had become more prevalent by the turn of the century.
In his annual report for 1900, Fort Yuma School Superintendent John Spear noted that
the Colorado’s annual overflow was “less than usual” that spring, forcing the Indians to
wage an “everyday battle to procure a living.” The decreasing reliability of the river’s
annual floods encouraged many Quechans to seek out employment as day laborers in the
2 Mary O’Neil, Superintendent, Fort Yuma Indian School, to the CIA, July 15, 1897, in ARCIA 1897,
342.
3 Frank C. Armstrong, Inspector, to the SOI, November 27, 1901; and Levi Chubbuck, Special
Inspector, to the SOI, February 13, 1904; both in Box 8, Inspection Reports 1901-1907, Indian Division,
RG 48, NARA II.
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nearby town of Yuma, as well as cutting wood for sale to “pumping plants along the
Colorado River” and shoveling coal for the Southern Pacific “when no one else could be
found to do the work.”4 However, in years when the Colorado’s floods were closer to
their pre-contact norms—as occurred in 1903—the Quechans would so eagerly “take
advantage of this favorable condition” that Spear claimed there was little doubt that the
Indians would “avail themselves of the still greater benefit of irrigation.”5
Once the Reclamation Service began construction of the Yuma Project, though, it
came nowhere near achieving the beneficial results anticipated by Superintendent Spear.
In fact, the initial item of construction within the reservation—the levee designed to
protect project farm lands from the annual floods of the Colorado—effectively cut off
access to the Quechans’ aboriginal farming areas. Moreover, since Reclamation engineers
finished building this levee four years before allotment field work was completed on the
reservation, tribal members were unable to farm using either their traditional flood-
irrigated farming methods or the “modern” techniques envisioned for them after they
received their long-promised allotments. Discussing this issue, an Interior Department
inspector indicated that, by 1908, the reservation levee had “entirely shut off” the water
supply that the Indians had relied on for centuries, except upon a “limited area” of lands
situated “between the levee and the river.” This left tribal members “apprehensive as to
their immediate future means support.”6
4 John S. Spear, Superintendent, Fort Yuma Indian School, to the CIA, July 30, 1900, in ARCIA 1900,
480; Spear to the CIA, August 17, 1901, in ARCIA 1901, 530; Spear to the CIA, August 8, 1902, in
ARCIA 1902, 166; and Frank Armstrong, Inspector, to the SOI, November 27, 1901, Box 8, Inspection
Reports 1901-1907, Indian Division, RG 48, NARA II. For a discussion of the low-flood years that
occurred in the 1870s and 1880s, see: Trippel, “The Yuma Indians,” 574; and Castetter and Bell, Yuman
Indian Agriculture, 7-8.
5 Spear, to the CIA, August 20, 1903, in ARCIA 1903, 138.
6 Joe Norris, Inspector, Interior Department, “General Inspection and Investigation of Conditions at the
Yuma Agency, Reservation, and Indian Boarding School at Fort Yuma, California,” February 24, 1910,
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Fort Yuma Superintendent Anna Egan also addressed this issue in her 1910
annual report, noting that the Reclamation Service levees had been a point of contention
among the Quechans ever since the government had finished building them. Since the
levees held back the Colorado’s “overflow waters,” tribal members complained that they
“had been deprived thereby of their chief source of sustenance, the produce of the
gardens they were used to plant, annually, after the overflow had receded.” Despite this,
Egan reported that some Quechans continued planting, in their traditional manner, on the
small patches of land lying between the levee and the river. But she indicated that, often,
“the little gardens are washed away” or were unproductive due to low floods, making
farming under such conditions “not encouraging.” Rather than supporting traditional
farming practices on these limited areas, Egan tried persuading the Quechans to accept
their future of irrigated-allotment farming, “with some degree of willingness, when the
time comes.” To do this, she echoed many of the arguments made by irrigation supporters
who had come before her, writing in her annual report:
The Yumas will see that they will be able to raise more and
better produce under irrigation than they ever could have done in
the old way; and besides they will see that they can raise it about
whenever they want it, and that they won’t, in future, have to
depend on the vagaries of the Colorado for a crop.7
To further encourage the Quechans’ shift toward more modern farming practices,
Egan urged tribal members to select and begin working on a 20-acre “experimental farm”
located near the Fort Yuma School, while they awaited their allotments. Although some
Indians did work on this farm— reportedly becoming “quite proud” of their melon, bean,
squash, and corn crops—the vast majority of the Quechans did not participate in Egan’s
Box 3, Indian Jurisdiction Inspection Reports 1907-1924, Inspection Division, Interior Department, RG 48,
NARA II.
7 Fort Yuma Indian School Annual Report, August 17, 1910, Roll 55, M1011, p. 2 and Education
Division—Industries Section.
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farming venture. She chalked this up to the Indians’ “suspicious” nature, which led them
to prefer “holding off until they get the lands that have been promised them.”8 Perhaps
more important, though, was the Quechans’ desire to maintain their traditional farming
practices, even within the context of the significantly altered environmental conditions on
their lands. For example, in 1912, when the Colorado River flooded “sufficiently to cover
all the land left unprotected by the Government levees,” Egan reported, with surprise, that
“[t]he water had no sooner receded than the Indians, women as well as men, were at work
clearing patches for gardens.” She was equally astounded at the Quechans’ harvest:
These gardens for the most part will be planted in the old time,
primitive manner, but the Indians will, nevertheless, reap a
surprisingly large crop of beans, pumpkins, melons, corn etc.,
and they are accordingly happy over the prospect of an old time
Indian harvest. We earnestly hope that their present good fortune
will not deter them from taking an interest in clearing their
allotments this fall, as we hoped they would.9
While some tribal members attempted to maintain their traditional, subsistence-
based farming practices, others began to abandon their centuries-old agricultural efforts
in favor of wage-labor opportunities on the reservation and in nearby Yuma. Lacking
allotments and without access to the traditional farming lands and methods that had so
long sustained them, many Quechans came to rely, increasingly, on wages to support
themselves. On the reservation, this often meant ditch-digging, dam-construction, and
land-leveling efforts on behalf of both the Reclamation Service and the non-Indian
farmers who had purchased farm units on the Indians’ recently opened lands. Off-
reservation, this translated into railroad work, wood-cutting, and domestic service and
other common labor in Yuma. Thus, despite the ostensible goals of the government’s
8 Fort Yuma Indian School Annual Report, August 17, 1910, p. 2; and Fort Yuma Narrative Report,
1911, pp. 10-11; both in Roll 55, M1011.
9 Fort Yuma Narrative Report, 1912, Section IV—Industries, p. 2, Roll 55, M1011.
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overarching irrigation and allotment policies—which sought to transform Indians into
self-sufficient farmers—the early years of the Yuma Project led to a sharp decrease in the
Quechans’ agricultural endeavors.10
Tribal farming efforts were further discouraged by long delays in completing the
canals on the allotted lands within the Fort Yuma Reservation. By any measure, canal
construction on the Indian allotments within the reservation portion of the Yuma Project
lagged far behind the construction activities on the non-Indian lands within the so-called
Bard unit that lay just to the east. While Reclamation engineers had completed the canals
on the “surplus” reservation lands within the Bard unit before their opening in early 1910,
canals remained incomplete on most of the irrigable western portion of the reservation,
even after Indian officials finished allotment field work there in the spring of 1912. This
issue came to a head in May 1913, when more than 125 Quechans petitioned the
secretary of the interior, urging the “immediate completion of the ‘Yuma Project’.” In
making this request, tribal members noted that “almost one half the Reservation under
allotment at the present time is in a condition where water is not obtainable.”11
It appears that the Indians’ petition may have been prompted, at least in part, by a
burgeoning dispute between the Reclamation Service and the Indian Office over unpaid
maintenance charges on the project. Outlining these issues in the spring of 1913, Francis
Sellew, the Reclamation Service’s project engineer at Yuma, claimed that the Indian
Office owed the reclamation fund nearly $80,000 for construction and maintenance
10 Fort Yuma Indian School Annual Report, August 17, 1910, Education Division—Industries Section;
Fort Yuma Narrative Report, 1911, pp. 15-16; and Fort Yuma Narrative Report, 1912, Section IV—
Industries, pp. 1-2; all in Roll 55, M1011.
11 Quechan Tribe to the SOI, May 2, 1913, File: 56339-1913-Fort Yuma-341 [2 of 2], Box 29, Fort
Yuma Agency, CCF 1907-1939, RG 75, NARA I. The Bard unit was named after one-term California
senator, Thomas Bard, who was instrumental in the passage of the 1904 act authorizing the construction of
the Yuma Project and the allotment of Quechan lands.
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activities over the previous three years. Sellew also blamed Indian officials for failing to
provide the Quechans with the appropriate tools and agricultural instruction to render
their farming efforts viable. This, he argued, had led to an extremely limited use of the
allotted lands to which water was then available—Sellew claimed, for example, that the
Indians had cleared only 100 acres by March 1913, while “less than 50 acres [had] been
prepared for crop.” Given this restricted use, he considered it “inadvisable” for his
agency “to spend any more money for the extension of these laterals until tangible
assistance for these people has become an actual fact.”12
Sellew expanded on this discussion later that summer, informing his superiors that
Reclamation engineers had completed canals to 3,200 acres “in the eastern portion” of the
Indian-allotment section by April 1910. Three years later, they expanded this irrigable
area to include another 800 acres, thereby enabling water deliveries to just under half of
the Quechans’ 8,200 acres of allotments. By July 1913, though, Sellew claimed that only
“140 acres [were] being cultivated by the Indians living upon the reservation” and that
farming on the newly extended area was “very slight.” With this information, Sellew’s
supervisors told the Interior Department that it would be “a waste of money” to spend the
roughly “$130,000 necessary to build the rest of the laterals” on the Quechans’ lands.
Moreover, they asserted that the Indian Office should pay the full cost of maintenance on
the entire allotted area—even though construction remained less than half complete—
12 Francis Sellew, Yuma Project Engineer, U.S. Reclamation Service [USRS], Memo, March 21, 1913,
File: 56339-1913-Fort Yuma-341 [2 of 2], Box 29, Fort Yuma Agency, CCF 1907-1939, RG 75, NARA I.
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because the irrigable acreage “standing idle” had created operating expenses “nearly as
large as if the entire area were being irrigated.”13
Commissioner of Indian Affairs Cato Sells vehemently disputed the Reclamation
Service’s position. Discussing Reclamation officials’ hesitancy in completing canals on
the allotted portion of the reservation, he indicated that numerous reports had shown that
the Quechans were “unable to farm their allotments because laterals had not been built to
convey water to them.” Sells then asserted that the 1902 Reclamation Act had specified
that maintenance fees assessed against project lands were not legally “payable until the
Reclamation Service [was] prepared to deliver water upon the land to bear the
assessments.” Since these regulations applied “on all reclamation projects as to land
owned by whites,” the commissioner saw no “just grounds for making any distinction
between such land owners and allotted Indians under the project.” Sells concluded his
letter by stating his belief that the Quechans “ought not to be required to pay maintenance
where a white settler would not be required to pay, that is, where the ditches have not
been built and absolutely no reason exists for paying such maintenance.”14
Sells further argued that the Reclamation Service’s own delays in building ditches
to serve the Quechans’ allotments had stood as the most significant deterrent to Indian
farming efforts. In making this case, he noted that tribal members had petitioned the
Interior Department, urging the completion of the project on their newly allotted lands.
Sells denounced the delayed construction effort on the reservation as a “grave injustice”
to the Indians, asserting that, by their “nature,” the Quechans were “lo[a]th to undertake
13 Sellew to Louis C. Hill, Supervising Engineer, USRS, July 18, 1913; and F.H. Newell, Director,
USRS, to the SOI, February 10, 1914; both in File: 56339-1913-Fort Yuma-341 [2 of 2], Box 29, Fort
Yuma Agency, CCF 1907-1939, RG 75, NARA I.
14 Cato Sells, CIA, to the SOI, December 29, 1913, File: 56339-1913-Fort Yuma-341 [2 of 2], Box 29,
Fort Yuma Agency, CCF 1907-1939, RG 75, NARA I.
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the huge task of clearing, leveling, breaking, and ditching their farms until, in most cases
they have seen water flowing in the ditch by which they expect to irrigate.” While he
considered it probable that “several years” might pass before the Quechans farmed all of
their allotments, Sells deemed it “an absolute certainty that they never will unless the
system [was] completed.” He also lamented that the Indian Office’s “industrial
development” programs on behalf of tribal people could not come to fruition “unless
water can be put on the land.”15
On-the-ground examinations of the Yuma Project in the summer of 1914 revealed
even more substantial problems in those allotted areas where canal construction actually
had occurred. Writing about the results of his investigation, Indian Irrigation Service
Chief Engineer William Reed informed Sells that he found a distinct difference in the
maintenance activities undertaken by Reclamation officials on the Indian portion of the
Yuma Project, as compared to the non-Indian Bard unit lying immediately to the east. In
particular, Reed noted that the ditches built on Quechan lands “showed no signs of
having been properly or even approximating properly cared for,” with the majority
“covered with weeds and brush and in a horrible state for operation.” Conversely, within
the Bard unit, the canals “were in a condition to operate successfully, and they were
patrolled regularly, and the usual methods of ditch riding were followed.” Reed’s
inspection left no doubt that the actual maintenance expenses incurred within the Bard
unit were “much greater than on the Indians’ portion,” even though the assessments
levied against the Indian Office were equal to those on Bard-unit lands.16
15 Ibid.
16 W.M. Reed, Chief Engineer, Indian Irrigation Service, to the Cato Sells, CIA, July 14, 1914, File:
56339-1913-Fort Yuma-341 [2 of 2], Box 29, Fort Yuma Agency, CCF 1907-1939, RG 75, NARA I.
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Even more egregious, however, was the Reclamation Service’s use of inferior
materials on the irrigation structures serving the Quechans’ allotments. In addition to
lower standards of maintenance on the Indian portion of the Yuma Project, Reed’s 1914
investigation showed that the canals in this area were all built “of lumber, and therefore
of short life.” Likewise, he found that the bridges and other project-related structures on
the Indian side—of which there were reportedly “not enough”—did not meet “the general
standard of the Reclamation Service work.” By contrast, Reed’s inspection of the Bard-
unit lands revealed vastly superior conditions. After commenting on his examination of
the short-lived wooden structures used on Quechan allotments, Reed wrote, “When I
crossed on to the white man’s land, I found conditions different. All structures, and
plenty of them, are of concrete.” Exposing the blatant inequity of this situation, Reed
concluded his report by demanding that additional canals on the allotted portion of the
Yuma Project “be completed as soon as possible, and that the material and workmanship
of all structures on the Indian land should be equal to that on the white land.”17
Reclamation Service officials responded to Reed’s report with a series of highly
questionable excuses that did little to address the legitimate issues raised by Reed’s
investigation. Regarding the construction of wooden canals on the Indian portion of the
project, Reclamation engineers claimed that, after building the concrete structures in the
Bard unit, they realized that “bad roads” within the reservation “and other reasons” had
rendered this type of construction far too expensive to continue pursuing. As a means of
reducing costs, they deemed it “more economical to resort to the use of wood on the
Indian portion of the work.” With respect to the differences in the maintenance work
completed by the Reclamation Service on Quechan lands, engineers simply argued that,
17 Ibid.
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because “only a few acres were being cultivated by the Indians it was not economical and
proper for [them] to spend time and money in operating the canals for the purpose of
serving these few acres.” Instead, they claimed that Indian officials and tribal members
had agreed to do the work of cleaning and maintaining the Quechans’ ditches on their
own.18
Reed considered these arguments far less than credible. Responding to the claim
that concrete canals on the Quechans’ allotments were too expensive, Reed maintained
that the costs would “not have been any more, probably not quite as much, to have placed
concrete on the Indians’ property, as it was on the white.” This was particularly true, in
light of the “well known” permanency of concrete and the “temporary” nature of wooden
structures intended for use on irrigation projects. Reed also considered it “strange” that
the Reclamation Service would have altered its policy of building concrete canals “just as
the structural forces came into contact with the Indian [allotments].” With regard to the
differences in the maintenance work completed in the Bard unit and on Quechan lands,
Reed found it equally “strange” that Reclamation officials would charge the same fees
against the Indian lands, when they had devoted the vast majority, if not all, of their work
to the non-Indian side of the project.19
Ultimately, the two agencies resolved their protracted dispute, in December 1914,
by signing an agreement that required the Reclamation Service to complete the canals on
the Indian portion of the Yuma Project “in such sequence as the Indian Bureau shall
require.” The agreement further stipulated that “concrete structures will be employed
instead of wood unless other material is demanded by the Indian Office.” Meanwhile, a
18 Reed to the CIA, August 6, 1914, File: 56339-1913-Fort Yuma-341 [1 of 2], Box 29, Fort Yuma
Agency, CCF 1907-1939, RG 75, NARA I.
19 Ibid.
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board of arbitration would handle the ongoing financial dispute over the assessment of
maintenance charges against the Indian portion of the project. By 1916, Fort Yuma
Agency officials reported that the Reclamation Service had finished constructing
“[p]ractically all” of the ditches on the Indian side of the Yuma Project, allowing tribal
members to begin the work of clearing, leveling, and preparing their own lands for
irrigated cultivation.20
Although the resolution of this long-standing interagency quarrel would finally
bring irrigation to all Quechan lands, this provided little solace to tribal members. Within
the first two decades of the twentieth century, the Quechans had not only witnessed the
rapid dissolution of their centuries-old cultivation and subsistence practices, but also had
waited years for both the allotments and the irrigation system that government officials
had begun promising them in the early 1890s. It took until 1912 for the Indian Office to
divvy up the reservation into individually held allotments, and it took another two years
for tribal members to obtain formal title, in trust, for these lands. By 1914, more than half
of Quechan allotments still lacked access to irrigation from Yuma Project canals.
Moreover, the levee system built by the Reclamation Service in 1907-8 had rendered
traditional farming by the Quechans nearly impossible, except on very limited land areas.
Taken together, these factors played a major role in lessening tribal members’ farming
efforts during the first 10 years after the authorization of the Yuma Project.
To make matters worse, the Indian Office began implementing a new policy on
the reservation, in the mid-1910s, that further discouraged tribal agricultural endeavors.
20 “Memorandum of Agreement between the Reclamation Service and the Indian Bureau for Irrigation
on Yuma Reservation,” December 29, 1914, File: 56339-1913-Fort Yuma-341 [1 of 2], Box 29, Fort Yuma
Agency, CCF 1907-1939, RG 75, NARA I. See also Fort Yuma Narrative Report, 1915, pp. 15, 19; and
Fort Yuma Narrative Report, 1916, p. 18; both in Roll 55, M1011.
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Initiated soon after the passage of the 1887 Dawes Act, the government’s allotment-
leasing program began impacting Quechan lands almost immediately after tribal
members obtained trust patents for their allotments in early 1914. Outlining his proposal
for leasing the tribe’s allotments that February, newly appointed Indian agent Loson Odle
asked the Indian Office to adopt “special regulations” that would allow him to
“arbitrarily” lease the lands of women, children, and older men who were unable to farm
their own lands.  Odle advised against leasing the lands for cash rentals and instead
supported “improvement” leases that, purportedly, were designed to ready the lands for
eventual cultivation by the Indians:
The allotments should be leased for a term not to exceed five
years for improvements only[,] which should consist of clearing,
leveling, and placing in alfalfa all of the land, constructing
necessary ditches, headgates, culverts, flumes, etc., for irrigation,
fencing and such other improvements as the term of the lease
would justify.21
In his 1914 annual report, Odle—who served as the Indian agent at Fort Yuma
until 1925—indicated that he had begun devising plans for leasing Quechan lands upon
receiving notification of the formal approval of their allotments. Within one month of the
Quechans receiving their trust patents, the Indian Office had approved farming leases on
nine allotments within the reservation. By the close of 1914, Odle had secured Interior
Department authority to lease 19 allotments—or, a total of 190 acres. He noted, however,
that additional leases “covering several hundred acres” were then “being prepared or
waiting action of the Department.” Two years into his nascent leasing program, Odle
claimed that he had proceeded with caution in implementing the new policy. In
particular, he told the commissioner that he had not leased any Quechan allotments
21 Loson L. Odle, Superintendent, Fort Yuma Indian School, to the CIA, February 4, 1914, quoted in
Odle to the CIA, December 3, 1914, Box 1, Correspondence 1907-1926, Fort Yuma Agency, RG 75,
NARA-Riverside.
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“where Indians could possibly farm it themselves with profit.” He further suggested that,
as the lessees completed the required improvements on the tribe’s lands, “less [acreage]
will be leased each year.”22
Despite Odle’s assertions, however, non-Indian leasing would come to dominate
the reservation during his tenure as agent at Fort Yuma. As historians have shown, the
Indian Office’s allotment-leasing policy clearly undermined the professed goals of “self-
support and assimilation” championed by allotment supporters of the late-nineteenth and
early-twentieth centuries. For the Quechans on the Fort Yuma Indian Reservation, the
application of this policy was no different. Although Odle claimed that his intentions
were pure and that his actions ultimately would increase Indian farming on the
reservation, the actual results of this policy proved just the opposite. From the time the
Quechans received their trust patents in 1914 throughout the first half of the twentieth
century, allotment leasing, not farming, became one of the primary means of economic
support among tribal members on the reservation.23
This stark reality began to reveal itself as early as 1917, when the Indian Office
expanded Odle’s leasing authority. In November of that year, Odle told his superiors that
he had brought under lease “practically every allotment which can be leased under
present regulations.” However, there were nearly 40 additional allotments that he was
unable to rent out, either because he could not “locate the allottees” or because of their
“refusal” to sign the lease documents. Upon receipt of this information, the Indian Office
empowered Odle to sign leases on behalf of Quechan allottees who were absent from the
22 Fort Yuma Narrative Report, 1914, p. 24; and Fort Yuma Narrative Report, 1916, p. 15; both in Roll
55, M1011. See also E.B. Meritt, Assistant CIA, to the SOI, February 9, 1914, File 5-1 (Part 1): Indian
Office-Fort Yuma-Leases General, Box 1216, CCF 1907-1936, RG 48, NARA II.
23 Janet A. McDonnell, The Dispossession of the American Indian, 1887-1934 (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1991), 43-59; and Bee, Crosscurrents Along the Colorado, 69-72.
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reservation or whom he deemed “recalcitrant.” Moreover, the office lengthened the time
during which Odle had authority to lease Quechan allotments, extending it from five to
10 years. In making this decision, Indian officials stated that the “recalcitrant” Quechans
who refused to sign leases were “incompetent” within the meaning of the law and the
agency’s leasing regulations. These officials also claimed that Odle’s expanded leasing
authority was a “necessary” means of ultimately rendering the allotments “productive.”24
Odle depicted the leasing situation in a similar light, viewing it as a step toward
improving self-sufficiency among the Quechans, as well as inculcating Anglo farming
methods. Writing in his 1917 annual report, Odle indicated that roughly 300 allotments
were under lease, at the expiration of which he expected that “many of the Indians will
farm all of their lands.” He also applauded the growing number of non-Indian lessees
within the Indian portion of the Yuma Project, claiming that their influence not only
modeled modern, market-driven farming techniques for the Indians, but also encouraged
the development of a “better feeling … between the races.” In fact, Odle claimed that,
with the ongoing improvements on the reservation, the Quechans would soon become
“the richest tribe” in California. And, despite the rapid expansion of leasing on the
reservation, he viewed his overarching industrial program as promoting individual
autonomy:
[The Quechans] will really be the richest tribe California has in a
very short time. By this we mean they will have their very
excellent allotments producing in abundance through the efforts
of their own labor which means worlds more than wealth
obtained through oil and other leases of which the owners know
nothing of values, etc.25
24 E.B. Meritt, Assistant CIA, to Loson L. Odle, Superintendent, Fort Yuma School, December 20,
1917, File 5-1 (Part 1): Indian Office-Fort Yuma-Leases General, Box 1216, CCF 1907-1936, RG 48,
NARA II.
25 Fort Yuma Narrative Report, 1917, Roll 55, M1011, p. 16, 19.
96
While Odle and his superiors continued to assert that their leasing policy would
eventually promote tribal agricultural efforts, statistics of on-reservation farming during
the late 1910s and early 1920s told an entirely different story. In 1917, Odle reported that
roughly 3,000 acres were under improvement leases. By 1920, that figure had doubled to
more than 6,200 acres—an area that encompassed some 75 percent of the reservation’s
allotted lands. During the remaining four years Odle was in office, more than half of
Quechan allotments were under lease annually, with leased-acreage figures hovering
between 4,300 and 5,300 acres.26 Odle, though, steadfastly supported the leasing program
throughout his tenure, telling the Indian Office in 1920 that this “progressive” policy had
led to “great progress” among the Quechans. Likewise, in his 1921 report, he told the
commissioner that he doubted whether “any other farming community in the United
States has made greater improvement.”27
Tribal members, however, were not so certain about the purported benefits of
Odle’s leasing program. In the fall of 1928, Patrick Miguel—a graduate of the Carlisle
Indian School and a prominent tribal leader throughout the early twentieth century—
testified before a Senate committee in Riverside, California, that had been sent to the area
in response to the recently published Meriam Report. Discussing the leasing program that
predominated on the Fort Yuma Reservation through the mid-1920s, Miguel indicated
that Odle had forced many Quechans who wanted to farm their own lands to sign leases
instead. In addition, he maintained that the lessees often did not fulfill the terms of their
improvement leases, telling Senate investigators: “Most of the agreements called for
26 Fort Yuma Narrative Report, 1917, pp. 16, 19; and Fort Yuma Statistical Report, 1920, pp. 25, 27-
28; both in Roll 55, M1011. For leasing figures for the 1921-1924 period, see Fort Yuma Statistical
Reports, 1921-24, Roll 56, M1011.
27 Fort Yuma Narrative Report, 1920, Roll 55, M1011, p. 1; and Fort Yuma Narrative Report, 1921,
Roll 56, M1011, p. 2.
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improvements, leaving lands in alfalfa and fencing, and that was not done. And
complaints were made, and nothing done.”28
Miguel noted that these tribal complaints had led to a series of investigations of
leasing issues on the reservation between 1921 and 1924. These inquiries, though, led to
few substantive changes in leasing practices on the reservation. Discussing the results of
these investigations in 1925, Commissioner of Indian Affairs Charles Burke indicated
that they had centered on the close relationship between Odle and E.F. Sanguinetti, a
prominent businessman in the Yuma area who held a large number of leases on the
reservation. In particular, the inspectors sought to determine whether Odle had shown
favoritism to Sanguinetti in leasing Quechan allotments and whether the two had “any
common interest in the proceeds of any of the leases on the reservation.” However, none
of the investigations uncovered sufficient evidence to file charges against Odle. In short,
Burke claimed that all of the leases entered into during the late 1910s and early 1920s
“were made in accordance with regulations approved by the Department.”29
In spite of these findings, the problems associated with allotment leasing on the
reservation led Odle’s successor, Herbert Jolley, to institute reforms that sought to
address these ongoing issues. In particular, Jolley hoped to encourage Indian farming,
and he took a decided stance against the leasing policy that was in effect when he took
office. In his annual report for 1926, he announced a plan to “inaugurate a constructive
industrial program over a period of years with a view of getting a larger number of
28 Senate, Survey of Conditions of the Indians in the United States, Part 2 (Washington: GPO, 1929),
629-633.
29 Charles Burke, CIA, to John Edwards, Assistant SOI, November 27, 1925, File 5-1 (Part 1): Indian
Office-Fort Yuma-Leases General, Box 1216, CCF 1907-1936, RG 48, NARA II. For additional
information about the investigation of leasing activities on the Fort Yuma Reservation during the early
1920s, see Senate, Survey of Conditions of the Indians in the United States, Part 2 (Washington: GPO,
1929), 526-533, 888-909.
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Indians to farm their own allotments and materially reduce the number of leases of
individual allotments.” The following year, he reported a measure of success: leases on
allotted lands had dropped to about 3,400 acres, while the acreage farmed by Indians was
now approaching 3,000 acres. In addition, he reported that all of the remaining leases on
the reservation had been converted to a cash-rental basis, rather than continuing the long-
standing improvement leases that had neither generated economic security for, nor
improved the lands of, tribal members.30
Despite Jolley’s good intentions, however, financial issues in the late 1920s
conspired to further discourage tribal agricultural efforts. Beginning in 1924, the newly
renamed Bureau of Reclamation (BOR)31 began assessing both construction costs and
maintenance fees against individual tribal members for the ongoing operations of the
Yuma Project. Up to that point, congressional appropriations—allocated from the funds
collected through the sale of the reservation’s surplus lands—had covered the charges
made against Indian lands within the project. By the mid-1920s, however, both Odle and
Jolley began warning tribal members that the costs made reimbursable by the 1910
allotment legislation would soon come due.32
Upon learning this, nearly 300 tribal members signed a petition in October 1924,
calling on government officials to halt the collection of these irrigation charges—which
would be set at $75 per year for each allottee. As the petitioners pointed out, these fees
essentially would gobble up any lease earnings they might obtain, since the currently
30 Fort Yuma Narrative Report, 1926, p. 8; and Fort Yuma Statistical Report, 1927, p. 17; both in Roll
56, M1011.
31 The Reclamation Service achieved “bureau” status in 1923 and officially changed its name to the
Bureau of Reclamation [BOR] that year.
32 Fort Yuma Narrative Report, 1922, Sections IV-V, Roll 55, M1011; and Fort Yuma Narrative
Report, 1923, p. 23; and Fort Yuma Narrative Report, 1925, p. 7-8; both in Roll 56, M1011. See also
Senate, Survey of Conditions of the Indians in the United States, Part 17 (Washington: GPO, 1931), 7979-
7983, 8018.
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depressed lease rates in the area equaled only $5 to $10 per acre for each 10-acre
allotment—or a total of $50 to $100 per year. As the petitioners pointed out, the $75
annual irrigation charges were, in some cases, “more than we get for our lands and owing
to the meager sum received we do not feel that we can stand the charges.” Moroever, the
vast majority of allottees lacked sufficient income to obtain “necessary implements and
stock and seed with which to properly till and irrigate” their own lands. Because of this,
they felt “compelled by poverty to resort to the leasing of their holdings to white settlers”
at rates that would net them a mere $25 per year, at best.33
The assessment of irrigation charges against Quechan allotments continued to be
a source of acrimony among tribal members when members of the Senate Indian Affairs
Committee visited their reservation in 1931. For example, in a prepared statement, John
Curran told the committee that relaxing these fees would significantly help struggling
Quechan families. Curran further informed the senators that many tribal people did not
have enough to eat, were unable to find work, lacked farming equipment, and had too
little money to pursue market agriculture. He stated, “[I]f you got enough to go ahead and
work your land it is all right, but when you have not got anything you can not work on
your land. You have got to eat something.” Likewise, Bernard Jackson, an early advocate
of Quechan tribal government, argued that many tribal members, lacking the financial
means required to farm their own lands, had given up their “agricultural pursuit[s] and
return[ed] to meager day wage for existence.”34
33 Yuma Indians to the CIA, October 6, 1924, File: 48603-19-Ft. Yuma-341 pt. 1 (3 of 4 folders), Box
30, Fort Yuma Agency, CCF 1907-39, RG 75, NARA I.
34 Senate, Survey of Conditions of the Indians in the United States, Part 17 (Washington: GPO, 1931),
8021-8023, 8032-8034.
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Although Congress halted irrigation charges against the Indians’ lands in the early
1930s—writing off nearly $850,000 of reimbursable irrigation costs assessed against the
tribe—the threat of these fees, nonetheless, had operated as yet another deterrent to
Indian farming at Fort Yuma. By the mid-1930s, it had been nearly three full decades
since BOR-constructed levees had halted the annual flooding of the Colorado River, and,
in the meantime, many Quechan allottees had become accustomed to finding non-
agriculturally oriented ways of making a living. Indeed, when anthropologists Edward
Castetter and Willis Bell conducted field work on the Fort Yuma Reservation in the late
1930s and early 1940s, they found that the Quechans “prefer not to farm” and, instead,
“choose rather to work at day labor if possible.” They also reported that fewer than one-
in-ten tribal members earned their living, principally, by farming. Statistics of on-
reservation farming from 1932 through 1936 bore this out, indicating that the Quechans
farmed an average of only 1,340 acres per year.35
While government officials were instituting policies that continually discouraged
Quechan agriculture, the Yuma Project itself was producing devastating effects on the
tribe’s once-productive farmlands. As noted above, the annual floods of the Colorado
River were an essential component in maintaining soil fertility during pre-contact times.
Castetter and Bell argued that the heavy silt loads deposited annually by the river were
the sole reason why tribes along the lower Colorado were able to cultivate these bottom
lands for centuries “without exhausting or depleting the fertility of the soil.” Discussing
35 Leavitt Act of July 1, 1932, 47 Stat. 564; Castetter and Bell, Yuman Indian Agriculture, 86-87; and
“Study of Ground Water Conditions, Fort Yuma Indian Reservation,” September 1937, Box 60, Entry 657,
Irrigation Division Reports and Related Records 1891-1946, RG 75, NARA I, p. 9. In 1936, John Collier
indicated that, under the Leavitt Act, the U.S. government cancelled $844,814 of the $1.09 million of
irrigation costs accrued on Indian lands within the Yuma Project to that point. See John Collier, CIA,
“Memorandum for Secretary Ickes,” November 5, 1936, File 5-1 (Part 2): Indian Affairs-Colorado River-
Removal of Indians, CCF 1937-53, RG 48, NARA II.
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the chemical components that encouraged such productive soils, they noted that the river
carried large amounts of nitrogen, potassium, phosphorus, and other “organic matter” that
it deposited, each year, onto the adjacent floodplain. Water samples obtained near the
reservation prior to the construction of the Yuma Project, for example, showed that the
Colorado’s floodwaters carried up to 38 pounds of undissolved nitrogen, as well as
averaging 113 pounds of potassium and 10 pounds of phosphorus each year.36
In 1916, Fort Yuma Agency officials experienced these heavy silt loads first-hand
when a break in the Reclamation Service levee led to the flooding of Quechan allotments.
That year, Superintendent Odle reported that the break in the levee had allowed the
Colorado “to flood the entire irrigable part of the Reservation except about 20 acres,
doing considerable damage.” He was also astounded that the river had deposited “from
four to thirty inches of silt” over the bottom lands, which, he claimed, was now “fertile
but difficult to work.” Prompt efforts to repair the levee, however, restored the Quechans’
lands to their post-reclamation status—which kept them “protected” from the “damage”
of the Colorado’s annual floods. Unfortunately, such protection also deprived reservation
farmlands of the naturally regenerative silt loads that had maintained soil productivity for
centuries before the introduction of dams and levees to the region.37
Irrigation structures, though, were not the only factors that played a role in
decreasing soil fertility on Quechan lands following the completion of the Yuma Project.
Both the introduction of market-based crops and the efforts of lessees to obtain large
yields of high-priced agricultural goods, likewise, gradually sapped essential nutrients
from reservation soils. By the late 1910s, corn, beans, melons, and pumpkins no longer
36 Castetter and Bell, Yuman Indian Agriculture, 12-13. Castetter and Bell also indicated that the river
carried a “considerable” amount of “dissolved nitrogen,” as well as the above-mentioned sediments.
37 Fort Yuma Annual Narrative Report, 1916, Roll 55, M1011, pp. 13-14.
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dominated Quechan fields. Instead, cotton and alfalfa—the former, notoriously harsh on
agricultural lands—had largely displaced these traditional crops. Writing in 1918, an
Interior Department inspector noted that “the cotton industry” on the reservation had
“grown to large proportions” during the previous three years, in response to high cotton
prices during World War I. In 1920, Odle stated that both long- and short-staple cotton
still “h[eld] the greatest attention” of lessees on Quechan allotments, due to the
continuing high prices for the crop. Despite fluctuations in market conditions over time,
cotton remained the predominant crop grown by lessees through the 1920s and 1930s,
occupying an estimated 70 percent of the reservation’s leased acreage in 1941.38
In addition to the replacement of traditional, subsistence-based crops with market-
oriented ones, the encouragement of “intensive” farming techniques by agency officials
led to the further depletion of soil productivity. In his 1920 annual report, Odle remarked
that, through the construction of the Yuma Project, federal officials and the Quechans had
“taken a small portion of the great desert and helped to transform it into what will soon
be known as the greatest agricultural district for the number of acres in the world.” To
expedite this transformation, he urged farmers—white and Indian alike—to adopt “more
intensive methods in farming,” with the goal of “doubling” the average crop-yield on the
reservation. Indeed, Odle viewed the Quechans’ eventual adoption of this type of market-
oriented agriculture as a surefire step toward tribal self-sufficiency.39
38 “Report of E.B. Linnen, Chief Inspector, H.T. Brown, Special Agent, and Walter G. West,
Supervisor, on the Irrigation Project on the Yuma Indian Reservation in the State of California,” March 9,
1918, File: 22349-1918-Ft. Yuma-341, Box 30, Fort Yuma Agency, CCF 1907-39, RG 75, NARA I. See
also: Fort Yuma Annual Narrative Report, 1920, p. 8; and Fort Yuma Annual Statistical Report, 1920, p.
26; both in Roll 55, M1011; Fort Yuma Annual Statistical Reports, 1921-25, Roll 56, M1011; and Castetter
and Bell, Yuman Indian Agriculture, 87.
39 Fort Yuma Annual Narrative Report, 1920, Roll 55, M1011, p. 7; and Fort Yuma Annual Narrative
Report, 1922, Roll 56, M1011.
103
Unfortunately, these so-called “intensive” agricultural methods often meant that
the lessees who dominated reservation farmlands into the 1940s did not implement crop-
rotation techniques and, instead, continued to plant the same crops each year, so long as
prices remained high. The senators who visited with Quechan tribal members in
Riverside in 1928 were aghast to find that agency officials and lessees had failed to
institute appropriate crop-rotation methods on the reservation, especially when planting
crops such as cotton. Senators discussed this issue with tribal member, Lincoln Johnson,
and had this exchange:
Question: [You] Grow about a bale of cotton to the acre don’t
you?
Answer [Lincoln Johnson, Quechan tribal member]: Some places
they get more than a bale …
The Chairman [Senator Lynn Frazier]: You don’t raise cotton
each year though?
Answer: Well, they did on the reservation.
Question [Frazier]: Do you think they should raise cotton each
year? Don’t you think they should rotate; change it?
Answer [Johnson]: I believe it is the best way because the land is
going to be poorer and poorer each year.
Question [Frazier]: In order to keep it up they have to rotate
crops and use fertilizer.40
These senators were well aware of the soil-depleting characteristics of cotton, as
well as the importance of using crop-rotation techniques, since they had discussed these
very issues with Interior Department Inspector Morgan Doyle just before they heard from
Lincoln Johnson. While he did not claim to be a soil scientist, Doyle told the senators that
he had ascertained from “agricultural experts” that cotton “t[ook] a great deal out of the
soil, more than almost any other crop.” Additionally, he learned from these experts that,
40 Senate, Survey of Conditions of the Indians in the United States, Part 2 (Washington: GPO, 1929),
661.
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“if you continue to raise cotton on the land it will be but a very short time when the land
will become impoverished.” Doyle further informed the assembled senators that many of
the leases Odle had approved on Quechan allotments during the 1910s and 1920s were
granted to E.F. Sanguinetti and his associates, whom Doyle claimed were well-known
“cotton growers,” who only wanted “Indian or any land” for growing that crop. Worse
yet, the leases approved by Odle did not require crop-rotation or the application of
fertilizer, nor did they stipulate the cultivation of “anything but cotton.”41
While the shift toward market agriculture—and the continued emphasis on cotton
production—clearly had deleterious effects on the fecundity of reservation farmlands, the
movement away from subsistence-based agriculture also began negatively impacting the
health of individual tribal members during the early 1900s. As early as the late-nineteenth
century, observers had remarked on the Quechan Indians’ fondness for recently
introduced Anglo foods. Writer Eugene Trippel noted in his June 1889 article in
Overland Monthly that tribal members were “inordinately fond of sugar, candy, pies,
cakes, and sweet-meats, which are purchased from the whites.” Although the increasing
availability of goods such as “candy, pies [and] cakes” obviously was not ideal from a
general-nutrition standpoint, the impact of these items came nowhere near the gradual
elimination of subsistence-based crops from the tribe’s farmlands and diets in the early
decades of the twentieth century.42
Indeed, historian Clifford Trafzer has maintained that the movement away from
subsistence agriculture, in the wake of the Yuma Project’s construction, had serious
impacts on the overall health of the Quechan Indians. He argued that, as cotton rapidly
41 Senate, Survey of Conditions of the Indians in the United States, Part 2 (Washington: GPO, 1929),
530-531.
42 Trippel, “The Yuma Indians,” 575.
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displaced the tribe’s traditional crops, “the bodies of Quechan men, women, and children
deteriorated,” due to a rapid decline of necessary nutrients in their diets—nutrients
previously supplied by the corn, beans, melons, and pumpkins grown by tribal farmers.
This lessening of vitamin- and nutrient-rich foods from Quechan diets—coupled with the
widespread introduction of new pathogens and disease strains into the lower Colorado
basin during the late 1800s and early 1900s—led to a general reduction in tribal health.
While Trafzer claimed that diseases like tuberculosis and pneumonia remained the
principal cause of the tribe’s declining health, a lack of nutritious foods also played a key
role in lessening the overall well-being of tribal members.43
Increasingly malnourished, the Quechans became more and more susceptible to
the new diseases introduced to the region by an ever-growing influx of white settlers.
According to Trafzer, the “destruction of [the Quechans’] native foods and cultivated
crops,” in the early 1900s, was one of the primary factors leading to “a high mortality
rate” among tribal members, as inadequate food supplies left them “vulnerable to attacks
by invading bacillus.” The onset and impact of diseases like tuberculosis and pneumonia
became more pronounced among the Quechans, in large part, because of the significant
dietary changes that occurred in the early 1900s. Trafzer, in turn, correlated these
diseases with large-scale population declines on the reservation. By the 1910s and 1920s,
the tribe’s population had dropped to barely 800 people, whereas estimates in the 1880s
and 1890s had placed their numbers between 1,100 and 1,200.44
43 Clifford E. Trafzer, “Invisible Enemies: Ranching, Farming, and Quechan Indian Deaths at the Fort
Yuma Agency, California, 1915-1925,” American Indian Culture and Research Journal 21, no. 3 (1997):
83-95.
44 Trafzer, “Invisible Enemies,” 85-86, 91-95, 106. Eugene Trippel indicated that census counts taken
in 1886 and 1888 found a total of 1,137 and 1,126 Quechans, respectively. See Trippel, “The Yuma
Indians,” 564.
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A lack of sufficient food was a recurring source of concern among the Quechan
witnesses who testified before Senate investigators in the late 1920s and early 1930s.
John Curran, for example, told the committee, in 1931, that many tribal members did not
have enough to eat, making it difficult for them to farm their lands or to look for work.
Three years earlier, Patrick Miguel had emphasized the inadequacy of the food provided
to Quechan children at the reservation boarding school. Miguel indicated that school
officials fed the children “a diet of bread and gravy” for breakfast “every morning of the
year,” while the “beans, flour, rice, and crackers” they received were often “infested with
weevils.” Noting that school officials prepared these foods in an “unclean” kitchen where
“cockroaches, flies, and mice abound,” Miguel claimed, “It is no wonder that the children
are infested with body sores and itch on such a poor diet.” Trafzer’s study backed up such
statements, showing that the influence of dietary changes and disease hit Quechan
children—infants, in particular—especially hard.45
In addition to lowered levels of tribal health, the transition toward market-oriented
agriculture on the Fort Yuma Reservation also had significant impacts on the dynamics of
Quechan families. As anthropologists who have studied the tribe have noted, the tribe’s
traditional, subsistence-based farming activities relied on the coordinated activities of
men, women, children, and additional family members such as aunts, uncles, and
grandparents. Robert Bee indicated that, for traditional Quechan farmers, the “extended
family household was the basic cooperative unit of subsistence,” arguing that these
“composite families” represented “an optimal unit of agricultural exploitation,” in the
pre-reclamation period. Bee further noted that men and women shared in the work of
45 Senate, Survey of Conditions of the Indians in the United States, Part 17 (Washington: GPO, 1931),
8021; Senate, Survey of Conditions of the Indians in the United States, Part 2 (Washington: GPO, 1929),
539; and Trafzer, “Invisible Enemies,” 92-101.
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cultivation, thereby lessening the amount of “heavy individual labor.” Meanwhile,
women and children generally assumed the duties of wild-food gathering—sometimes
accompanied by men, when these excursions lasted beyond one day.46
As more and more Quechan men and women left the once-fertile fields of their
traditional lands for wage work in Yuma, on project canals, or on the nearby railroad, the
long-standing structure of these family units began to unravel. While no detailed studies
have investigated this particular issue, it is reasonable to conclude that the breakdown of
the tribe’s subsistence-oriented agricultural economy had fundamental effects on their
familial and social dynamics. By the early decades of the twentieth century, men and
women no longer worked, side by side, in the fields. And Quechan children, who were
forced to attend reservation boarding schools, became less able to join their parents on
wild-plant gathering expeditions. Trafzer counted these kinds of familial dislocations
among the numerous reasons for the tribe’s declining health during the first half of the
twentieth century. Bee, meanwhile, noted that, although the “nuclear family” was not “a
viable unit in the traditional horticultural economy of the Quechans,” it was well-suited to
the “Anglo lifeways,” to which tribal members had become increasingly adapted.47
By the 1930s, the negative effects of the federal government’s turn-of-the-century
irrigation-and-allotment regime had been clearly demonstrated through a steady reduction
in Quechan agriculture, the deteriorating fertility of reservation fields, and the declining
health of tribal members. However, the construction of the All-American Canal across
46 Bee, “Quechan,” in Handbook of North American Indians, vol. 10, 88-89; Bee, Crosscurrents Along
the Colorado, 4-5; and Castetter and Bell, Yuman Indian Agriculture, 139-144, 179-186.
47 Bee, Crosscurrents Along the Colorado, 78-80; and Trafzer, “Invisible Enemies,” 91-92, 111-112.
Elaborating on his argument about the negative impacts of social and familial dislocation, Trafzer claimed
that, in the early 1900s, the Quechans “faced a cultural and social anomie” that led to “[s]erious social
depression,” which, in turn, rendered them “more susceptible to disease.”
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the reservation’s northern mesa lands in the late 1930s served as a final example of the
immense failure of these policies on Quechan lands. The canal finally brought to fruition
the long-standing dream of private entities like the Colorado River Irrigation Company—
which had hoped to irrigate a vast empire of lands in California’s Imperial valley with
Colorado River waters, diverted entirely upon American soil. With the passage of the
Boulder Canyon Act in 1928, that vision took one step closer to becoming a reality.
However, since the canal had to cross the Quechans’ non-irrigable mesa lands, the Fort
Yuma Reservation, once again, stood as the linchpin to the Imperial valley’s ultimate
development.48
When BOR officials began formalizing plans for the construction of the All-
American Canal in the mid-1930s, a group of more than 200 Quechan tribal members
petitioned the Indian Office, protesting the canal’s construction “without the proper
settlement.” As indicated by Commissioner of Indian Affairs John Collier in May 1935,
the “settlement” sought by the tribe included not only monetary compensation, but also
assurances that BOR engineers would construct “intercepting drains” to prevent seepage
from accumulating on their lands. Moreover, the Quechan petitioners called on the BOR
to pay for any canal-related damages that might occur on their allotments—which were
located in the valley below the proposed line of the All-American Canal—in the event of
the canal’s failure. Finally, the tribe sought rental payments for any power development
undertaken by the BOR within the boundaries of the reservation.49
48 deBuys, Salt Dreams, 159-63. As deBuys points out, the Imperial valley’s often-unpredictable
supply of irrigation water had run through Mexico for the roughly 40 years prior to the All-American
Canal’s construction. Note, too, that the All-American Canal supplied no water to Quechan lands.
49 John Collier, CIA, to Elwood Mead, Commissioner, Bureau of Reclamation [BOR], May 10, 1935,
File 5-1 (Part 2): Indian Affairs-Colorado River-Removal of Indians, CCF 1937-53, RG 48, NARA II.
Additionally, the tribe requested that they share the proceeds from the excavation of any mineral or sand-
and-gravel deposits on their lands.
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In response, however, BOR officials argued that the Quechans did not hold title to
the mesa lands where the canal would be located, thereby rendering their request for a
“proper settlement” moot. Citing an obscure provision of the tribe’s ill-fated agreement
of December 4, 1893, BOR Commissioner Elwood Mead claimed that the area across
which the All-American Canal would be built included only “rough, non-agricultural
land, none of it being susceptible of irrigation.” Since he believed that the tribe had
relinquished title to all of the lands within their reservation, except for the 10-acre
irrigable tracts allotted to them in 1912, Mead asserted that the Quechans had “no
interest” in the area traversed by the line of the canal and that title to these lands was
“vested in the United States.” Owing to this understanding, Mead informed Collier that
the BOR would “continue construction of the All-American Canal” without further
consideration of the Quechans’ settlement demands.50
Despite the Indian Office’s stringent opposition to this reading of the 1893
agreement, a legal opinion issued by Interior Solicitor Nathan Margold in January 1936,
upheld Mead’s view. Adopting a narrow interpretation of the tribe’s more-than-40-year-
old agreement—the provisions of which had not been fulfilled by the Colorado River
Irrigation Company—Margold argued that, although the roughly 30,000 acres of mesa
land within the 1884 boundaries of the Fort Yuma Reservation had not technically
become part of the “public domain,” the Quechans no longer held title or interest in the
lands. Margold’s ruling, thus, disallowed tribal members from receiving compensation
for the construction of the All-American Canal across their reservation. Moreover, the
50 Mead to the CIA, July 15, 1935, File 5-1 (Part 2): Indian Affairs-Colorado River-Removal of
Indians, CCF 1937-53, RG 48, NARA II.
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settlement provisions requested by Quechan petitioners in the spring of 1935 became
legally ineffective.51
As it turned out, though, BOR officials would have been wise to heed the
Quechans’ demands. Not only did the construction of the All-American Canal effectively
deprive tribal members of ownership of roughly two-thirds of their original reservation,
but it also led to the seepage problems that they had feared would occur. By the fall of
1936, Commissioner Collier was receiving reports from Indian irrigation officials
informing him of their concerns that the construction of the All-American Canal would
“greatly aggravate” the already-existing problems of seepage and alkali build-up on the
tribe’s allotments. These officials argued that, “unless adequate drainage facilities are
constructed and maintained,” the canal’s construction would doom Quechan lands “to
complete destruction from rising ground water.” In response, Collier formulated plans to
remove the Quechans to the Colorado River Reservation, noting that the BOR continued
to adopt a more “optimistic view” of the situation and did not plan to build additional
drainage facilities.52
An investigation of the reservation’s ground-water levels conducted by Indian
Irrigation Service [IIS] officials in September 1937 further backed Collier’s arguments.
The report found that the reservation had begun experiencing rising ground-water levels
even before the completion of the All-American Canal, noting that “the water-table stood
within 5 feet of the surface over 18 percent of the Indian area.” Moreover, the study
found that the primary reason why such “a large part” of the Quechans’ lands were “in a
51 Nathan Margold, Solicitor, Interior Department, Opinion M. 28198, January 8, 1936, File 5-1 (Part
2): Indian Affairs-Colorado River-Removal of Indians, CCF 1937-53, RG 48, NARA II.
52 A.L. Wathen, Director of Irrigation, BIA, to John Collier, CIA, October 20, 1936; and Collier,
“Memorandum for Secretary Ickes,” November 5, 1936; both in File 5-1 (Part 2): Indian Affairs-Colorado
River-Removal of Indians, CCF 1937-53, RG 48, NARA II.
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vulnerable position with respect to ground water” was due to the BOR’s failure to build
“adequate drainage facilities” on the Indian portion of the Yuma Project during the initial
construction of the system. IIS officials argued that this problem would only worsen once
the All-American Canal became operative. Although they expected to face “almost
certain controversy” over the canal’s anticipated impact on reservation farmlands, these
officials maintained that, without additional drainage facilities, seepage from the canal
would “water-log a substantial part of the reservation.” If such a system were not built—
at an estimated cost of $140,000—the report recommended serious consideration of
Collier’s proposal to remove the Quechans from their reservation.53
Although the plan to remove the Quechans ultimately did not materialize, the
anticipated seepage and alkali damage on the Fort Yuma Reservation did. In June 1941—
nearly one year after the All-American Canal went into operation—E.C. Fortier, district
engineer for the IIS, reported that these problems had become especially acute on the
Indian allotments within the Yuma Project:
As a result of operation of the All-American Canal and lack of
adequate drainage facilities the ground water situation on the
Indian lands is more serious at this time than at any time in the
history of the project. This situation was serious in 1937 when
we made the last study. It is definitely worse at this time. In the
past 2½ years the ground water underlying Indian lands has risen
an average of 2½ feet in the irrigated area.54
Fortier maintained there was “conclusive proof” that seepage and alkali accumulation
was directly attributable to the operation of the All-American Canal and that these
problems “constitute a real menace to the security of the project.” Perhaps even more
53 “Study of Ground Water Conditions, Fort Yuma Indian Reservation,” September 1937, Box 60,
Entry 657, Irrigation Division Reports and Related Records 1891-1946, RG 75, NARA I, pp. 1-6.
54 E.C. Fortier, District Engineer, Indian Irrigation Service, to A.L. Wathen, Acting Chief Engineer,
Office of Indian Affairs, June 2, 1941, in “Study of Ground Water Conditions, Fort Yuma Indian
Reservation, California, Period of September 1937 to February 1941,” Box 59, Entry 657, Irrigation
Division Reports and Related Records 1891-1946, RG 75, NARA I.
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appalling was Fortier’s realization that the BOR had already built drainage facilities to
address such problems on the non-Indian farmlands within the reservation. Because of
the presence of these drains, ground-water levels within the Bard unit—immediately east
of the Quechans’ allotments—were “appreciably lower than in 1937.” Meanwhile, the
Indians’ lands had uniformly shown “sharp rises in the water table” during that time.55
Even when BOR officials finally began constructing a series of drains to alleviate
the groundwater problems on the Quechan allotments during the early 1940s, IIS officials
doubted the long-term efficacy of these structures. Writing in October 1942, Fortier and
three other Indian Office engineers argued that it was highly unlikely that the drainage
system then under construction on the Indian portion of the project would be “fully
effective” in controlling “future ground-water levels.” Their report also discussed the
extremely low use of the Yuma Project by the Quechans, pointing to the reportedly
“abundant opportunities for work” in Yuma and asserting that the Indians appeared
“entirely satisfied with a wage economy.” In fact, Fortier and his colleagues doubted
whether many Quechans “would take advantage of the opportunity to farm, even if the
lands were prepared for them and funds provided for operation.”56
While this early 1940s report reflected BOR’s ongoing biases against the
Quechans—biases that had defined much of the history of the Yuma Project’s
construction, from the early 1910s forward—it also reflected the larger impacts of
allotment and irrigation on the Indian people who had occupied these lands for centuries.
Despite the efforts of BOR officials to address problems created by the project, they were
55 Ibid.
56 C.H. Gensler, A.L. Walker, E.C. Fortier, and Herbert V. Clotts to the CIA, October 3, 1942, in
Indian Irrigation Service, “Joint Report on Drainage & Economic Conditions, Fort Yuma Indian
Reservation, California,” October 3, 1942, Box 60, Entry 657, Irrigation Division Reports and Related
Records 1891-1946, RG 75, NARA I.
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unable to reverse the more pervasive damage that the federal government’s allotment and
reclamation policies had inflicted on the Quechans’ lives and livelihoods during the
previous half century. By the mid-1900s, these two key components of the assimilationist
agenda had fully transformed a once-agriculturally-oriented tribe into a group of people
who relied largely on wage work and lease rentals for their survival.
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5. CONCLUSION
A half-century before seepage from the All-American Canal inundated the
farmlands of the Fort Yuma Reservation—increasing soil alkalinity and threatening the
viability of the Yuma Project—the Quechan Indians had maintained a livelihood that had
sustained them for at least the previous 300 years. Adopting a multifaceted subsistence
system that relied on cultivated agriculture, the semi-cultivation of wild plants, and
seasonal gathering activities, the Quechans had, since their southward migration to the
junction of the Colorado and Gila rivers sometime in the 1600s, relied, significantly, on
agriculture for their support. Tribal members were well-situated for farming, as they
occupied the fertile floodplain along the banks of the Colorado, near its confluence with
the Gila, in the southeastern corner of present-day California. Using the river’s annual,
silt-laden floods for irrigation and actively managing the bottom lands on which they
resided, each year the Quechans could count on raising abundant crops such as corn,
beans, pumpkins, and melons in the region’s rich soils once floodwaters had receded.
Events that occurred in the latter half of the 1800s challenged the continuation of
these traditional lifeways. The establishment of a military post on tribal lands in the early
1850s—and the subsequent development of transportation networks; the growth of the
nearby town of Yuma, Arizona; and the creation of the Fort Yuma Reservation—placed
increasing demands on the region’s resources, as well as expanding the numbers of white
settlers in the area. By the 1870s and 1880s, the yearly floods of the Colorado, upon
which the Quechans had depended for centuries to fertilize their lands and cultivate their
crops, were becoming less reliable. Moreover, the growing wage-labor opportunities in
Yuma had begun luring some Quechan tribal members away from their fields and into an
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Anglo economy focused more on money than on subsistence farming. The Quechans,
though, were largely able to weather these various storms, adapting their livelihood in
subtle ways that allowed them to maintain their traditional subsistence strategies within
an ever-changing social, political, and environmental landscape.
The dawn of the twentieth century, however, marked the beginning of serious
efforts to implement the two, deeply intertwined federal policies that would permanently
alter the complexion of Indian lands throughout the West, including those of the Quechan
Indians—irrigation and allotment. Situated as they were along the fertile floodplain of
one of the West’s largest and most important rivers, the Quechans became an early target
for policymakers who viewed allotment and irrigation as a means of assimilating tribal
groups into the larger American society. In the arid Southwest, these two overarching
policies went hand in hand. By partitioning tribally held reservation lands into
individually owned allotments and by building large-scale irrigation systems, federal
officials believed they would position Indian people for a prompt movement toward their
overriding Jeffersonian vision of agricultural independence. In short, policymakers
theorized that, through irrigation and allotment, tribes would gradually adopt Euro-
American cultivation practices and, thereby, become self-sustaining, yeoman farmers.
It mattered little to these officials that tribal groups like the Quechans had
supported themselves through agriculture for centuries prior to contact with the Anglos.
Of primary importance to them was that the Quechans’ subsistence-based farming did not
match their idealized conception of individual, market-oriented agriculture. Aligning the
tribe’s agricultural efforts more closely with this vision became the singular focus of both
private irrigation companies and Indian officials during the 1890s and early 1900s.
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Following the colossal failure of private entities to irrigate the Fort Yuma Reservation,
the government ultimately irrigated and allotted the tribe’s lands under the authority of
the 1902 Reclamation Act. The project developed by the Reclamation Service ultimately
envisioned the irrigation of nearly 90,000 acres of land, with fewer than 15,000 included
within the boundaries of the Fort Yuma Reservation and the remainder lying south and
east of Quechan lands, in Arizona.
Because of the closely linked nature of irrigation, allotment, and surplus-land
sales and due to the repayment requirements stipulated in the Reclamation Act, the
inclusion of Quechan lands within the Yuma Project led to the loss of a large amount of
fertile land formerly farmed by tribal members. In effect, the legislation authorizing
allotment and irrigation construction on the Fort Yuma Reservation made project costs
for Indian allotments repayable through the proceeds obtained from surplus-land sales.
By 1909, Yuma Project engineers had finished building both the Laguna Dam—the
principal diversion structure that supplied project canals and prevented the accumulation
of silt therein—and a system of flood-prevention levees along Quechan lands. Within a
year, the Interior Department opened surplus lands within the so-called Bard unit to white
settlers. It would take another four years for Quechan allottees to obtain trust title to their
10-acre, irrigable allotments. All the while, federal officials continued to espouse hopeful
rhetoric regarding the transformative impact of allotment and irrigation on the Quechans.
While the implementation of these two policies certainly was transformative, the
changes wrought by irrigation and allotment on the Fort Yuma Reservation came
nowhere near the lofty and munificent goals of their supporters. For example, despite the
technological know-how of Reclamation Service engineers, officials did little to consider
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the intimate, place-based knowledge that the Quechans had developed through centuries
of farming in this region. As anthropologists later demonstrated, the annual overflow of
the Colorado River—which deposited large amounts of nitrogen-rich silt upon the river’s
floodplain—was essential to maintaining soil fertility and preventing alkali build-up on
reservation bottom lands. The construction of the Laguna Dam and the Yuma Project’s
levee system not only prevented the Quechans from continuing their traditional, flood-
irrigated farming methods, but also contributed to the gradual lessening of soil fertility
along this portion of the lower Colorado.
Government actions in the wake of building the Yuma Project further undermined
the Quechans’ agricultural endeavors, in spite of the ostensible goals of the turn-of-the-
century irrigation and allotment policies. For one, the Reclamation Service’s construction
activities on the Indian portion of the Yuma Project lagged far behind the agency’s efforts
on the farm units of the Quechans’ non-Indian counterparts. While project construction
proceeded quickly on the white-owned surplus lands in the Bard unit and in Arizona, it
took until the mid-1910s for Reclamation officials to complete the canals on Quechan
allotments. Without canals to serve their lands and with project levees preventing them
from farming in their traditional manner, more and more Quechans turned toward wage-
labor opportunities in Yuma, to construction work on the project, and to prospects with
the nearby Southern Pacific Railroad to support themselves.
Another governmental policy associated with the broader allotment regime served
to further discourage Quechan farming efforts, following the construction of the Yuma
Project. Soon after tribal members received trust patents for their allotments, and as
Reclamation Service engineers were finally nearing completion of the canals to Quechan
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lands, officials who oversaw the tribe’s affairs asked for—and quickly received—
permission to lease the newly allotted lands within the reservation. Although this plan
was ostensibly designed to prepare Quechan allotments for eventual cultivation by their
Indian owners, it ultimately encouraged non-Indian lessees to obtain control over the vast
majority of reservation farmlands. Despite efforts to encourage tribal members to farm
their own allotments in the late 1920s, white lessees continued to control a significant
proportion of these lands throughout the 1930s and into the 1940s.
While federal officials were instituting various policies that discouraged Quechan
agriculture, the Yuma Project was having deleterious impacts on the health of both
reservation farmlands and tribal members themselves. In particular, the shift away from
the Quechans’ traditional, subsistence-based crops toward market-oriented ones like
cotton had decidedly negative effects on reservation soils. While halting the Colorado’s
annual floods had deprived Quechan lands of their yearly dose of naturally regenerative
silt, the replacement of corn, beans, pumpkins, and melons in tribal fields with cotton—
which was often planted without the benefit of crop-rotation techniques—contributed to a
steady decrease in soil-fertility levels through the first half of the twentieth century. At
the same time, the substitution of cultivated crops with Anglo foods in Quechan diets
encouraged a rapid decline in tribal health. Coupled with the social dislocations caused
by the Indians’ movement away from traditional agriculture, the alteration of tribal diets
left the Quecahns increasingly susceptible to disease, ill-health, and even death.
Seen in this light, the inundation of reservation farmlands by seepage from the
All-American Canal in the early 1940s simply represented the final occurrence in a long
line of events that had negatively impacted the health and welfare of the Quechan Indians
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and the lands upon which they had subsisted for centuries. While this incident seemed
especially abhorrent—given that both the Quechans and Indian officials had forewarned
irrigation engineers of the seepage-related problems that might occur, and given that the
reservation did not benefit, in any way, from the canal’s construction—the history of the
All-American Canal’s construction was ultimately representative of the broader impacts
of irrigation and allotment on the tribe’s lands. By the time Reclamation officials turned
water into the canal in 1940, very few Quechan allottees were farming their own lands;
the once-fruitful soils of their reservation were becoming decreasingly fertile; and the
bodies of Quechan men, women, and children were reflecting the ill-effects of an entire
generation disconnected from traditional agriculture. In a sense, then, the near-removal of
the tribe to the Colorado River Reservation, in the wake of the canal’s construction, was a
continuation of already-existing themes in the early-twentieth-century history of the
Quechans.
As with many other agriculturally oriented tribes in the West—including the
Tohono O’odham and Pima Indians studied by historians David Rich Lewis and Donald
Pisani— the ultimate impact of the federal government’s irrigation and allotment policies
was reflected, most visibly, in a sharp decline in Indian farming. As Lewis found, by the
latter half of the twentieth century, Indian agriculture had mostly become “a part-time
operation for individuals supporting their families through wage work.” Meanwhile, on
reservations where the government constructed irrigation systems, these projects often
became dominated by non-Indian farmers who “benefited from irrigation systems paid
for by Indian peoples.” The history of the Yuma Project reflects these larger trends in
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Native American history, in that it led both to a steep decline in Quechan agriculture and
in the eventual takeover of an Indian-financed irrigation project by white settlers.1
Coupled with this decline in tribal farming, however, was the gradual degradation
of the lands and the environmental landscape upon which tribes like the Quechans had
supported themselves for centuries. As Richard White found among the tribal groups he
studied—the Choctaws, Pawnees, and Navajos—the devastation of aboriginal lands and
the varied subsistence systems that they supported often ushered in tribal dependency.
Likewise, Lewis argued that the refusal of federal officials “to recognize that in some
cases Indian farming techniques proved better adapted to the reservation environment
than Anglo techniques” meant that “both Indian farmers and the land suffered.” This
widespread suffering, in turn, led to the wholesale transformation of “functional”
subsistence systems into “dysfunctional” ones.2
This process of dismantling once-viable subsistence systems meant different
things to different tribal groups. And it had different ecological, social, and political
ramifications for different Indian nations and the widely varying landscapes they
occupied. The allotment and irrigation policies of the late 1800s and early 1900s clearly
affected tribes that relied, principally, on hunting, fishing, and gathering for their
subsistence far differently than these policies impacted the Quechan Indians of
southeastern California. By studying the impacts of these policies on a range of tribal
groups—and their varied responses thereto—we gain further insight into a highly
important era in Native American history. My hope is that, read together with works such
as Lewis’s Neither Wolf Nor Dog and Pisani’s Water and American Government, this
1 Lewis, Neither Wolf Nor Dog, 169-171.
2 Ibid., 171-173; and White, The Roots of Dependency, xiii-xix, 315-323.
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thesis will help to elucidate both the general and the tribally specific themes present in
this significant period in the history of American Indians.
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